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This thesis examines the notion of Love (Eros) in key texts of the 
Neoplatonic philosophers Plotinus (204/5–270 C.E), Proclus (c.412–485 
C.E.) and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (late 5th-early 6th cent.).  In 
the first chapter I discuss Plotinus’ treatise devoted to Love 
(Enneads,III.5) and I attempt to show the ontological importance of Eros 
within the Plotinian system.  For Plotinus for an entity (say Soul) to 
be/exist is to be erotic, i.e. be directed to the intelligible realm.  Hence, 
one of the conclusions is that Love implies deficiency, and, thus, it 
takes place in a vertical scheme, where an inferior entity has eros for its 
higher progenitor.  
If this is so, then Proclus apparently diverges greatly from Plotinus, 
because in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades Proclus clearly states 
that inferior entities have reversive (/upwards) eros for their superiors, 
whereas the latter have providential (/downwards) eros for their 
inferiors.  Thus, the project of my second chapter is to analyze Proclus’ 
position and show that in fact he does not diverge much from Plotinus; 
the former only explicates something that is already implicit in the 
latter.  The first part of my discussion emphasizes the ethical aspect, 
whereas the second deals with the metaphysical aspect. 
Finally, in the third chapter I examine pseudo-Dionysius’ treatment 
of God as Eros in his work On the Divine Names.  One motivation was 
the verdict of a number of old scholars that the Areopagite is a 
3 
plagiarizer of Proclus.  Still, the examination of Eros is a characteristic 
case, where one can ascertain Dionysius’ similarities and divergences 
from Proclus.  Supported by recent literature, we can suggest that 
Dionysius uses more of a Proclean language (cf. providential and 
reversive eros), rather than Proclean positions, owing to ontological 
presuppositions that differentiate the Neoplatonic philosopher from 
the Church Father.  Proclus forms the bridge between pagan 
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Nowadays many people talk about Platonic Love; in this thesis I 
present how the Neoplatonists understood it.  Given that Eros plays a 
central role in Plato’s thought,1 it is not surprising that the same is true 
for Neoplatonic philosophy.  My treatment attempts to show this 
significance.  I will be focusing on three key figures: Plotinus, the 
acknowledged founder of Neoplatonism, Proclus, a great systematizer 
of Platonic philosophy, and pseudo-Dionysius, who has affinities with 
Neoplatonism even if (in my view at least) he is fundamentally a 
Christian thinker.  By juxtaposing Dionysius the Areopagite with the 
two earlier Neoplatonists, I will be able to explore the question of how 
Platonic love interacted with Christian love and how ancient Greek and 
pagan conceptions of eros survived in the Christian and especially 
Byzantine tradition, of which Dionysius is a cornerstone.   
Love has of course attracted attention not only in contemporary 
systematic philosophy,2 but also in the field of the history of 
philosophy.3  There have been several studies examining love 
                                                          
1 Apart from works to be referred to in the following chapters two classic studies 
about Platonic love are Robin [1933] and Gould [1963], while for more recently see 
Price [1989], pp.1-102 and 207-235.  See also O’Connell [1981], esp. pp.11-17, Halperin 
[1985], Rhodes [2003] and the introductory piece by Κάλφας [2008].  Platonic love is 
related to death by Maraguianou [1990],pp.3-26 and 49-69, and compared to Freud by 
Χριστοδουλίδη-Μαζαράκη [1983] and Santas [1988], as well as Kahn 
[1987],pp.95-102, from a wider perspective. 
2 See for instance the relevant entry and its Bibliography in the online Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP). 
3 See May [2011], Rist [1964], Osborne [1994] and Düsing [2009]. 
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especially in Plotinus,4 but also in Proclus5 and in the pseudo-
Dionysius.6  There have been also some short treatments which make a 
comparison between them.7  However, to my knowledge there do not 
                                                          
4 On the one hand, there are studies which examine specifically Enn.III.5: Wolters 
[1984], Dillon [1969] and Smith [2007]. On the other hand, there are discussions with 
wider scope in Plotinus’ metaphysics: Lacrosse [1994], Pigler [2002], Δαμάσκος [2003] 
and Rist [1964],pp.56-112.  See also Romano [1984], Kelessidou-Galanos 
[1972],pp.98-100 and Ucciani [1998], each of them with more specific focus. 
5 See Τερέζης [2002].  Prof. P. Hoffmann has informed me that the subject of 
D’Andres [2010] is very close to the thematic of my Proclus-chapter.  (This PhD thesis, 
written under the supervision of A. Longo, has private on-line access and I have not 
examined it.)  What is more, M. Martijn has told me that she intends to turn a lecture 
of her entitled “The Demon Lover. Inspired love in Proclus’ In Alc.” (read at the 9th 
ISNS 2011 Conference in Atlanta and at the International Conference “Ἀρχαί: Proclus 
Diadochus of Constantinople and his Abrahamic Interpreters”, Istanbul, Dec. 2012) 
into an article. 
6 See the old study of Horn [1925], Rist [1966] and recently Riggs [2009], comparing 
closely Proclus and ps.-Dionysius in pp.82-87, and Perl [2013].  See also the entries in 
Aertsen [2009],p.193, n.11, and Rist [1999], having modified some of his earlier views.  
7 Armstrong [1961] gives a brief portrait of love in Plato, Plotinus and Proclus 
(including the Neoplatonist Hierocles), as well as Christianity (without specifically 
referring to any Christian author, save for passing mentions of Origen), and my 
approach is similar to his spirit.  On the other hand, Vogel [1963], treats also 
Dionysius and Boethius, but avoids specific references to Plato (at least the Phaedrus), 
while she presents some Hellenistic and Middle Platonic dimensions, too (pp.4-10).  
McGinn [1996] has the scope of both aforementioned papers adding to the list 
engagement with Origen (pp.189 and 195-197) and Thomas Aquinas (pp.204ff.  I am 
afraid though that in n.25,p.198, where Nygren’s procrustean attitude, to be seen, is 
criticized, the criticism against Armstrong [1961],p.113 is unfair.).  Quispel [1979] 
begins with the same grounds as Vogel [1963] (pp.189-195, with some criticism of her 
in p.194), but then he departs to other fields: apart from curious speculations about 
the author and the content of the Fourth Gospel (of love, pp.201-205, which invert 
Nygren’s thesis, as we will see), he stresses Proclus’ indebtedness to the Chaldean 
Oracles for the role of Eros in cosmogony, tracing this back to the Orphic cosmogonies 
(pp.196-201), although he, too, neglects to mention Plato (save for some passing 
mentions of the Symposium in pp.194 and 203), and especially the Phaedrus.  Vogel 
[1981] answered to the challenges of Quispel by elaborating on the topics she had 
touched in [1963], and especially on the ontological position of eros in Proclus’ 
hierarchy (pp.64-69.  This fact explains the loose structure of that paper).  In his 
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exist treatments that present both a detailed discussion of love in each 
of these philosophers and a comparative treatment that can give us a 
basis for understanding how from Plato we can get to, say, Yannaras, a 
contemporary thinker who grounds his philosophy on the Patristic 
notion of Eros.8   
The first chapter discusses a treatise of Plotinus that is devoted to 
Love.  Given the importance ascribed to Love throughout the Enneads, 
various interpreters have been dissatisfied by the discussion Plotinus 
offers in III.5.  However, the critics have neglected the narrower scope 
of the treatise’s exegetical character.  One of Plotinus’ main aims is the 
defense of genuine Platonic love against the interpretations that other 
philosophical circles, e.g. the Gnostics, had given for key Platonic 
passages, such as the myth of the genealogy of Eros in the Symposium 
(203b1-c6).9  Despite its dialectical character, though, III.5 does provide 
                                                                                                                                                                      
condensed presentation of Plato, Plotinus, Proclus and pseudo-Dionysius, 
Beierwaltes [1986] examines primarily the status of Beauty in relation to the Good, 
god and the divine, and secondarily the complement of Eros, while in my treatment I 
do the reverse.  Tornau [2006], too, is concerned with the relation of Beauty to 
Goodness (e.g. p.203), albeit in a lesser degree, while mainly he compares Proclus 
with Plotinus, but only in terms of ascending eros.  Finally, Esposito Buckley [1992] 
gives a comparison only of Dionysius and Plotinus on the issue of God as Eros.  She 
leaves aside Proclus (referring to him only in n.57,p.55 and p.60 with n.64) and with 
regard to Plotinus she focuses on procession (pp.35ff., although we should bear in 
mind that the ‘self-contemplation’ of the One is applied ‘as if’ to it) and his conception 
of the One as Eros, (hence the absence of references to Enn.,III.5, apart from a passing 
ref. to §4 in n.3,p.44).  
8 His seminal work is Yannaras [2007], whose first Modern-Greek version dates back 
to 1970.  See also in my Conclusion. 
9 Cf. Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.408 with n.6.  In ibid.,n.12 (p.410) he rightly criticizes Miller 
[1992],pp.232-234, because, apart from parallels in erotic imagery, she fails to note 
Plotinus’ distance from Gnosticism with regard to the positive value of eros.   
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us with insights into the function of Eros within Plotinus’ system as a 
whole.  My main thesis here will be that eros is identified with 
reversion, because it implies deficiency in need of fulfillment.  For an 
entity (say Soul) to be/exist is to be erotic, i.e. be directed to the 
intelligible realm.  If, then, reversion is necessary for the constitution of 
an entity qua entity, then Plotinus’ entire ontology is erotic. 
The second chapter deals with Proclus’ Commentary on the First 
Alcibiades.  The Alcibiades is not a straightforwardly erotic dialogue.10  
Yet its opening lines give Proclus the occasion to say so many things 
about love that this Commentary11 winds up as the principal source for 
Proclus’ ideas on love.12  With Proclus we have a new association of 
love with procession and/or providence.  In various sections I explain 
how this is the case.  In the first part I examine the ethical aspects, 
whereas in the second I deal more with metaphysics.  Although 
already in the conclusion of the first part I note that Proclus’ divergence 
from Plotinus is much more verbal than substantial, I give the final 
answer of how Proclus can consistently combine ascending (-upwards) 
and descending (-downwards) eros in the second part.  A by-product 
of my overall treatment is that Proclus emerges as an interpreter of 
                                                          
10 Still, it is included in the anthology of Reeve [2006], and Belfiore [2012] devotes her 
first chapter (pp.31-67) to the Alcibiades I, focusing on the relation between love and 
self-knowledge.  See also Dillon [1994],p.390 (and p.391 with n.14). 
11 Its extant part finishes with incomplete comments on Alc. I, 116a3-b1. 
12 Another source, but not treated in the thesis, is within the Essay (IΔ’) of the Republic 
Commentaries, (ibid.,2,28-31), as: «Τί αἰνίττεται ἡ τοῦ Διὸς πρὸς τὴν Ἥραν συνουσία, 
καὶ τίς ὁ τῆς Ἥρας κόσμος, καὶ τίς ὁ τόπος, ἐν ᾧ ἡ συνουσία, καὶ τίς ὁ ἔρως τοῦ 
Διός, καὶ τίς ὁ θεῖος ὕπνος, καὶ ἁπλῶς πάσης ἐκείνης τῆς μυθολογίας ἐξήγησις.»   
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Plato who has affinities with modern scholars, and who should be 
consulted especially in defense of Plato against his modern critics.  On 
the one hand, I show the way in which Proclus could answer to 
Vlastos’ famous accusation that Plato’s erotic theory fails to capture 
genuine concern for others,13 even if I also emphasize the negative 
aspects and limitations of the Proclean lover.  On the other hand, my 
discussion of Proclus’ dependence on Platonic texts can do away with 
A. Nygren’s proposal about Christian influences.14 
Because I do not accept Nygren’s portrayal of (pagan) «ἔρως» and 
(Christian) «ἀγάπη» as two rigid categories that are in absolute 
conflict,15 I also cannot accept the statement that these two are confused 
                                                          
13 See Vlastos [1973] (which is a revised form of a talk given in 1969).  Vlastos 
generated a host of articles and books by other scholars as a response.  Some of them 
have already been referred to in n.1, while others are to be found in ch.2 (:nn.69 and 
70 in chs.2.1.2. and 2.1.3. respectively).  For now, as an example of the criticism 
Vlastos has received see Osborne [1994],pp.223-226 (with n.17 in p.57), whose book 
contains an abundance of pertinent remarks to my project. 
14 See Nygren [1953],p.569.  This is even accepted by Rist [1964],p.214, who however 
criticizes Nygren’s presentation of Proclus’ Platonic (and Plotinian) interpretation in 
ibid.,pp.215-216; cf. also ibid.,p.219 and McGinn [1996],p.198,n.27.  Rist retracted his 
former concession to Nygren already in Rist [1966],p.243; cf. also Rist [1970],p.168 and 
n.37 in p.407. 
15 To be sure, Nygren’s discussion is learned and has some merits, but it is too over-
simplified and driven by an objectionable agenda.  A useful synopsis of Nygren’s 
overall project is given in: Ράμφος [1999],pp.128-134, who criticizes it in ibid.,134-138; 
Rist [1970],pp.156-161, 169, and n.53 in p.408, (especially the two columns of 
pp.160-161), presenting his Platonic and Scriptural counter-arguments in pp.161-173; 
(although Vogel [1981],pp.61-62 talks about the disagreement with Nygren, I am 
afraid she is too harsh with Rist’s approach in ibid.,pp.63-65 and n.28 in pp.77-78); 
Düsing [2009], pp.30-38, who dwells much on Augustine (pp.34-38) and presents a 
Roman-Catholic response (pp.38-40).  Osborne (now Rowett) conceives her whole 
book as a counter-argument against Nygren; see Osborne [1994],p.222; cf. also ibid., 
e.g. pp.3, 5, 6, 10ff. (not always mentioning Nygren by name), 29 (with n.18), 52-55, 
INTRODUCTION 
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in pseudo-Dionysius’ treatment,16 with the further suggestion that ps.-
Dionysius is a plagiarizer of Proclus.  My last chapter, which draws 
mostly on the Divine Names, defies the old suggestion about ps.-
Dionysius’ uncritical reception of Neoplatonism and concludes the 
thesis by showing how the Proclean language can be transformed in 
light of Christianity.  The main difference stems from a different 
conception of ecstasy, which neglects the (upwards or downwards) 
direction.  I have structured the chapter following the metaphysical 
scheme I discussed in the second part of the treatment of Proclus.  I 
show that Dionysius’ system is as erotic as the Proclean, though I 
emphasize the differences between them as well by drawing a contrast 
between the Neoplatonic hero Socrates, an embodied soul, and Christ, 
the incarnated person of the Holy Trinity. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
57, 60-61, 65-66, 69, 71, 76, 85, 164-165 and 221.  Another classic response has been 
given by Armstrong [1961], esp. pp.119-120, (with the complement of Armstrong 
[1964] against W.J. Verdenius’ accusations of egocentricity found in the divine lover 
of the Phaedrus and the Demiurge of the Timaeus).  For a prudent critique from an 
Orthodox Christian point of view see, apart from Ράμφος, Florovsky [1987],pp.20-25, 
taking issue with Nygren’s general stance in many other places: see e.g. ibid.,pp.29; 
120-121 (on St Antony), 145-148 (on St Gregory of Nyssa), and 249-252 (on St John 
Climacus).  Even Vlastos [1973],p.6,n.13, p.20,n.56 and p.30 is critical to Nygren.  An 
interesting criticism of both Socratic-Platonic justice and Christian love as ethical 
conducts has been launched by Williams [2007], although I am afraid that his, like 
Nygren’s, knowledge of versions of Christianity is limited.  The same may be said 
about Συκουτρῆς [1949],pp.230*-246* but for chronological rather than geographical 
reasons.  Still, he includes some excellent observations, e.g. his point (5) in 
ibid.,pp.238*-239*.  Writing almost contemporaneously with Nygren, he gives a brief 
exposition of the differences between “Platonic Love and Christian Agape”, which in 
many places is similar to Nygren’s approach; see e.g. pp.237*-240* and 243*-245*.  
However, he does think that there are similarities between the two phenomena that 
enable one to compare them (cf. pp.232* and 246*). 
16 See Nygren [1953], p.563; cf. also pp.566, 577 and 589. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PLOTINUS AND ENNEADS III.5.[50]: “ON LOVE” 
 
1.1. The ontological status of Soul’s Eros  
1.1.1. Synopsis of III.5 
Plotinus starts his enquiry concerning Eros,1 posing the following 
question: “is it a divinity (god or daimon) or is it an affection of the 
soul?”.2  The formulation of this problem foreshadows the structure of 
the whole treatise; hence, III.5 can be divided into two parts. In the first 
section (§1) Plotinus examines Eros as affection («πάθος») of the 
human soul.  He distinguishes three types: a) a pure («καθαρός») eros 
of Beauty without any connection to bodily affairs.  People having such 
appreciation of the beautiful in the world may, or may not, recollect the 
true intelligible Beauty. b)  Mixed («μικτός») eros is love which 
embodies the veneration of Beauty via sexual affairs, the aim of which 
                                                          
1 The Plotinian text used is by Henry-Schwyzer [1964-1983] (:H-S2), along with the 
“Addenda et Corrigenda” of Henry-Schwyzer [1983],pp.304-325 (:H-S4), and the 
“Corrigenda ad Plotini textum” of Schwyzer [1987] (:H-S5; H-S1 and H-S3 stand for the 
“editio maior” and its “Addenda et…” respectively).  The references to Plotinus’ text 
indicate the numbers: of the Enneads, of the specific treatise, (of the place in the 
chronological order within square-brackets, when needed), of the paragraph and the 
lines (e.g.: III.5.[50].8,16-19).  Concerning English translations of Plotinus’ text, I use 
the Loeb edition of Armstrong [1966-1988], unless otherwise stated.  Specifically for 
Enneads III.5 I cite Wolters’ translation, which accompanies his commentary, in 
Wolters [1984],pp.xxxv-lii. 
2 III.5.1,1-2: «Περὶ ἔρωτος, πότερα θεός τις ἤ δαίμων ἤ πάθος τι τῆς ψυχῆς,…». 
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is the generation of offspring, as a path towards immortality.  It is 
noteworthy that for Plotinus both instances of love are legitimate, 
although pure Love, as more self-sufficient, is ranked higher than the 
mixed.  c) It is the third instance that represents a deviation, since, in 
this category, eros is a desire contrary to nature («παρὰ φύσιν»).3 
The remaining chapters (§§2-9) constitute the second section of the 
treatise, the ‘theology’ of love.  Plotinus has to reconcile two traditions: 
a) the idea that Eros is a god, son and follower of Aphrodite, a view 
found not only in “divine” Plato’s Phaedrus,4 but also in “theologians” 
such as Hesiod. b) The other fundamental text is, of course, the 
Symposium, in which Diotima proclaims the daimonic nature of Eros.  
Plotinus succeeds in combining these two notions by exploiting the 
distinction that Pausanias [sic] makes in the Symposium between 
Heavenly («Οὐρανία») and Common («Πάνδημος») Aphrodite.5  Thus, 
in his interpretation, Eros-god is the offspring of Heavenly Aphrodite, 
i.e. of the Undescended Soul, which is pure and free from the 
interfusion with matter6 (cf. §2), whereas Eros-daimon is descendant of 
the World-Soul, which is represented by Common Aphrodite(cf. §3).  
                                                          
3 Apparently, Plotinus condemns homosexuality and, generally, every expression of 
intemperate sexual desire, which does not aim at the generation of a new entity. 
4 Cf. Plato, Phaedrus,243d9. 
5 Cf. idem, Symposium,180d7-8.  Plotinus does not mention the name «Πάνδημος» 
explicitly, although he had done so in his early treatise VI.9.[9].9,30.  Cf. also 
Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.433. 
6 Hence, in the mythological language Heavenly Aphrodite, daughter of Ouranos, is 
«ἀμήτωρ».  Cf. III.5.2,17. 
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In other words, both of the divine instances of Eros correspond to the 
first section’s legitimate affections of human souls:7 pure and mixed 
eros. 
There is, however, another problem.  The reconciliation of the two 
Platonic versions of love is not yet complete, since Plotinus has to 
account for the different mythical genealogies, too.  Whereas according 
to the tradition expressed in the Phaedrus Eros is son of Aphrodite («ἐξ 
αὐτῆς»),8 in the Symposium he is said to be borne by Poverty’s 
(«Πενία») intercourse with Plenty («Πόρος») on the day of Aphrodite’s 
birth («σὺν αὐτῇ»).9  Hence, from §5 and onwards Plotinus’ comes to 
his main exegetical task.  This part, which deals with the interpretation 
of the Symposium’s myth, forms the second subdivision of the general 
theological section.  In §5 the Neoplatonist rebuts Plutarch’s 
cosmological interpretation of the same myth, although, interestingly 
enough, Plotinus himself had subscribed to a similar cosmological 
allegory in his earlier treatise “On the impassibility of things without 
body”.10  In §6 Plotinus relates Eros’ genealogy with a general survey 
on the nature of daimons.  According to §7 what differentiates Eros 
                                                          
7 What is more, Plotinus mentions the daimonic loves of individual souls in §4. 
8 Cf. ΙΙΙ.5.2,13. 
9 Ibid.; see Symposium,203b1-c6: the famous myth of the genealogy of Eros enunciated 
by Diotima in the early stages of her discussion with Socrates. 
10 Cf. III.6.[26].14,7-18.  Except for a clerical mistake, this is perhaps a reason why 
Συκουτρῆς [1949] in his monumental modern-Greek edition of the Symposium 
(p.199*,n.1) ascribes to Plotinus’ treatise III.5 the view that Eros is equated with the 
(physical) cosmos.   
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from the rest of the daimons is that Eros is the desire for the absolute 
Good, whereas the others crave partial goods.11  So, after an 
explanation of Eros’ insatiability due to his parents’ traits, in §8 
Plotinus figures out what ‘Zeus’ stands for in the myth, and in the first 
half of the concluding §9 the Neoplatonist elaborates on the identity of 
Poros with other elements of the myth.  Finally, after some succinct, but 
crucial, methodological remarks on the interpretation of myths (and 
rational discourses), Plotinus gives us a synopsis of his interpretation, 
according to which the different mythical elements (e.g. Poros and 
Penia) are reduced to aspects of Soul.  In that way, Plotinus completes 
his survey by showing the continuity of the aforementioned two parts 
of his erotic theology: as in the first part Soul was said to be Eros’ 
mother, so too in the second one, since Penia, as well as Poros represent 
Soul.   
 
1.1.2. The main issue 
As can be seen from the above brief account of III.5, this treatise 
raises a host of interesting subjects which have preoccupied the 
commentators.  The vindication of sexual love, the complicated 
psychology depicted in the two Aphrodites, Plotinus’ version of 
‘daimonology’ and, most importantly, his attitude towards the 
interpretation of myths are only some aspects that deserve the reader’s 
                                                          
11 Further, these distinctions account for the specific desires that human beings 
develop. 
CHAPTER 1:  PLOTINUS AND ENNEADS III.5.[50]: “ON LOVE” 
17 
attention.  I would like, however, to focus on the most crucial issue that 
arises from this tractate, namely the question of the ontological status 
of Eros, as depicted in the ‘theological’ part of the treatise.  In §2 
Plotinus states that (Heavenly) Aphrodite’s, i.e. Soul’s, intellectual 
activity towards her progenitor, Nous,12 produced «ὑπόστασιν καὶ 
οὐσίαν»,13 which is none other than “the beautiful Eros, he who is born 
as an ὑπόστασις that is eternally set towards Another that is 
beautiful”.14  Ascribing «ὑπόστασιν» and/or «οὐσίαν» to Eros is 
something frequently met in both parts of the theological section.15  
This fact seems to suggest that Plotinus sees Eros as an entity in its own 
right, which despite being dependent upon Soul as source of its 
existence, is external to Soul, just as Soul is generated but still different 
                                                          
12 Usually, the mythical equivalents for Plotinus’ system of three Hypostases are the 
gods of the Hesiodic Theogony: Ouranos (-One), Kronos (-Intellect), Zeus (-Soul).  Yet, 
according to the interpretative strand followed in this treatise, Aphrodite, not Zeus, 
stands for Soul.  Hence, there is a complication as to Aphrodite’s superior principle, 
since, according to Hesiod, Aphrodite sprung from the foam of Ouranos’, not 
Kronos’, mutilated genitals.  Granted that for Plotinus Soul’s superior principle is 
undoubtedly Nous, in ΙΙΙ.5.2,33-34 he concedes that for the purposes of his enquiry 
either Kronos or Ouranos can be conceived as Aphrodite-Soul’s progenitor.  Proclus 
solved the aforementioned problem in his own way in the Commentary on the 
Cratylus,183,(1-54) and 110,5-111,16 (Pasquali).   
13
 Cf. III.5.2,36.  (Armstrong translates “real substance”; Wolters: “Existence or 
Substance”.)  
14 Ibid.,§2,37-38: «ὁ καλὸς Ἔρως ὁ γεγενημένος ὑπόστασις (Existence with Wolters) 
πρὸς ἄλλο καλὸν ἀεὶ τεταγμένη».  [Every emphasis in the ancient Greek texts is 
mine.] 
15 Apart from the references to come, see ibid.,§3,15 («…ὑπόστασιν ἔχει» sc. ὁ Ἔρως); 
§4,2 (ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει)  and 3 (ὑποστατὸν ἔρωτα); §7,9 (ὑπόστασιν), 42 (ἐν 
οὐσίᾳ) and 43 (ὑποστάσεις οὐσιώδεις); §9,40 (ὑπέστη).  Cf. also §9,42, where Eros is 
called «μικτόν τι χρῆμα».  In §9,20 «ὑπόστασις» is ascribed to λόγος.   
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to Intellect (Nous).  Further, Plotinus ascribes these very substantives to 
Heavenly Aphrodite-Soul itself, calling her “a kind of separate 
ὑπόστασιν, that is οὐσίαν not participating in matter”.16  Thus, since 
Heavenly Aphrodite stands for the proper “Hypostasis” of 
Undescended Soul, it seems that Plotinus suggests that its offspring is 
itself a Hypostasis, although a degraded one, just as Soul, being an 
offspring of Nous, is an “ousia”, albeit inferior to Nous’ «ὄντως 
ὄντα».17  Indeed, in §3 Plotinus writes: “That Eros is an Ὑπόστασιν, 
however – οὐσίαν sprung ἐξ οὐσίας – there is no reason to doubt.  It 
may be inferior to the one that produced it, but οὖσαν nevertheless”.18  
Finally, in the following lines he compares Eros’ generation with Soul’s 
emanation from Nous.19 
                                                          
16
 Ibid.,§2,ll.23-24: «χωριστὴν οὖσάν τινα ὑπόστασιν (Existence) καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης 
οὐσίαν (substance)».  (Armstrong renders «τινα ὑπόστασιν» as “separate reality”.)  
Cf. also ibid.,§9,23 («ἡ Ἀφροδίτη ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑποστῆναι λέγεται») and §9,30 
(ψυχὴ… παρὰ νοῦ ὑποστᾶσα). 
17 It is a fundamental Plotinian tenet that Nous is the world of Forms. 
18 III.5.3,1-2: «Ὑπόστασιν (Existence) δὲ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν (Substance) ἐξ οὐσίας (from 
Substance) ἐλάττω μὲν τῆς ποιησαμένης, οὖσαν δὲ ὅμως (but it exists nevertheless), 
ἀπιστεῖν οὐ προσήκει».  The «ἐξ οὐσίας» may refer to Aphrodite-Soul, but there is 
an alternative: Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.428 ad loc. ingeniously proposes Nous.  His 
interpretation has the merit of a) breaking the analogy with Soul’s emanation of Nous 
that suggests ‘hypostatization’, and b) the fact that ‘ousia’ does sound like Nous.  
Although this view could be helpful for the interpretation I will put forward, it might 
also complicate things: even from this point of view Eros seems to remain external to 
Soul, although it ‘emanates’ not from Soul but from Nous, something that is even 
more difficult to explain in terms of Plotinus’ system.   
19 See ibid.,§3,3-5.  (Wolters’ translation needs to be emended in view of Igal’s 
addition of <ζῶσα> adopted by H-S5.)  That Plotinus refers to two Aphrodites, a 
goddess and a daimonic one, complicates the story even more, but I want to refrain 
from further confusion. 
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Do these straightforward statements suggest “the emergence of 
Eros as a separate Hypostasis”20 and the “the incipient break-up of the 
‘traditional’ Plotinian system of hypostases into something more 
elaborate and scholastic”, as some commentators have suggested?21  If 
so, we would seem to be faced by two serious difficulties: a) Plotinus 
does not seem to embrace such a “more elaborate” view of reality in his 
remaining four treatises, written after III.5; b) in previous treatises, 
Plotinus has ardently condemned any attempt to introduce more 
entities outside the austere “numerus clausus” of the three Principal 
Hypostases, i.e. One, Nous, Soul.22  A relatively easy way out of this 
problem is to emphasize, with many commentators, that, although 
Plotinus uses in his writings the term “hypostasis”, it never has the 
technical meaning that was ascribed to it by Porphyry, when the latter 
was giving the titles to Plotinus’ treatises.23  Hence, when the term 
                                                          
20 Dillon [1969],p.42.  Dillon adds “the emergence… indeed of Logos as another [sc. 
separate hypostasis]” (p.42; cf.ibid.,p.40).   
21 Ibid.,p.43. 
22 See Plotinus’ anti-Gnostic polemic: II.9.[33].1,12-16;30-33;57-63.  Cf. also Lacrosse 
[1994],pp.124-125.  NB that in III.5 Plotinus most probably tries to rebut other overly 
ascetical interpretations of Platonic myths, put forward by various Gnostic sects.  Cf. 
Καλλιγᾶς [2004],pp.407-410.  We have already seen that in §1 Plotinus tries to defend 
the sexual desire as a legitimate kind of appreciating the beautiful, contra to Gnostic 
outright condemnations of everything pertaining to our sensible world.  The same 
can be said about the Symposium-myth.   
23 Cf. Kαλλιγᾶς [1998],p.146 (:comment on I.8.3,20), Dörrie [1976],p.45, Wolters 
[1984],pp.27 and 247, Hadot [1990],pp.24-25, Lacrosse [1994],p.124, Δαμάσκος 
[2003],p.212,n.112 and p.213,n.120.  Ιf we want to do justice to Porphyry though, he 
does not use the term unqualifiedly in the titles.  Enneads V.1 is entitled: «Περὶ τῶν 
τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων» (“On the three primary hypostases”, «ἀρχή» being a 
term usually used by Plotinus to denote his principal hypostases -cf. Wolters,ibid.); 
V.3: “On the knowing hypostases and that which is beyond”.  See also Καλλιγᾶς 
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«ὑπόστασις» is used by Plotinus, it does not denote any of his three 
principles («ἀρχαί»), but merely “existence”, i.e. something that 
exists.24  Αn equivalent story could be said about «οὐσία».  Strictly 
speaking it applies to the realm of «ὄντως ὄντα», i.e. the world of 
Forms.  However, Plotinus can speak qualifiedly about an ‘ousia’ in the 
physical world, as a degradation of the ‘noetic ousia’.25  In this flexible 
use, ‘ousia’ can have an equivalent meaning to hypostasis.26 
Still, although this response saves us from the insertion of more 
Principal Hypostases in the Plotinian system, it leaves Eros as a 
substantial entity27 which is distinct from and external to Soul.28  I think 
                                                                                                                                                                      
[2013],pp.221-222 (: comment on the title of V.1.); in p.221 he stresses an additional 
sense of the word (: ‘being a product’).  In a paper I attended at the ISNS-2012 Xth 
Conference (in Cagliari), Ilaria Ramelli, “The Philosophical Roots and Impact of 
Origen’s Notion of Hypostasis”, suggested that Porphyry was influenced by Origen, 
the church-father. 
24 See Wolters’ already cited translations.  Dillon,p.40 seems to be aware of this 
modification and in n.16,p.44 he refers to the above-mentioned §1 of Enn.,II.9. 
25 See also the notion of «λόγοι» found e.g. in III.8,§§2-3 and 7-8.  
26 See also Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, 7.1.22,1-23,6 (De Lacy), esp.§23,6 
(:«ἀκουόντων ἡμῶν τοῦ τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόματος, ὅπερ ἐστὶν οἷον ὕπαρξις.»), cited by 
Chiaradonna [2009],p.64 and n.92.  For another Plotinian example where the 
compound of «ὑπόστασις and οὐσία» clearly suggests ‘existence’ in its context see 
VI.4.9,24-25: «Ἡ γὰρ δύναμις ἐκεῖ [sc. in the true All] ὑπόστασις καὶ οὐσία…».  For 
another use of “ousia” that denotes only the nature of a thing –in that case: time-, see 
III.7.13,23 (with Armstrong’s trnsl.: “essential nature”). 
27 Moreover, it ascribes desire to what is the personification of desire.   
28 Hence, Δαμάσκος [2003],p.306, referring to Plotinus’ innovations against the 
Platonic interpretation of the Symposium myth, states that “[i]n the Plotinian 
treatment, Eros arises as a separate entity [/hypostasis: «ὑπόσταση»], in the sense that 
it is something [:κάτι]…”.  [Every translation from Modern-Greek is mine.]  He 
makes this statement although elsewhere he emphasizes that we cannot speak about 
a new “hypostasis” in the narrower-technical sense of the term.  (Cf. supra,n.23, 
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on the contrary that a closer reading of III.5 gets us further than that, in 
making Eros internal to Soul.  I am going to argue that eros is the 
activity that constitutes Soul as a proper entity.  In another formulation, 
eros is Soul itself, seen from the perspective of its upwards orientation.  
I will defend my proposal by drawing on representative passages from 
both theological sections of III.5, but in an inverse order, starting from 
the end, as Plotinus would urge us to do. 
 
1.1.3. Eros and myth  
The first passage that will concern us is in §9, the final synopsis of 
Plotinus’ interpretation of the Symposium-myth.  To this Plotinus 
applies the hermeneutical principles he has laid down earlier in the 
same chapter, hence I need to begin with them:29   
“Now myths, if they really are such, must do two things: 
split up temporally the things they refer to, and divide from 
one another many of the Entities’ aspects which, while 
existing as a unity, are yet distinct as regards rank and 
functions.  After all, even reasoned discourses, like myths, on 
the one hand assume ‘births’ of things which are 
unbegotten,30 and, on the other, divide things which exist as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
where I refer to Δαμάσκος,pp.212 and 213,nn.112 and 120; cf. also ibid.,p.177,n.10, 
where he cites a passage by V. Cilento.)  In these assertions Δαμάσκος faithfully 
follows Dillon’s aforementioned conclusions (in their moderate sense), especially if 
one considers Δαμάσκος’ whole statement:  “…Eros arises as a separate entity…, and 
Logos [sc. arises] as another entity.”  Cf. also Vogel [1963],p.23 (but contrast p.24). 
29 III.5.9,24-29.  See also Brisson [2004],pp.74-75 and 80. 
30 Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.451, seeing an allusion to the Timaeus’ problem concerning the 
eternity of the world, follows the minority of the MSS’ printing «ἀγενήτων» with one 
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a unity.  When the myths have fulfilled their didactic 
function to the best of their ability, they make it possible for 
the perceptive learner to come to a re-integration.”31 
According to our Neoplatonist, two elements are present in the 
interpretative process.  The first one is that of “διαιρεῖν/διαίρεσις”,32 
and has two aspects: a temporal and a systematic.  That is, myth and 
rational discourse describe in a linear-temporal fashion realities that 
are atemporal and eternal.  In fact, division into temporal parts denotes 
onto-logical relations.  This is also what the second aspect tries to 
elucidate by discriminating things that are not in fact distinct from each 
other.  Such distinctions help discursive thought to see the same reality 
from different points of view.  The hermeneutical approach is 
completed by the act of “συναιρεῖν/συναίρεσις”:33  what the mytho-
logical narrations have split in terms of time and structure, the 
‘synairetic’ act of the philosopher-interpreter comes to re-unify, so that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‘ν’.  NB that all over the treatise Eros is said to be born (γενητός) from Aphrodite or 
Penia, and the very last word of the treatise is «γεγενημένος», although the spelling 
with two “νν” is also present, e.g. in. §5,3-4: «γεγεννημένος».  According to 
Liddell-Scott-Jones [1940] (henceforth LSJ), the verb «γεννάω» (beget) is the causal of 
«γίγνομαι» (: to be born/produced/come to pass), whose cognates are written with 
one ‘ν’.  Hence, Wolters,p.30, remarks that, as the critical apparatus of our treatise 
attests, the confusion between the right spelling of their cognates is reasonable.   
31 «Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἔσονται, καὶ μερίζειν χρόνοις ἃ λέγουσι, καὶ 
διαιρεῖν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων ὁμοῦ μὲν ὄντα, τάξει δὲ ἢ δυνάμεσι 
διεστῶτα, ὅπου καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ἀγεννήτων ποιοῦσι, καὶ τὰ ὁμοῦ 
ὄντα καὶ αὐτοὶ διαιροῦσι, καὶ διδάξαντες ὡς δύνανται τῷ νοήσαντι ἤδη 
συγχωροῦσι συναιρεῖν.» 
32 I.e. pulling apart/disassociating/dividing/decomposing/disintegrating. 
33 I.e. pulling together/associating/(re)composing/contracting/synthesizing/re-
integrating. 
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we can contemplate the depicted reality in its genuine, pure and 
complete state, i.e. as a part of the non-discursive, atemporal realm of 
ὄντως ὄντα, the kingdom of Nous.34  In other words, mythical 
allegories and philosophical illustrations come to life in the stage of 
«διαίρεσις».  These narrations analyze a unified reality into various 
kinds of parts, and take place “for the sake of exposition (/teaching) 
and clarity”.35  Still, since every allegory calls for de-allegorization, the 
crucial hermeneutical step is that of the second level of interpretation, 
«συναίρεσις», where the philosophical mind brings the separated 
elements into their primary unity again.36  Take as an example the issue 
of Timaeus’ cosmogony.37  In Plato’s ‘diairesis’ which depicts the 
ordering of the cosmos taking place in time, due to a Demiurge who 
                                                          
34 For Nous’ unity see in III.5.9,3: «Τὸ γὰρ ἐν νῷ συνεσπειραμένον,…» (“For that 
which is in Intellect is contracted together,…”; Armstrong’s trnsl.), with Armstrong’s 
n.1 ad loc.,p.198 (vol.III), and the references of Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.451. 
35 IV.3.9,14-15: “…διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ σαφοῦς χάριν…” [my translation].  See also 
the following lines,ibid,18-20: “…in discussing these things [e.g. the ordering of 
matter by soul] one can consider them apart from each other.  [When one is reasoning 
about] any kind of composition, it is always legitimate to analyse it in thought into its 
parts.  (“ἐπινοῆσαι ταῦτα χωρίζοντας αὐτὰ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τῷ λόγῳ οἷον τε.  ἔξεστι 
γὰρ ἀναλύειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ πᾶσαν σύνθεσιν.”  [Armstrong’s trnsl.].  Cf. 
also VI.7.35,28-29:  “ὁ δὲ λόγος διδάσκων γινόμενα ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ [sc. Nous] ἔχει τὸ 
νοεῖν ἀεί,…”.  In this last case the succinct methodological remark is preceded by a 
reference to Poros’ drunkenness (“μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος”), i.e. a familiar to us 
reference to the Symposium myth (203b5) present in Enn.,III.5, but this time with 
reference to Nous’ relation to the One, expressed in the formula “νοῦς ἐρῶν”; cf. 
VI.7.35,24-27.   
36 In another paper (work in progress) I examine the issue of Plotinus’ methodological 
remarks in greater length and present a more detailed story about how they relate 
with the form and content of III.5 and in which Platonic texts Plotinus founds this 
approach. 
37 Cf. also Pépin [1976],p.504. 
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contemplates the Forms, Plotinus responds ‘synairetically’: the function 
of the Demiurge (efficient cause) is to be contracted/identified with that 
of the Forms (formal cause), while this procedure is eternal; that the 
cosmos has a beginning in time means only that it depends 
ontologically upon its intelligible pattern. 
Let us see now Plotinus’ application of this methodology in the 
synopsis of his mythical exegesis.38  He synairetically reduces to aspects 
of the soul all the different elements that the myth has depicted as 
separated, since in the myth the events of Eros’ conception take place 
contemporaneously with Aphrodite’s birth.  From this point of view, 
Πενία comes to represent Soul’s indefiniteness, a kind of psychic 
substrate, before it is informed by the emanated λόγοι from Nous.  In 
an analogous way intelligible matter reverts upon the One, and 
becomes proper Nous,39 who has been identified with Zeus in §8, 
contrary to Plotinus’ standard identification of it with Kronos.  These 
emanated λόγοι/rational principles are ‘extended unfoldings’ of the 
Forms, i.e. the Forms discursively perceived by Soul, which in their 
subsequent degradation at the level of Nature, Soul’s lowest part, are 
going to form the physical world.  Πόρος represents these logoi, in so 
far as Plotinus calls him also a λόγος (in the singular),40 which stands 
for the totality of logoi that fulfill Soul.  In other words, Poros is soul’s 
                                                          
38 See III.5.9,30ff. and an exposition in Pépin [1976],pp.192-198, although I do not 
accept the negative part of his assessment of Plotinus’ practice in ibid.,p.197. 
39 Cf. e.g. III.9.5,(1-3): “The soul itself… is matter (ὕλην) in relation to intellect”. 
40 See III.5.9,1. 
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discursive apprehension of Nous.  Now, before Penia and Poros are 
reduced to aspects of Soul, Plotinus has already associated other key-
features of the myth with the main protagonists.  So, Zeus’ garden is 
identified by Plotinus with the “adornments” (κοσμήματα)41 that are in 
the garden, and it is these adornments that form a single representation 
of Πόρος’ plenitude.  Furthermore, this plenitude is manifested more 
properly in Poros’ drunkenness with nectar, which overflows from 
Nous’ satiety.  Thus, we are presented with many subsequent and 
gradual levels of contraction, before we come to the final identification 
of Πόρος and Πενία as two (constituting) characteristics of Soul: to the 
extent that Soul has a desire for the good, this represents its ‘Poros-
aspect’;42 yet in so far as it desires, it falls short of the good,43 “because 
desire goes with being needy”,44 and this is its ‘Penia-aspect’.  In this 
sense Eros becomes again directly dependent on Soul, as his 
progenitor.  But is this the end of the synairetic procedure?   
We still have to see what Plotinus says about Eros, but before that I 
want to elaborate a bit further on each partner of the Poros-Penia pair.  
I begin from the top with Logos, who in §9 is called “νοῦ γέννημα καὶ 
ὑπόστασις μετὰ νοῦν».45  When formulating the problem of Eros’ 
                                                          
41 Ibid.,§9,14.  See the context of ll.8-14, where other synonyms for κοσμήματα are: 
«καλλωπίσματα» (“showpieces”), ἀγλαΐσματα (glories), ἀγάλματα (images). 
42 See also ibid.,§9,44-45. 
43 Cf. ibid.,§9,56-57: «… ἐκ ψυχῆς, καθόσον ἐλλείπει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἐφίεται δέ,…». 
44 Ibid.,l.49: «ὅτι ἀεὶ ἡ ἔφεσις ἐνδεοῦς».  An exploration of Plotinus’ vocabulary of 
(erotic) desire is offered by Arnou [1967],pp.59-64. 
45 III.5.9,19-20.   
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ontological status, I omitted to mention that this question might arise 
for Poros, i.e. Logos, too, which is ascribed a “hypostasis”,46 like Eros.  
Of course, we have just seen that Poros is reduced to an aspect of Soul, 
representing Soul’s discursive apprehension of Nous’ Forms.  In this 
way the ‘reality’ of Logos is not denied, but is internalized, as a part of 
Soul’s existence, in a way that paves the path for Eros’ internalization 
and synairesis with Soul that is to come.47   
I turn to the bottom both in terms of ontological structure, because 
Penia is lower than Poros-logos, and in terms of narrative structure, 
since Plotinus chooses to conclude his treatise, and more specifically 
the Symposium-myth exegesis, not with the polarity of Soul’s Poros and 
Penia, but solely with its feminine member.  Let us see, then, what 
remained for Plotinus to state about Penia, in order to extol its 
importance: “Its [sc. Eros’] mother is Penia, because desire goes with 
                                                          
46 Sole occurrence within III.5, whereas the conjunction of “hypostasis and ousia”, so 
strongly put forwards in the first part of the theology of Eros, never appears with 
respect to logos. 
47 Dillon [1969],p.40, is once more vacillating between a diairetic and a synairetic 
reading when he states with respect to Logos that it “is being made in some way an 
hypostasis between Nous and Soul.  It cannot be regarded as any hypostasis in the 
same way as the basic three… but it is being accorded Real Existence, as was Eros, 
child of Aphrodite Urania.”  Dillon’s general stance is that these ‘innovative’ 
Plotinian theses foreshadow the elaborations of the hierarchical scheme of reality in 
the later Neoplatonists, notably Iamblichus and Proclus (cf. e.g. p.24 and passim.).  
Such an ‘anticipating’ attitude is criticized by Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.426, as having 
misled Dillon.  See also the fair criticism of Δαμάσκος [2003],p.269 (and cf. 
ibid.,pp.268 and 270), against Dillon’s far-fetched interpretation (cf. Dillon,p.40) of 
Poros as a kind of Nous’ ‘part’, which receives Logos instantiated by the ‘nectar’, and 
which, then, is ‘participated’ by Soul-Penia, all this conceived by Dillon as 
foreshadowing Iamblichus’ doctrine of «μετεχόμενος νοῦς».  After all, what we want 
to find is a coherent view in Plotinus not just an anticipation of Iamblichus. 
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being needy.”48 This assertion is familiar from above.  But whereas in 
the treatise’s context the maxim “desire goes with being needy” refers 
to Eros from a certain point of view, we have already seen Plotinus 
ascribing desire, and hence ‘need’ to Soul.  It is actually Soul that is in 
need and, thus, produces the activity towards the good, which is Eros, 
as we will see shortly.  Hence, Penia is Soul both before its reversion 
towards Nous and after its self-constitution: the fact that it cannot 
become the Good, but only good-like makes it remain forever an erotic 
entity.49  Further, I have already noted the relational sense of Penia and 
of its correspondent, ‘matter’.  They can denote a relational 
indefiniteness; thus, when Plotinus states that “Penia is Matter, because 
matter is completely needy”,50 this need not refer to prime matter, 
although Plotinus is categorical about the ‘complete poverty’.  That he 
need not mean prime matter follows immediately from his next phrase, 
where he speaks about the “indetermination of the desire for the 
good”.51  As he had formerly stressed, “that which is utterly without 
part in the good would never seek the good”,52 and this is indeed prime 
matter.  But, since in our case Penia has the possibility of reversion in 
                                                          
48 III.5.9,48-49, cited partly above (in n.44).  The fundamental idea in that eros implies 
deficiency is initially introduced in Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium (e.g. 
191a5-6 and d3-5).  See also Mortley [1980],pp.45 and 49. 
49 See infra,ch.1.3. 
50 III.5.9,49-50: «ὕλη δὲ ἡ Πενία, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐνδεὴς τὰ πάντα». 
51 Ibid.,§9,50-51: «τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμίας». 
52 Ibid,ll.44-45: «οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάμπαν ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄν ποτε 
ζητήσειεν.»   
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itself, it means that we are higher in the hierarchy of being, where the 
Poros-aspect is much stronger.53  Nor should the phrase “for there is no 
determinate form or Reason in something which desires this [sc. the 
good]”54 worry us, if seen from a relational point of view.  For the 
desirer to be in a condition to desire (presumably the good), it must 
already have the traces of the good.  Hence, its indeterminateness is 
relational to that of its principle of formation.55  Again this aspect of 
relationality is stressed further in a following phrase:  “But that which 
is directed to itself56 is Form, remaining solitary within itself, but when 
                                                          
53 Hence, I cannot understand why at this point Δαμάσκος, e.g. p.304 changes his 
mind and thinks that Plotinus’ treatise concludes with reference to the matter of the 
sensible world.  (Compare his stance in ibid.,pp.276—277 and 296, and cf. Arnou 
[1967],pp.70—79.)  Even if we assume that Plotinus is specifically speaking about the 
World-Soul, with the restrictions that the kinship with matter might impose on it, 
‘Penia-matter’ could have only an indirect relation to sensible matter, as expressing 
the increased level of Soul’s indefiniteness that enables the interfusion with matter.  
However, we are not obliged to read in the context only the World-Soul.   
54 III.5.9,51-52: «οὐ γὰρ μορφή τις οὐδὲ λόγος ἐν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ τούτου». 
55 The whole surrounding phrase may seem paradoxical: Plotinus states that “the 
Indetermination of the desire for the good… makes the desirer more matter-like the 
more he desires” (ΙΙΙ.5.9,50-51 and 52-53: «τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμίας… 
ὑλικώτερον τὸ ἐφιέμενον καθόσον ἐφίεται ποιεῖ.»).  We are still talking about Soul, 
not about Eros, which personifies and is the necessary outcome of Soul’s desire, and 
we would expect Plotinus to state that the desire leads to the subsequent 
formation/self-constitution of the desirer; hence it leads to a decrease of 
indefiniteness, not the opposite.  Nonetheless, here he wants to emphasize the crucial 
aspect of Penia.  Thus, Plotinus may mean that the realization of an entity that is 
Penia in relation to its progenitor, awakes its desire to get formed by its source;  
hence, it is disposed as «ὑλικώτερον» towards its progenitor, which makes its desire 
to be self-constituted as enformed even more ardent.  
56 Ad loc. Καλλιγᾶς [2004] agrees with Wolters in that we should read «αὑτὸ» instead 
of «αὐτὸ».  This is also the reason why Wolters prefers printing «ἐν αὑτῷ» in the 
same line.  Although in this second instance Καλλιγᾶς does not think necessary to 
alter the text, he translates following Wolters’ proposal.  
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it also desires to receive, it causes the would-be recipient to be Matter 
for that which comes upon it.”57  Here, we are reminded of Nous’ case 
where, as we will see (in chapter 1.3.), Nous is fulfilled in respect of his 
nature, but when compared to the One becomes ‘needy’, hence ‘drunk’ 
Nous.  As I have repeated, there must already be Poros-traces in Penia-
Soul so that it reverts to its progenitor.  Consequently, whereas Soul-
Penia could be said to be Form, i.e. have a certain level of definiteness, 
with respect to itself, the realization of its divine origin allows the 
entity to realize its Penia state in relation to its source, and therefore it 
is like a ‘receptacle’ for the reception of higher-level form.58 
I can return, now, to what Plotinus has to say about Love: “Thus 
Eros is eternally and necessarily come into existence out of the longing 
of Soul for the higher and good, and from the moment there was Soul, 
there was eternally Eros.”59  Does Plotinus mean that, although 
necessarily dependent on Soul, Eros is an external entity to Soul?  The 
tendency towards internalization regarding Plenty and Poverty in the 
preceding discussion would not favour this reading.  Plotinus 
responds:  “It is therefore out of Poros and Penia that Eros is said to be 
                                                          
57 ΙΙΙ.5.9,53-55: «τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶδός ἐστι μόνον ἐν αὐτῷ μένον· καὶ δέξασθαι δὲ 
ἐφιέμενον ὕλην τῷ ἐπιόντι τὸ δεξόμενον παρασκευάζει.» 
58 As I have noted, the form does not actually ‘mix’ with this receptacle, but rather it is 
the Penia-receptacle that is transformed into this higher-level Poros.   
59 Ibid.,§9,39-41: «ἀεὶ δὲ οὕτως ὑπέστη ὅδε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφέσεως πρὸς 
τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἦν ἀεί, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ ψυχή, Ἔρως.»  In this pivotal 
passage both a) the necessity (cf. «ἐξ ἀνάγκης») of eros/reversion and b) its taking 
place in an ascending hierarchy (cf. «πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον») are mentioned. 
CHAPTER 1:  PLOTINUS AND ENNEADS III.5.[50]: “ON LOVE” 
30 
born, in that Soul’s60 lack and desire, and the memory that constitutes 
the Reasons,61 come together into a unity in soul and produce an active 
orientation (τὴν ἐνέργειαν) towards the good, and this is Eros.”62  
Plotinus does not claim here that the activity of Soul gives rise to 
another substantial entity.  Soul is not mother of Eros in the sense that 
Nous is father of Soul.  Rather, Eros represents Soul’s own activity 
towards the intelligible.  Furthermore, this activity, i.e. Eros, is self-
constituting of Soul in that it expresses the formation of Soul’s inherent 
Penia by Poros, in other words Soul’s discursive apprehension of Nous, 
in the way that inchoate Intellect erotically reverts upon the One and 
constitutes itself as the proper Hypostasis of Nous.  This is the way to 
understand how “Eros is eternally and necessarily come into existence 
out of the longing of Soul for the higher and good, and from the 
moment there was Soul, there was eternally Eros.”63   
If Eros forms a substantial and internal aspect of Soul’s being,64 we 
can also understand why in his other reference to the myth of the birth 
                                                          
60 The subjective genitive ‘ψυχῆς’ is absent from Plotinus’ text, but the context 
supports Wolters’ insertion, which is for the sake of clarity of the translation. 
61 Καλλιγᾶς and Armstrong take the genitive «τῶν λόγων» as objective (“and the 
memory of the rational principles…”), while Wolters as appositive.  Although I 
favour Wolters’ rendering, in both cases there are clear overtones of the theory of 
recollection. 
62 §9,45-48: «ἐκ Πόρου οὖν καὶ Πενίας λέγεται εἶναι, ᾗ ἡ ἔλλειψις καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ 
τῶν λόγων ἡ μνήμη ὁμοῦ συνελθόντα ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγέννησε τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρὸς 
τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔρωτα τοῦτον ὄντα.»  Cf. §4,21-23, (: penultimate period of the first 
theological section).  
63 Passage cited again supra (n.59). 
64 Cf. also Smith [2007],p.238.  
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of love, in VI.9.[9], Plotinus speaks about Soul’s innate («σύμφυτος») 
love, which explains “why Eros is coupled with the Psyches in pictures 
and stories. … every soul is Aphrodite; and this is symbolized in the 
story of the birthday of Aphrodite and Eros who is born with her (μετ’ 
αὐτῆς).  The soul in her natural state is in love with God and wants to 
be united with him; it is like the noble love of a girl for her noble 
father.”65  A soul can be a proper entity only via the erotic orientation of 
its activity towards the intelligible, and this bond is exemplified by 
Eros.  Hence, Eros is actually Soul itself seen from the point of view of 
its self-constitution, via its orientation towards the higher levels of 
reality.  This is the radical synairesis to which Plotinus invites us, his 
readers.  It is the synairesis that he himself had done, when in Ennead 
VI.7.[38] he had declared that “the soul, receiving into itself an outflow 
from thence [i.e. from the Good], is moved and dances wildly and is all 
stung with longing and becomes love (ἔρως).”66  In III.5, after the final 
exegetical stage, Plotinus urges us to go back and read again the 
treatise under this synairetic point of view.  Upon a second reading we 
will be prepared to understand that when Soul is said to give birth to 
the οὐσία and ὑπόστασις of Eros, this substance is nothing else but 
                                                          
65 VI.9.9,24-34: «… ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ ἑνωθῆναι θέλουσα, 
ὥσπερ παρθένος καλοῦ πατρὸς καλὸν ἔρωτα.»  Here Plotinus speaks of Soul’s love 
for the One, without the explicit mediation of Nous.  This is why Καλλιγᾶς,p.441 
objects to Wolters’ stubborn remarks that Plotinus in III.5 speaks about love towards 
Nous, not the Good.  If Nous has/is the trace(s) of the One, it follows that an 
aspiration for Nous is also an aspiration for the One, the ultimate source of 
everything. 
66 VI.7.22,8-10: «καὶ τοίνυν ψυχή λαβοῦσα εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορροὴν κινεῖται 
καὶ ἀναβακχεύεται καὶ οἴστρων πίμπλαται καὶ ἔρως γίνεται.» 
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Soul, as fulfilled by its orientation to the intelligible.  By generating this 
erotic self-constituting activity, Soul generates its authentic self: it is an 
erotic entity.   
I close with a final comment.  My synairetic reading of Soul’s Eros 
is supported by a parallel that can be drawn to another, more 
frequently discussed issue: time’s relation to Soul.  In some parts of 
III.7.[45] Plotinus seems to be speaking of time as an entity alongside 
Soul.67  However, the whole view of III.7 does not leave any doubt 
about time’s ontological status, as an aspect of Soul’s discursive life.  
Thus, Plotinus underlines that “one must not conceive time as outside 
Soul, any more than eternity There as outside real being.  It is not an 
accompaniment of Soul nor something that comes after (any more than 
eternity There) but something which is seen along with it and exists in 
it and with it, as eternity does There [with real being].”68  Even in that 
formulation one could assume that time is a hypostasis within Soul, but 
this is just not the case.  Time can be “seen” along with Soul because it 
is an expression of Soul’s discursive life.  What I aim to achieve with 
my present reflections is to show that this is an example of the 
                                                          
67 See e.g. III.7.11,17: «ἐκινήθη μὲν αὐτή [sc. Soul],ἐκινήθη δὲ καὶ αὐτός [sc. time]». 
68 Ibid.,§11,59-62:  «Δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔξωθεν τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον, ὥσπερ 
οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα ἐκεῖ ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος, οὐδ’ αὖ παρακολούθημα οὐδ’ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ 
οὐδ’ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἐνορώμενον καὶ ἐνόντα καὶ συνόντα [sc. with Soul], ὥσπερ κἀκεῖ ὁ 
αἰών.» 
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interpretative attitude that we should hold towards Plotinus’ treatment 
of Eros in III.5, too.69 
 
1.1.4. Eros and Vision 
I now return to §2 of III.5, where Eros is compared to the eye of a 
lover;70 an eye that, like the Eros of the Symposium, mediates between 
(«μεταξύ»)71 the lover, that is Soul, and the beloved, that is Nous.72  I 
will attempt to show how the first theological part of the treatise 
facilitates a synairetic reading as was suggested above.  Ι do so because 
Plotinus’ hermeneutical remarks apply to both myths and rational 
discourses,73 the Enneads falling under the latter genre.  Moreover, the 
old idiom of vision can help us identify philosophical, not only 
hermeneutical, reasons for the synairesis I propose.  Finally, in this way 
the two basic claims I pursue will become clearer, i.e.: a) the synairetic 
interpretive proposal, whereby soul is identified with eros, or her eyes;  
b) a further ontological claim, supported by the previous one, 
according to which an entity, soul in the particular case, constitutes 
itself via its erotic orientation towards its higher principles.   
                                                          
69 See also a passing remark by Armstrong,p.190,n.1 (on III.5.7.12-15), who connects 
Soul’s Eros and Time.   
70 For a pre-history of the simile see Bartsch [2006],pp.57-114, esp.pp.58-84. 
71 Τhe precise reference is to Eros-god, while the Symposium speaks of Eros-daimon 
72 And through Nous the Good, as remarked in n.65. 
73
 See supra, in ch.1.1.3. 
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So, what does the lover’s eye precisely do?  “[T]o the lover it 
provides a medium through which to see his beloved, while the eye 
itself precedes vision, that is: prior to making possible this instrument-
mediated vision (τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν δι’ ὀργάνου δύναμιν), the instrument 
itself is filled with the image seen.  It sees earlier, to be sure, but not in 
the same way, since the eye does impress the visual image on the seer, 
but itself only enjoys the vision of the beautiful one as it runs past.”74  
Plotinus has moved from the mythical to the metaphorical language of 
this double simile,75 and his ‘synairetic’ view is notable: Eros is 
internalized; it is no longer a separate entity, but a substantial aspect of 
Soul, since the seer cannot see without his eyes.  Just as vision is the 
defining capacity of the seer, so eros is the defining capacity of an 
entity, like soul.   
Yet, the problem is that this eye seems to have some desire of its 
own, independent from that of its bearer because it “sees earlier” than 
the lover.  True, Plotinus qualifies by adding “but not in the same 
way”, since the eye’s function is instrumental for the enabling of the 
lover’s seeing, and, hence, in metaphorical terms, what remains for the 
eye-Eros is the appreciation of “the vision of the beautiful one as it runs 
past”.76  But is it that eros can be specifically located somewhere within 
soul, and thus be differentiated from it, as an eye or an arm is distinct 
                                                          
74 III.5.2,39-46.  The last remark reminds us of Eros’ insatiability expounded ibid.,§7 in 
the context of the Poros-Penia myth.  See infra, ch.1.1.5. 
75 Cf. Wolters,p.83. 
76 ΙΙΙ.5.2,45-46: «τὴν θέαν τοῦ καλοῦ αὐτὸν παραθέουσαν.»   
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from the body, although an integral part of it?  How can we respond to 
this diairetic challenge?   
For one thing, we have the antecedent of Plato’s various 
statements.  Our Neoplatonist must be certainly aware of the 
Theaetetus’ claim that the eyes are that “’through which’ (δι’ ὧν) we 
perceive in each case, rather than ‘with which’ (oἷς)… It would be a 
very strange thing… if there were a number of perceptions sitting 
inside us as if we were Wooden horses, and there were not some single 
form, soul or whatever one ought to call it, to which all these converge–
something with which, through those things [sc. eyes and ears], as if 
they were instruments (οἷον ὀργάνων), we perceive all that is 
perceptible.”77  So, it is clear that «νοῦς ὁρῆι καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει»,78 as 
Epicharmus could put it, too.  Nevertheless, it is again Plato who states 
that “dialectic gently pulls… out and leads…upwards” not soul in 
abstracto, but the eye of the soul («τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα»), when it is 
“really buried in a sort of barbaric bog”.79  If the intellectual vision 
plays the fundamental role in the apprehension of the Good and the 
Beauty of the intelligible realm, depicted either in the Sun and Cave-
analogy of the Republic or the ascent of the Symposium, then in cases 
like our last citation the eye cannot be differentiated from its bearer’s 
                                                          
77 Plato, Theaetetus,184c10-d6. (All translations of Plato come from Cooper [1997], 
unless otherwise stated.) 
78 (Ps-)Epicharmus, Carmen Physicum, 249.1 (Kaibel): “The mind sees and hears; the 
rest is deaf and blind”.  Cf. idem, Ἀξιοπίστου γνῶμαι, 12DK. 
79 Republic,VII,533d1-3. 
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actual identity:  a soul is a proper, i.e. philosophical soul in so far as it 
envisages the Good, viz. in so far as it has eyes, or rather, as long as it is 
an eye.  On this Platonic antecedent one can base Plotinus’ propensity 
to ‘contract’ the seer, i.e. Soul, with her eye, i.e. Eros, and thus support 
my first interpretive claim.  
Going on further to base my ontological claim upon the previous 
one,  as is clear from above, it is not only the eye, but the vision that 
self-constitutes Soul as such.80  There are two issues in need of 
clarification here.  Starting with the first: could it be that an 
unactualized capacity is enough?  No, Plotinus is ready to connect the 
eye, i.e. the agent who has the eye, with the (“image-mediated”) 
vision,81 emphasizing thus the Aristotelian idea of ‘second actuality’.  
For our Neoplatonist an eye is a ‘filled’ eye, i.e. an entity is fulfilled, in 
so far as it actualizes its capacity to see.  This is the reason why in the 
context of his first beautiful ascent towards the Good Plotinus assures 
us that, when one has “already ascended”, he “has already become 
sight…  For this eye alone sees the great beauty.”82  Thus, from the 
initial stage of the synairesis between the eye and the agent we get to 
the next stage of the intimate connection between the seer-eye and the 
actuality/activity of seeing.   
                                                          
80 Cf. also Καλλιγᾶς’ excellent notes on §2,32-38 and 39-46,pp.426-427.   
81 See for example the close proximity of «ὄμμα…ὅρασις, Ἔρως…» in III.5.3,13. 
82 Cf. I.6.[1].9,22-25: «εἰ τοῦτο γενόμενον σαυτὸν ἴδοις, ὄψις ἤδη γενόμενος 
θαρσήσας περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἀναβεβηκὼς μηκέτι τοῦ δεικνύντος 
δεηθεὶς ἀτενίσας ἴδε· οὗτος γὰρ μόνος ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ μέγα κάλλος βλέπει.»  
(Armstrong’s trnsl. heavily modified.)   
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But now we may move to the second issue in need of clarification: 
why and how does ‘second actuality’ tell us anything regarding the 
fulfillment of the agent (or the eye) itself?  It is the time for Aristotle’s 
theory of perception to come to the forefront, since for Plotinus, too, the 
(vision of the) seer in a way becomes assimilated to the object to which 
he directs his vision.83  Plotinus evokes this idea clearly in the second 
recurrence of the eye-simile in §3, when he states that “[i]t is… out of 
that which is strenuously active towards the visual object, and out of 
that which ‘streams off,’84 so to speak, from the object, that Eros is born, 
an eye that is filled: like image-mediated vision.”85  From this 
fundamental assertion it follows that, in order for the eye to become 
filled with the images that emanate from the object of its vision, it is the 
eye, i.e. the agent, that must act first.  Hence, although the Cratylus’ 
(folk-)etymology relates Eros to the passive aspect of vision -viz. 
“because it flows in from outside (ὅτι <εἰσρεῖ ἔξωθεν>), that is to say, 
the flow doesn’t belong to the person who has it, but is introduced into 
him through his eyes… it [sc. Eros] was called ‘esros’ (‘influx’)”86-, 
                                                          
83 This is how the «ὀφθαλμός» which looks at the sun becomes «ἡλιοειδής».  (Cf. also 
Plato, Phaedrus, 253a1-5.)  Cf. Emilsson [1988],pp.70-71, and Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.429.  
84 According to Wolters,p.99, “[i]t is probably no coincidence either that ἀπορρέοντος 
is similar in sound to πόρος, since both refer to the same ‘parent’  of eros, and 
especially since Πόρος is identified in chapter 9 with the ‘images’ (9.12 ἀγάλματα, 
9.33 εἰκόνας; cf. ῥυέντες, 9.35 ῥυέντος) down from intellect (the beloved object of 
vision) to Soul.”   
85 III.5.3,11-13: «ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος συντόνως περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ ἐκ τοῦ 
οἷον ἀπορρέοντος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου ὄμμα πληρωθέν, οἷον μετ’ εἰδώλου ὅρασις, 
Ἔρως ἐγένετο». 
86 Plato, Cratylus,420a9-b2. 
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Plotinus here emphasizes the active element of the actuality of seeing, 
stating that “it is perhaps rather from this that Eros gets its name, 
because it comes to Existence out of vision, horasis.”87  In this last 
citation we get a summary of my proposals so far; starting reversely: a) 
being an eye implies the activity of seeing, since it is the latter that 
literally shapes the form of the former.  b) Plotinus calls this eye/vision 
Eros, but we have seen how we can move to a synairesis of the eye 
with(in) the seer.  If so, then Eros himself can be contracted with its 
bearer, Soul.  He is only the persona of the entity that is self-constituted 
by the activity of seeing, or in metaphorical terms, the “eye that is 
filled” itself.  Moreover, this fact explains why in the end of the first 
theological part (§4), as with the second one, Plotinus arrives at the 
same conclusion: “Eros is Soul’s activity as it strains toward good”, 88 
by which the ‘Poros’-principles of Nous come to form Soul’s ‘Penia’. 
To conclude, from this ‘synoptic-synairetic’ point of view, the eye-
simile combines and unifies the two seemingly conflicting notions of 
Eros:  the internalization of Eros as eye of Soul shows us that a) the 
activity of contemplating the intelligible, being an erotic act, stems 
from and instantiates the passionate love with which Soul is filled for 
her progenitor “in the way a girl feels noble89 love for her noble 
                                                          
87 III.5.3,14-15.  Cf. also Etymologicum Magnum,379.50 (Gaisford). 
88 ΙΙΙ.5.4,22-23: «…ἔρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς ἀγαθοῦ ὀριγνωμένης.»  Cf. ibid.,§9,45-48 
and supra,n.62. 
89 Thus we avoid potentially negative ramifications of the type “Oedipus-Electra” 
relation.  
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father”.90  b) The actual result (the ‘offspring’) of this erotic 
intentionality, however, is again to be found ‘within’ this subject:  soul 
constitutes itself as a proper Hypostasis by eternally gazing at the 
intelligible realm, that is by being in constant erotic reference to its 
progenitor.  In other words, Soul, and every inferior being in relation to 
its superior, is an erotic entity; it is what it is only with actual reference 
to the immediate source of its existence, and ultimately to the Good.  
Furthermore, the expression of this erotic intentionality is the activity 
of contemplation.  This is why Plotinus under the mythological veil 
states that, after Eros’ generation, “the two of them look upward: both 
the mother and the beautiful Eros, he who is born as an Existence 
(ὑπόστασις) that is eternally set towards Another that is beautiful”.91  It 
turns out that Eros is like a mirror of the Soul: it reflects Soul after the 
orientation of her intellectual activity towards the intelligible; or the 
mirror represents how Soul apprehends the reflection of the intelligible 
in its eyes/itself, in her ceaseless struggle to be(come) good-like.92  In 
either case, this substantial Eros is actually nothing else but Soul itself, 
seen from the point of view of its upwards orientation towards the 
intelligible (cf. my ontological claim).93  This is the radical ‘synairesis’ 
that Plotinus invites us to do once more (cf. my interpretive claim).  It is 
                                                          
90 VI.9.[9].9,34. (Armstrong’s trnsl. modified.) 
91 ΙΙΙ.5.2,37-38.   
92 Both images invoke the picture of a lover seeing himself in the eyes and soul of the 
beloved, for which see Alcibiades I,132e8-133b11, esp.133b2-10 and Phaedrus,255d5-6.  
Cf. Aristotle, Magna Moralia, 2.15. esp. 1213a8-27 or 7,4-8,1 (Susemihl-Armstrong). 
93 Cf. also Καλλιγᾶς [2004],esp.p.426. 
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the ceaseless intentional activity of contemplation (cf. eros as ἐνέργεια) 
that self-constitutes Soul as a proper entity (cf. Eros as ὑπόστασις and 
οὐσία).94   
 
1.1.5. Eros and Tragedy 
Finally, I return to the myth of Poros and Penia once more.  One of 
A.M. Wolters’ most insightful remarks concerns the identification of a 
relation between the eye-simile in §3 and the treatment of Eros as son 
of Poros-Penia in §7.95  This relation consists not only of verbal 
affinities,96 but also of structural analogies, as will be shown later.  The 
synairetic reading of the myth presented in §9 prompted us to read in 
this way the eye-similes of the first theological part.  Now I will close 
the (hopefully not vicious) circle by coming back to the Symposium-
myth in §7, which, on the one hand, presents similarities with the first 
part of the theology, and on the other paves the way towards the final 
synairesis expounded in the last section (§9) of the second theological 
part.  For a final time, I will try to show how Eros can be contracted 
                                                          
94 Thus, my account supersedes that of Wolters’, which suggests that Plotinus is 
simply equivocal with respect to the identity of Eros, calling it either activity or the 
result of the activity.  Cf. Wolters’ note on §4,22, p.137; his explanation “is probably 
that Soul’s ἐνέργεια ‘constitutes’ Eros, the way ‘acting’ constitutes an ‘act.’   Eros is, 
as it were, the ‘internal object’ of Soul’s activity.  In the same way, Eros, the desire of 
Soul, is also said to result from that desire; see on 9.40.”   
95 See Wolters [1984],p.97.  For Wolters the eye-simile, applying to both Eros-god and 
daimon, is to be understood better under the light of the Poros and Penia exegesis of 
the last part of the treatise.   
96 See supra,n.84. 
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with Soul.  After all, the methodological principles of diairesis and 
synairesis in §9 are meant to apply to this myth, even if it precedes 
them. 
In §7 Plotinus chooses to stress the tragic nature of Eros, although 
the context of the picturesque myth of the Symposium would suggest a 
more cheerful atmosphere.97  We have already seen (ch.1.1.3.) that in §9 
Poros, in being logos, represents the totality of logoi that emanate from 
Nous to Soul.  On the other hand, Penia represents the indefinite desire 
of the intelligible, before it gets the logoi.  According to the account of 
§7, “[s]ince Reason, then, entered that which was not Reason, but an 
indeterminate desire and attenuated Existence (ὑποστάσει), it caused 
the resulting offspring to be neither perfect nor self-sufficient, but 
deficient, being born out of indeterminate desire and self-sufficient 
reason.”98  Thus, Love “is not a pure rational principle, since he has in 
himself an indefinite, irrational, unbounded impulse; for he will never 
be satisfied, as he has in him the nature of the indefinite.”99  So, we see 
again that for Plotinus the characteristic of Penia is fundamental; what 
                                                          
97 According to Symposium,223d3-6, “authors should be able to write both comedy 
and tragedy: the skillful tragic dramatist should also be a comic poet”. 
98 III.5.7,9-12: «λόγος οὖν γενόμενος ἐν οὐ λόγῳ, ἀορίστῳ δὲ ἐφέσει καὶ ὑποστάσει 
ἀμυδρᾷ, ἐποίησε τὸ γενόμενον οὐ τέλεον οὐδὲ ἱκανόν, ἐλλιπὲς δέ, ἅτε ἐξ ἐφέσεως 
ἀορίστου καὶ λόγου ἱκανοῦ γεγενημένον.» 
99 Ibid.,§7,12-15: «καὶ ἔστι λόγος οὗτος οὐ καθαρός, ἅτε ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ ἔφεσιν 
ἀόριστον καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἄπειρον· οὐ γὰρ μήποτε πληρώσεται, ἕως ἂν ἔχῃ ἐν 
αὑτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσιν.»  Here I choose Armstrong’s translation, because 
Wolters,p.179 thinks that the «λόγος οὐ καθαρός», being identified with the λόγος of 
l.9, does not refer to Eros, as the rest of the interpreters take it.   
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is more, even after the coming of Poros the Penia-element remains.  As 
I will note in the next section (1.1.6.), Poros’ is in a sense Penia in 
relation to its higher principle, if we are not to ascribe dualities that can 
be found only in the sensible world.  The upshot of Plotinus’ 
description is that “Eros is like a craving100 which is by its nature 
aporos: needy and without means or resources.  Therefore, even in the 
act of achieving its goal, it is again needy.  For it cannot be fulfilled, 
because its mixed nature forbids it.  For only that truly achieves 
fulfillment, which also constitutionally possesses fulfillment.  But that 
which craves on account of its inherent deficiency is like a leaky vessel; 
even if it does achieve fulfillment momentarily, it does not retain it, 
since its powerlessness101 is on account of his deficiency, whereas its 
’efficiency’ [poristikon] is due to the Reason-side of its nature.”102 
                                                          
100 Wolters,p.183 renders «οἶστρος» as “craving”, and not as “gadfly” or “sting” (so 
Armstrong), as the rest of the translators do.  He evokes Creuzer’s note ad loc. (in his 
Parisien edition of Plotinus from 1855; in this note, inter alia, we find a reference to 
VI.7.22,9), adding that the sense of ‘gadfly’ “is rare after Aristotle, being supplanted 
by μύωψ (so already in Plato)”.  But if Eros bears characteristics of Socrates both in 
the Symposium and in III.5, why not stick with the Apology’s ‘gadfly’?  Cf. also 
Osborne [1994],p.114 and n.112. 
101 I altered Wolters’ “cleverness” into “powerlessness”, since Wolters wants to retain 
the MSS’ reading «εὐμήχανον» (followed by H-S2) instead of «ἀμήχανον», proposed 
by Kirchhoff (followed by H-S4).  Although Wolters’ long justification (pp.187-192) 
has influenced me, I follow H-S4 and Καλλιγᾶς’ choice (p.444) in retaining 
Kirchhoff’s emendation.  The parallel text from Plutarch, De Is.,57.374d, given in H-S4, 
makes the case stronger for the «ἀμήχανον» option.  Further, in their “Fontes 
Addendi” H-S4 ascribe to our present III.5-passage a reference to Aristophanes, 
Ranae,1429, regarding the opposition of «ἀμήχανον» with «ποριστικόν».  
Kαλλιγᾶς,p.444 supplies more references in order to show the commonplace of the 
aforementioned opposition.  In another paper I will pursue the consequences of 
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A part of Eros’ aforementioned tragic nature consists in the 
fundamental insatiability of his desire, which in fact recalls the eye-
simile of the first theological part.  In that case, we saw that the eye is 
not fulfilled “but itself only enjoys the vision of the beautiful one as it 
runs past”, while it “does impress the visual image on the seer”.  
Nonetheless, Plotinus’ elaboration of this image in terms of the Penia-
Poros myth sharpens even more the tragic aspect of ceaseless desire, 
and actually brings in our mind the behaviour of the incontinent man, 
who is compared to a leaky jar in Plato’s Gorgias.103  However, while 
such an incontinent man presumably has desires for bodily pleasures, 
Eros is confined in insatiableness, whereas he pursues the loftiest object 
of desire.104   
Still, the central problem that arises from the description of this 
tragic figure is its actual identity, while we are confronted with another 
aforementioned problem, that of ascribing desires to that which is only 
the instantiation of desire itself.  Now, let us not forget that Plotinus’ 
agenda is to capture Eros as activity of Soul, at least in chs.9 and 4.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Plotinus’ affinity with the passages from playwrights in respect of Plotinus’ literary 
engagement with the characters of the Symposium. 
102 III.5.7.19-25: «καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἔρως οἷον οἶστρος ἄπορος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει· διὸ καὶ 
τυγχάνων ἄπορος πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει πληροῦσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ μίγμα· μόνον 
γὰρ πληροῦται ἀληθῶς, ὅτιπερ καὶ πεπλήρωται τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει· ὃ δὲ διὰ τὴν 
συνοῦσαν ἔνδειαν ἐφίεται, κἂν παραχρῆμα πληρωθῇ, οὐ στέγει· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ 
εὐμήχανον αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, τὸ δὲ ποριστικὸν διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου φύσιν.»  Cf. 
also ibid.,§9,42-44. 
103 See Gorgias,493a5-b3. 
104 This can be an apt example of tragic irony, or indeed of Socratic one: the gadfly 
pursues knowledge constantly without being able to possess it… 
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Further, the affinity of Eros’ tragic description in the present context 
with the eye-simile of the first part can be a useful guide in our 
interpretation.  To be more precise, the picture of Eros as ‘mixture’ of 
Reason-Poros and indefiniteness-Penia is analogous to the image of the 
filled eye.  In the second eye-simile Plotinus spoke of that which is 
active towards the beloved visual object, and of the latter as ‘streaming 
off’ images that fill the eye, which is compared to Eros.  This ‘streaming 
off’ clearly corresponds to the logoi emanating from Nous, i.e. to logos-
Poros, while the active orientation to the visual object is analogous to 
Penia’s indefinite desire for Poros.  In the eye-case I proposed that 
Plotinus, making Eros the eye of a lover/desirer, that is of Soul, on the 
one hand he internalizes Eros, and on the other he identifies the 
medium of vision with the activity of seeing itself.  The result is that if a 
seer is seer qua actualizing his capacity to see, then the fulfilled eye of 
the seer stands for the erotic self-constitution of an entity (lover-Soul) 
as always being in constant erotic reference to its desired object.  
Hence, in our present case, too, we can diagnose under the veil of Eros’ 
persona the self-constituting activity and desire not of Eros, but of Soul 
itself.  In other words, we are confronted with the radical synairesis of 
Soul with Eros, the latter being a necessary aspect of the former’s (way 
of) being.  
However, it is not only the analogy with the eye-simile, but also 
other elements from §7 alone that lead us towards this synairetic view.  
As we saw in the last cited passage, Eros is called «μῖγμα» (“mixture”), 
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a word that has been repeatedly used for Eros since the beginning of 
§7.105  We can then wonder regardless of the eye-analogy: who is really 
the “mixture”?  For one thing, Wolters aptly remarks that “Plotinus 
interprets Eros as being not so much the independent offspring of 
Poros and Penia as their fusion...106 As a result, the nature of Penia 
(insatiability) and the nature of Poros (resourcefulness) are presented 
in the sequel as simply ingredients of the ambivalent nature of Eros.”107  
Nonetheless, according to the descriptions that I gave by using the 
terms of Poros-Penia myth, we could suggest that the actual fusion of 
these two “ingredients” is not Eros, but a substantial entity, e.g. Soul, 
which in fact, due to its constitution, exists as erotic entity.  This point 
can be made with reference to Plotinus’ assertions in §7, too.  There, he 
states that Eros’ birth from Penia due to her intercourse with Poros 
denotes that “it [sc. Eros’ generation] is out of Form and 
Indetermination –an Indetermination characterizing Soul when it has not 
yet achieved the good, but ‘presages that there is Something’ in an 
indeterminate and indefinite mental image”.108  From this it follows 
that Eros and Soul have many things in common, since, if Eros is a 
“mixture” of Penia-Poros, these two ingredients are actually reduced to 
                                                          
105 See l.16; cf.l.17. 
106 Wolters,p.181 adds that Plotinus “can do this by exploiting two peculiarities of the 
Greek word μείγνυμι (and its compounds): the connotation of sexual intercourse 
which it has (LSJ B 4) alluding thus to the union of Poros and Penia..., and the 
possibility of construing it with ἐκ (LSJ I),…”. 
107 Ibid. 
108 III.5.7,6-9. 
CHAPTER 1:  PLOTINUS AND ENNEADS III.5.[50]: “ON LOVE” 
46 
aspects of Soul itself.  It is the Penia-state that makes Soul gaze at the 
intelligible, by which activity it gets formed by Poros-logoi, that is by 
the ‘unfolding version’ of Nous’ forms, i.e. the Forms under the mode 
of Soul’s discursive reasoning.  Thus, the result of this procedure is not 
any other substantial entity, apart from proper Soul itself; it is Soul qua 
constantly related to its intelligible source of formation.  Further, as I 
had briefly noted during the course of the exegesis of §9 (ch.1.1.3.), the 
roles of Penia and Poros are not so stable.  Penia can revert towards 
Nous, because it already contains traces of Poros; what is more, the fact 
that after the advent of Poros Soul is said to be able to orientate its 
activity towards the source of Poros means that there is always an 
aspect of Penia in Soul that causes to be ceaselessly desiring the 
intelligible, as if Soul were insatiable. 
Therefore, if the real and substantial ‘mixture’ is Soul, Eros must be 
mixture in another sense.  The contrast is sharp when Plotinus makes 
the following joint reference: “and it [sc. Eros] depends on Soul in the 
sense of [sc. Soul being his] principle, since it has been generated by 
Soul, although it [sc. Eros] is [sc. at the same time] a mixture…”.109  If 
Poros and Penia are already reduced to aspect/states of Soul, then their 
mixture cannot be an independent substantial entity within Soul, as 
also the eye-simile would suggest prima facie, but a certain state of 
Soul, being the outcome of the dialectical synthesis of Poros and Penia: 
exactly this dialectical state is expressed by the upwards orientation of 
                                                          
109 III.5.7,15-17.  My translation following Καλλιγᾶς’ choices. 
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Soul, since it desires (Penia-aspect) the intelligible (Poros-aspect).  
Finally, the image suggested by the last Plotinian citation is exactly 
equivalent to the image we have seen him using in the end of §2, where 
he speaks about the generation of Eros from Aphrodite’s activity 
towards her progenitor Kronos, both of them gazing at Aphrodite’s 
progenitor.  There (ch.1.1.3.), I proposed that the Eros-offspring is 
nothing else but Soul itself seen as self-constituted by its eternally 
gazing at its progenitor, i.e. by ceaselessly being an erotic entity.  In the 
same way, here we can propose that what depends on Soul as its 
principle of generation is Soul’s activity, instantiated in its upwards 
orientation, which, however self-constitutes Soul as such, that is as an 
erotic entity which always strives towards its source.  The synairesis of 
Eros with Soul is again at the forefront. 
Consequently, if this is so, the real tragic figure is actually Soul,110 
which cannot be fulfilled, because “its mixed nature forbids it”, with 
the result of its ceaseless aspiration of the intelligible.  If we take this 
reference in that sense, i.e. as describing Soul’s erotic way of being,111 
then the immediately following comparison in Plotinus’ text becomes 
more intelligible; Plotinus states: “For only that truly achieves 
fulfilment, which also constitutionally possesses fulfilment.”112  This 
reference seems to be to Nous, who “always desires and always 
                                                          
110 It seems that instead of tragedy we are confronted with a tragic monologue. 
111 Cf. my approach on the eye simile (ch.1.1.4.): seer is a seer qua actualizing his 
capacity to see, instantiated in his eyes. 
112 Cited supra within n.102.  
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attains”.  Hence, if we establish this,113 then there would be something 
quite odd in a comparison between the ontology of Eros and Nous.  For 
example, where would Soul fit into that scheme?  What is more, if Eros 
can be conceived as the instantiation of an activity, why contrast it with 
a Hypostasis such as Nous?114  However, we have seen that both Soul 
and Nous are erotic entities.  Hence, a comparison between Soul’s and 
Nous’ way of being becomes more reasonable. 
 
1.1.6. Eros and vision, again 
I want to conclude this chapter by clarifying two aspects 
concerning the importance and convergence of the Poros-Penia image 
and the eye-simile.  I begin with the issue of the necessity of the (erotic) 
reversion, or why the eye is to see.  In a previous section (1.1.4.), in the 
treatment of the second eye-simile, I noted that contra Cratylus’ 
etymology, Plotinus emphasizes the active element of the activity of 
                                                          
113 We should do so due to the parallel and unmistakable reference to Nous from §9: 
III.5.9,18-19: “Intellect, however, possesses itself in satiety and it is not ‘drunk’ in its 
self-possession for it does not possess anything extraneous”.  Cf. also Armstrong’s 
n.3,p.191 (on III.5.7.20).  Lacrosse [1994],pp.125-127, esp. p.126 neglects this evidence 
and proposes that in the passage from §7,20-22 we should read Soul, qua bearer of 
Eros, and her Eros.  Hence, the contrast he draws is between a fulfilled hypostasis, i.e. 
Soul (or Nous for that matter) and its Eros, which is unfulfilled.  Despite this 
hermeneutical discrepancy Lacrosse’s overall interpretation of the significance of Eros 
does not really diverge from mine.   
114 Of course, in Nous’ complete unity in multiplicity the activity of thinking is 
identified with Nous’ essence, viz. the Forms.  However, we have seen that Eros is the 
orientation to what is higher, which in the case of Nous results in Intellect’s thinking 
of himself. 
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seeing.  Nonetheless, one may justly retort that, contrary to what this 
image suggests, as well as its apparent differentiation from the 
Cratylus,  for Plotinus the reversion of an entity, and its subsequent 
self-constitution, are both necessary aspects stemming from the very 
first emanation of that entity.115  In other words, the active and the 
passive elements are just two sides of the same coin: if there is to be 
direction of the vision towards an object, the latter is going to emanate 
its images to fill the vision of the eye; conversely, if there is any 
emanation of images from an object to any eye, this means that the 
latter has directed its vision upon that object.  This is one reason I think 
that the Penia-Poros interpretation serves better to clarify Plotinus’ 
concrete attitude, since it explains why we have the reversion of an 
entity in the first place.  In other words, it gives us an answer as to why 
Aphrodite can be «ἐρασθεῖσα» before it gives birth to Eros,116 i.e. 
before it is fulfilled by the limit that Poros imposes.   
As Plotinus states in §9, “clearly that which is utterly without part 
in the good would never seek the good”.117  This description fits only 
prime matter, which is the source of evil in the world.  Contrary to that, 
intelligible (or ‘psychic’) matter apparently has already traces («ἴχνη») 
of the Good.  It is the presence of these good-like elements that enable 
e.g. inchoate Intellect to ‘feel’ its need-‘poverty’ in relation to the Good.  
                                                          
115 It is not up to Nous not to be(come) Nous, and so forth. 
116 See III.5.2,34-35.  
117 Ibid.,9,44-45. 
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Thus, what is potentially good in intelligible matter, Nous tries to 
actualize it, although it ends up with the best possible image (cf. 
«εἴδωλον») of the Good, which is the Forms.  In this process we see, 
indeed, that the reversion towards the superior principle is necessary, 
since the offspring of an entity carries within it the traces of its 
progenitor. 
Moreover, we have already seen (ch.1.1.4.) that the activity of 
vision/contemplation assimilates the vision with what is seen, although 
the result within the seer is not the actual object of vision duplicated, 
but the image of the latter.  From that point of view, we can understand 
why the idea of ‘second actuality’ has such an importance for Plotinus.  
In his view, an eye is the potential receptacle of the images of vision, 
i.e. it is a ‘not yet filled eye’, as intelligible matter is the potentiality of 
the World of Forms.  For Plotinus, an eye can be actual eye, i.e. ‘filled’, 
only qua seeing.  From this whole procedure, we can really perceive 
why an eye, representing Penia, strives to see, and why, since it sees, it 
receives the “glories” of Poros, i.e. the images of the object seen. 
The above description leads us to the issue of the actual 
‘intercourse’ of Poros and Penia, or the nature of the “filled eye”.  All 
these images could suggest a view close to the Aristotelian notion of 
physical substance, whereby Penia and eye are the passive elements, 
and Poros and the fulfillment of the eye are the active-formal elements.  
However, we have seen that Penia-eye are active in that they do not 
just receive Form, but this reception is the outcome, even if necessary, 
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of their actuality of seeing.  This comes to a strong opposition to the 
paradigm of sensible world, where matter is really inert, unable for 
contemplation, and just receives form from Soul-Nature.118  Hence, 
whereas in the sensible world we can speak about Aristotelian 
composites, although for Plotinus matter never fully takes on form, in 
the intelligible world we do not have such dualities.  Rather, Penia-
intelligible matter, via the actuality of contemplation, transforms itself 
becoming Poros(-Nous), viz. Good-like.  The same holds in the case of 
the eye which is filled by the images of the object of contemplation, 
actually becoming like it, in Aristotelian terms.   
Such a synairesis of Poros and Penia is not explicitly suggested by 
Plotinus in his exegesis, as we saw, but it underlies many of his 
assertions.  However, the aforementioned synairesis is not the only 
possible interpretation.  For, as we have stressed, the offspring remains 
always inferior to its progenitor, although it is the best possible image.  
Even if Poros is what makes e.g. Nous Good-like, it is still not the 
Good.  Poros represents the constant relation of Nous to the One, yet it 
is still inferior to its source.  Hence, in a way Poros is always Penia in 
relation to the One, and this fact explains why the gazing at the One is 
eternal.  Besides, in Plotinus’ flexible use of several notions, every level 
of reality is said to be ‘matter’ (hence, Penia) in relation to its superior, 
                                                          
118 And hence we have all the complications that arise from Soul’s second/downwards 
reversion.  
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i.e. more infinite in relation to its principle of limit.119  This is why the 
eye in order to be filled must be (/is) always in the state of second 
actuality, i.e. gazing at its object.   
In a nutshell, Penia can denote the ‘first’ moment of the generation 
of an entity, and hence explain the reversion in the first instance, but it 
can also denote that the result of the reversion remains always inferior 
to (‘in need of’) its higher principle, and thus in constant relation to its 
progenitor: this is why a self-constituted entity always remains an 
erotic entity being orientated to the intelligible.  This, then, is the gist of 
Plotinus’ view on the nature of love: for an entity to be(come) erotic 
must be inferior to another one.  In this view eros, as in the Symposium, 
is the force that leads us only upwards.  Most importantly, it has been 
clear throughout our above discussions that this ascending erotic force 
cannot be a substantial entity, external and/or independent of the erotic 
entity to which it corresponds.  In other words, the synairesis of Penia 
with Poros, or the eye itself actually corresponded to an entity, (e.g. 
Soul), whose nature is erotic; that is, an entity which has an erotic 
intentionality, i.e. an intellectual activity towards its beloved object 
(Nous/One). 
 
                                                          
119 Hence, I diverge from Smith [2007],p.241, who sees in Poros and Penia the polarity 
of our undescended and embodied self.  In my view the ‘duality’ of these principles 
can describe a single entity, e.g. either the Undescended or the embodied soul.  For 
Smith’s approach see also ibid.,p.236, but compare also the end in ibid.,p.242, which 
comes closer to my ‘unitary’ reading.  Finally, the relevant note of Gerson 
[2006],p.60,n.48 is too short to be evaluated. 
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1.2. Potential objections and answers  
I will now consider some potential objections to my proposals.  My 
aim is to strengthen even more the solution I put forward by answering 
to the challenges.  Issues that will concern us in this section are the 
unity of Plotinus’ treatise, its daimonology and a specification 
regarding the relation of Eros to Soul. 
 
1.2.1. Unity of theme 
I start with a note on my methodology.  One might object that I 
gave an answer to our problem by collecting evidence from both 
theological sections of III.5, although they do not refer to the same 
entity.  The passages from the first theological part I evoked (§§2-3) 
speak about god Eros, son of Heavenly Aphrodite, whereas the 
Symposium-myth relates to daimonic Eros.  To this challenge I respond 
thus: the first part of Eros’ theology does not exclusively refer the Eros-
god, but also to daimonic Love.120  Further, in that very section the 
characteristics ascribed to Eros-god, e.g. the eye-simile, are explicitly 
attributed to Eros-daimon, too.121  Hence, even if the Symposium-
                                                          
120 See III.5.3,27ff. and my Synopsis above (ch.1.1.1.). 
121 Cf. e.g. ibid.,§3,29.  Hence, my diversion from Brisson [2004],p.79, who suggests 
that Heavenly Aphrodite gives birth to an Eros identified with the higher Soul, 
(because he is a god?), whereas the Soul of the sensible world engenders a daimonic 
Eros, who is her vision.  But why such a ‘diairetic’-fragmentary reading?  Although 
Brisson comes partly close to my response, he ignores the aforementioned 
equivalence between god and daimon Eros.  More specifically, how can the Eros of 
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exegesis analyzes only the daimonic Eros, this does not preclude the 
interpreter from drawing conclusions about the phenomenon of eros in 
general.   Such a view is also corroborated by Wolters’ aforementioned 
insightful remark, according to which the eye-simile, which applies to 
both Eros-god and daimon, is to be understood better under the light of 
the Poros and Penia exegesis of the last part of the treatise.   
Further, in a treatise which aims at extolling the importance of 
“synairesis” and the unity incurred by love the Plotinian interpreter 
needs to respond with the corresponding gesture.122  For example, it 
might be the case that the exegesis of the myth comes as an answer to 
the enquiry into the nature of daimons generally, and specifically 
daimon-Eros, as proclaimed in §5 and started in §6.  Still, one might 
wonder what connects the two theological parts, not the potential 
differentiations of Eros-daimon from Eros-god.  For this reason I have 
not stressed the aspect of the mother of daimon-Eros, World-Soul’s 
proximity to matter, and the ramifications that this has for the various 
daimonic powers employed for the administration of this whole.123  
Nor have I inferred that Penia denotes only the indefiniteness that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Undescended Soul be a Soul, whereas that of the World-one is not?  What does the 
latter imply about the ontological status of daimonic Eros?  Further, if indeed 
Heavenly Aphrodite is to be identified with Undescended Soul, and Commonly one 
with the World-Soul, what is the actual identity of this “higher soul”? 
122 This aspect is nicely brought out by Smith [2007],passim.,e.g.pp.236 and 242, 
although I do not agree with all of his conclusions. 
123 As Kalligas [2004],p.433 points out, these partial “powers” neglect sometimes the 
overall planning of Soul’s administration, being in conflict with it and with each 
other. 
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characterizes the level of being of World-Soul, as being close to matter.  
In conclusion, for the purposes of my enquiry and for the above 
reasons I view the accounts of Love given in the two parts of the 
theological section of III.5 as complementary.124   
I am not the only interpreter who takes this synairetic stance, 
although I do not always agree with the synairetic fruits of other 
scholars.  The following is a good example:  if we turn to §7, we find a 
reference to a «λόγος… οὐ καθαρός».125  Here, I assumed that Plotinus 
refers to Eros qua the offspring of Poros and Penia.  We saw that the 
Neoplatonist reduces the relation of Eros with his parents to a sort of 
fusion of Poros and Penia-traits, which characterize Soul.  If we can 
speak about such a fusion, then the straightforward interpretation of 
“impure logos” concerns the Soul’s Eros, not either of Eros’ 
mythological parents.  Although this is the option of the majority of 
translators-commentators, Wolters disagrees.126  The latter suggests that 
this127 «λόγος οὐ καθαρός», which is identified with the λόγος of l.9, 
does not refer to Eros, but solely to Poros-logos, which has emanated 
from Nous, and which contrasts with another “λόγος which does 
remain pure: the one which is self-contained (17) and does not mix 
                                                          
124 In another paper (work in progress) I examine the structure of Plotinus’ treatise 
into more depth, I relate it with the theme of III.5 and will show in greater length why 
a more synoptic view of the different parts of the treatise is preferable.    
125 III.5.7,12-13: “So Love is not a pure rational principle…” (Armstrong’s trnsl.).   
126 Cf. Wolters [1984],p.179. 
127 Cf. III.5.7,13: «oὗτος». 
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with ἀοριστία (18).  This pure λόγος belongs to the ‘pure’ Soul which 
is situated above the ‘mixed’ Soul.”  Thus, for Wolters this impure 
logos gives rise to Eros-daimon, aspect of World-Soul, and is 
juxtaposed to a pure logos, which emanates from Nous and enforms 
the Pure Soul (-Penia?), which respectively gives birth to the Eros-god, 
mentioned only in the first theological part, but not in the part of the 
Symposium exegesis. 
The asset of Wolters’ interpretation is that it leaves open the 
possibility that the Symposium myth can refer directly, albeit implicitly, 
to the Heavenly Aphrodite (/pure Soul).  In this way, Wolters could 
once more support my reading, because I have noted my propensity to 
view the two parts of Plotinus’ theology synairetically, i.e. as 
complementary.  However, a problematic implication of Wolters’ 
proposal is that with respect to pure Soul there would be apparently no 
indefiniteness/Penia element, since its logos does not mix with 
indefiniteness.  How could we, then, explain the desire of 
Undescended Soul for Nous?  In previous sections I explained how by 
speaking of a synairesis of Poros with Penia, every ontological level can 
be seen as Poros in relation to its inferiors, but Penia in relation to its 
superiors.  In that way, even if pure Soul did not share in the 
indefiniteness/Penia referred to in the Symposium myth, its Poros aspect 
would still be Penia in relation to Nous, and hence we can account for 
Heavenly Aphrodite’s longing of its progenitor. 
CHAPTER 1:  PLOTINUS AND ENNEADS III.5.[50]: “ON LOVE” 
57 
Consequently, although I endorse Wolters’ general synairetic 
stance, due to the aforementioned problem I disagree with the details 
of his approach,128 a substantial part of which is his thesis on the 
referent of “impure logos” in l.13.  Thus, I will stay with the traditional 
view: “impure logos” already refers to Eros.129  Besides, the abrupt 
change of the subject (of «ἐξήρτηται δὲ ψυχῆς») in the immediately 
following passage,130 where the reference is undoubtedly to Eros, as is 
acknowledged by Wolters, too, would make very difficult the 
explanation as to how these consequent passages relate to each other.   
 
1.2.2. On daimonology 
The reference to the daimonic or divine status of Eros brings me to 
a second potential objection.  Save for the aforementioned ascriptions 
                                                          
128 See also the case of Dillon [1969], whose attitude is to read the whole treatise, or at 
least the theology section, as being an exegesis of the Symposium myth.  Although I 
am sympathetic to this view, his conflation of the data given in the second section of 
the theology (logos) with that of the first one (ousia) leads him to results I cannot 
follow.  For instance, when commenting on the second section of the theology, 
§7,15ff., Dillon,p.36, states the following: “Eros itself is a logos, proceeding from Soul.  
What seems to be stated here is that it is also a mixture produced from another logos 
(Poros) proceeding from Nous, (which is not mentioned), this logos descending from 
Nous to mingle with the soul (as unboundedness)”.  Yet, the statement that “Eros 
itself is a logos, proceeding from Soul” does not appear in the passage he comments 
on, and actually it is not stated, at least explicitly, anywhere in the treatise.  See also 
Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.428,(: note on §3,1-11), who underlines that the reference to 
«λόγος» is made only in the second part of the theology; hence, another reason to see 
Dillon’s overall conclusion as illegitimate.   
129 See e.g. Καλλιγᾶς’ relevant comments and translation ad loc. 
130 See III.5.7,15ff. 
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of ‘substance’ and ‘activity’ to Eros, Plotinus underlines Love’s divine 
status throughout the treatise.  Especially in the end of both theological 
parts, after he has made the bold statement about Eros’ being Soul’s 
activity, Plotinus concludes that “the Eros of the upper Soul may be 
considered a god, which keeps Soul eternally attached to that higher 
reality, but the daimon is the Eros of mixed Soul”.131  Regarding this 
second instance of Eros, in the end of the treatise Plotinus adds that it 
“is something matter-like… which is born from Soul, insofar as Soul 
lacks the good, yet desires it.”132  Furthermore, in §6 he gives us an 
extensive discussion of the nature of daimons in general and of the 
criteria of their distinction from gods.133  Does not this material build in 
the view that Eros can be seen as a specific divine entity,134 which, 
although related to Soul, is external to it?   
My retort is that if Eros-daimon is an instance within a larger 
group of daimons and deities, then my previous presentation about 
Eros’ ontological status should modify our conception of Plotinian 
daimonology on the whole.  We should not see daimons as substantial 
entities on their own right, but rather as powers whose exercise fulfills 
the being of an entity like World-Soul.  This synairetic point of view is 
                                                          
131 Ibid.,§4,23-25. 
132 Ibid.,§9,55-57: «οὕτω τοι ὁ Ἔρως ὑλικός τίς ἐστι, καὶ δαίμων οὗτός ἐστιν ἐκ 
ψυχῆς, καθόσον ἐλλείπει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἐφίεται δέ, γεγενημένος.» 
133 In this Plotinian context Osborne [1994],p.113 notes a literary inversion of the 
Platonic theme of lack, because now the daimons are said to have «πάθη» whereas 
the gods lack them; (they are ἀπαθεῖς».  See III.5,6,10-11). 
134 Cf. also ibid.,§9,42: “This Eros is a mixed thing («μικτόν τι χρῆμα»)…”. 
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verified by Plotinus’ various statements in §6 itself.  First of all, 
although he ascribes daimonic status to both World-Soul and the rest of 
the daimons, including her Eros,135 Plotinus is not unequivocal.  World-
Soul is the proper substance/entity from which several activities with 
respect to the administration of the world emanate.  Now, in ll.30-32 he 
refers to “…the other daimons…being brought forth from Soul…but by 
different powers” («δυνάμεσι δὲ ἑτέραις γεννώμενοι»), whereas two 
lines below (ll.33-35) he remarks that “it was necessary for the World-
soul to be adequate for the world by bringing forth daimon-powers 
(«γεννήσασαν δυνάμεις δαιμόνων»)…”.  That is, on the one hand 
Plotinus declares that daimons are generated by powers, whereas, on 
the other, he claims that they are powers themselves.136  But then the 
case is as with Eros: we have seen that in chs.4 and 9 Eros is the activity 
that result from Soul’s erotic disposition.  We concluded that this 
activity is also self-constitutional of Soul.  The same applies to the 
daimons: in so far as they serve in the administration of the world,137 
daimons self-constitute World-Soul (the proper entity) as the ruling 
principle of the world.  Hence, we can come to a synairesis of the 
daimons with World-Soul, asserting that they are necessary aspects of 
                                                          
135 Since we are closer to matter, the multiplication-indefiniteness-division increases, 
thus Plotinus speaks about daimons in the plural, whereas so far he has referred to 
only ‘one’ god:  Aphrodite and the necessary aspect of her being: god Eros.  This is 
not to suggest that he does not accept the existence of a plurality of deities, e.g. the 
stars, the visible gods.  It is interesting however, what he is willing to refer to in this 
treatise and what not to.   
136 Cf. also Wolters,p.164. 
137 Cf. III.5.6,31-33. 
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World-Soul’s being.  It turns out that Plotinus’ concept of daimons (and 
equivalently of gods) is more nuanced than expected, and that Eros’ 
ontological status can help us in clarifying these ontological 
questions.138 
Moreover, my de-mythologizing reading of Plotinus can be 
verified by Plotinus’ stance in other treatises.  When, nowadays, we 
read the Symposium, we do not need to take the references to the 
daimonic nature of Love as fundamental tenets which reveal the 
complicated structure of reality between the sensible and the 
intelligible realm.  Instead, such mythological references just pave the 
way for an understanding of Diotima’s “greatest mysteries”.139  
However, every historical phase sees the past from its own eyes.  That 
we, or Plato, do not seem to ascribe much importance to this kind of 
                                                          
138 Hence, I believe that my approach is more adequate than Hadot’s one, when he 
relates the answer to the problem of the ontological status of Eros with Plotinus’ 
principles of classification concerning a) intelligences and souls within the intelligible 
realm and b) gods, daimons and humans within the realm of Soul.  See Hadot 
[1990],pp.24-25: “L’‘Âme’ représente… un ensemble, lui aussi hierarchisé et unifié...  
A l’interieur…, la moindre distinction réelle est ell-même essence et substance.  Si 
donc,…, l’Amour est désigné comme une hupostasis, cela signifie, selon le sens 
habituel du terme chez Plotin, une ‘production substantielle’.  Pour situer exactement 
l’Amour dans le système plotinien des réalités, il faut remarquer,…, que, chez Plotin, 
on constate une interférence entre le principe de classification qui distingue les 
Esprits et les âmes et un autre principe de classification qui distingue les vivants 
raisonnables en dieux, demons et hommes (par exemple 38 (VI, 7), 6, 26-34),…  
Voulant insister fortement sur le caractère substantiel, et donc sur la bonté de l 
Amour, comme désir naturel de l’âme, Plotin n’a donc aucune difficulté à le 
concevoir comme un dieu ou un démon, comme un être vivant et eternel du même 
type que l’âme elle-même,...  Mais ce n’est évidemment pas une quatrième 
hypostase.”   
139 Perhaps Plato would seem more committed to the existence of daimons in 
Laws,713c5-e3.  Cf. also Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.376,n.1 (:Introduction to Enn.III.4). 
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reference need not reflect the attitude of other historical periods.  The 
example of the perception of the idea of our “allotted guardian spirit” 
in conjunction with Socrates’ ‘guardian spirit’ (δαιμόνιον) is 
characteristic.  Philosophers have been always ready to read allegorical 
references to human psychology under these ascriptions.140  However, 
within the course of time, complications were not avoided.141  The 
Middle Platonists seem to have made a lot from such references in their 
elaborate accounts of daimonologies.142  Such attitudes led to the 
elaborate religious-pagan hierarchies of later Neoplatonists.143  Hence, 
the position of Plotinus within such a historical context144 would seem 
to justify why one could take him as suggesting a hypostatization of 
Eros.  But is Plotinus really committed to that view? 
The above mention of “our allotted guardian spirit” becomes an 
ally of mine, since it testifies to Plotinus’ calm and rational engagement 
with popular-superstitious beliefs and the various pagan-religious 
                                                          
140 See the references of Καλλιγᾶς, pp.379-380, to Xenocrates and the Stoics, notably 
Chrysippus.  From the Pre-Socratic reflections on the theme of ‘daimon’ let us not 
forget Heraclitus,B119DK: «ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων», and Democritus,B170 and 
171DK. 
141 Cf. also Συκουτρῆς [1949],p.193*,n.7. 
142 See Plutarch, Περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου, (e.g. 580d-e); Apuleius, De deo 
Socratis, (e.g. 11.145); Μάξιμος Τύριος, Τί τὸ δαιμόνιον Σωκράτους α ΄(e.g. VII 5, 
90.17-92.4 Hobein) καὶ β΄.  Cf. Καλλιγᾶς, pp.381-382 with notes. 
143 See e.g. Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades,67,19-83,16, and cf. infra my 
discussion in 2.2.3.  At ibid.,75,11-15, Proclus refers to and criticizes Plotinus’ relevant 
view of the ‘guardian-spirit’, for which see infra in the next paragraph of my text.  
(This is also acknowledged by Armstrong’s Introductory Note to III.4 [vol.3],p.140.) 
144 See also the informative survey of Timotin [2012]. 
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elements found in the philosophical works of his past.  That is, 
according to Plotinus’ early treatise III.4.[15], entitled “On our allotted 
guardian spirit”, the Neoplatonic founder is ready to internalize this 
belief, and incorporate it in his psychological theory.  For Plotinus this 
guardian spirit may not be the leading-reasoning part of our soul, but 
actually it is identified with the ontological level above that which is 
dominant in our conscious life.  In such a view, even the One can be 
said to be the guardian spirit of a philosopher, who has attained to the 
level of Intellect.145  We should approach other references to gods and 
daimons throughout the Plotinian corpus in a similar way.146  Under 
the veil of such ‘traditional’ references Plotinus may be entertaining 
innovative views, absolutely compatible with his whole system, and 
also crucial for a better understanding of his rational stance towards 
reality. 
 
1.2.3. A daimonic counter-objection from within III.5? 
One might claim, however, that there is a serious argument within 
Plotinus’ text which undercuts my proposal of the synairesis of Eros 
with Soul, i.e. the synairetic view of Eros as an internal and necessary 
aspect of Soul’s being.  When Plotinus in §5 rebuts Plutarch’s 
interpretation of the Symposium-myth which identified Eros with 
                                                          
145 See especially III.4.§6,passim. 
146 In III.5 Plotinus refers to the specific issue of the ‘guardian spirit’ in §4,4-6. 
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cosmos, the Neo-Platonist gives several arguments against the Middle-
Platonist.  One of them is that “if the world is equivalent to its Soul, just 
as man is equivalent to man’s Soul, then it necessarily follows that 
Aphrodite is Eros.”147  Nonetheless, this statement leads to many 
absurdities according to Plotinus, since e.g. if the cosmos would be a 
daimon, then we would not able to account for the rest of the daimons: 
since they have the same substance as each other, therefore they, too, 
should be (parts of) the world, and then the world would be the 
mishmash of daimons, something unbearable for Plotinus.148   
What is more important, though, is his thesis concerning the 
avoidance of identifying Aphrodite, that is Soul, with its off-spring, i.e. 
Eros.  Such an attitude shows why the ‘synairesis’ I propose is not an 
unqualified identification, and hence it can clarify my views.  It is true 
that talking about Penia and Poros I came close to the point of 
identifying them with Soul; Soul is Penia in relation to Nous, but Poros 
in relation to the physical cosmos.  In any case, the myth talked about 
Eros as the offspring of this pair, hence I diagnosed the derivative sense 
in which Eros is connected to Soul.  Eros depends on Soul, because it is 
the outcome of her ontological status; we saw that it was the self-
constituting activity that brings Soul in contact with the intelligible.  
Hence, Eros was an activity stemming from within Soul’s own nature, 
not something external.  What is more, a Soul without erotic activity 
                                                          
147 Ibid.,§5,13-15. 
148 See ibid.,§5,15-18.   
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cannot be considered as existent entity, at all.  Hence, my ‘synairesis’ 
does not simply identify Soul with Eros.  It is as if we claimed that a 
music conductor is the activity of conducting.  However, it is true that 
in so far as he conducts, he is a conductor; thus, the (intentional) 
activity gives one his proper identity.  It is in this way why Eros is an 
internal and inseparable aspect of Soul; it stems from Soul’s own nature 
as the aspiration of its self-completion.  Hence, the real problem that 
Plotinus has with Plutarch’s interpretation is that Eros is not any more 
the self-constituting activity of an entity, but an independent entity 
itself.  This is what could enable one to identify Aphrodite with Eros.  
Contrary to that, Plotinus’ interpretation preserves the derivative sense 
between Aphrodite and her Eros; for Plotinus an Aphrodite that has 
not given birth to an Eros, is not a real Aphrodite.149 
 
1.2.4. Eros and Soul: who is first?  
Ι will conclude this chapter with an important detail of Plotinus’ 
account of the generation of Eros that completes the synairetic picture I 
gave.  We have seen that eros is the activity of Soul that constitutes it as 
a substantial entity.  In this formulation eros is at once 
contemporaneous and posterior to its mother.  As Καλλιγᾶς aptly 
                                                          
149 Cf. the beginning of Pausanias’ speech in the Symposium,180d4: «…οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ 
Ἔρωτος Ἀφροδίτη».  What this discussion brings out is that there is an inseparable 
unity between the entity and its (intentional) activity, between what an entity is and 
how it exists. 
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remarks,150 Aphrodite’s Eros is both «ἐξ αὐτῆς», as causally dependent 
on Soul, and «σὺν αὐτῇ»,151 because it is Soul’s self-constituting 
activity.  This is what Plotinus wants to bring to the forefront when in 
§2 he states that “since Aphrodite [sc. Soul] follows upon Kronos [sc. 
Nous]… she directed her activity towards him and felt affinity152 with 
him, and filled with passionate love for him brought forth Love, and 
with this child of hers she looks towards him”.153  Here, the ‘loving 
passion’ found in the activity of Aphrodite to her progenitor is distinct 
from the Love-Eros, the result of her activity.  Hence, one could 
complain: if Soul can be filled with eros prior to its generation, why do 
we really need a hypostatized Eros-offspring?  My synairetic 
interpretation has already given an answer to this: the erotic activity of 
Soul gives rise to its authentic self, i.e. an erotic entity.   
Now, if we turn to the description of Eros’ birth in the second 
theological part of the treatise, one might note an inconsistency with 
the previous citation.  I refer to our well-known passage: “…lack and 
desire, and the memory that constitutes the Reasons, come together 
                                                          
150 Cf. Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.426. 
151 Remember Plotinus’ initial questions in III.5.2,11 and 13-14, which I included in my 
Synopsis (ch.1.1.1.). 
152 The notion of «οἰκείωσις» is Stoic in origin and its cognates are used more than 
once in our treatise; (see §1: ll.13,18,25,38; §2,34).  Cf. Wolters,p.10. 
153 III.5.2,32-35: «ἐφεπομένη δὴ τῷ Κρόνῳ… ἐνήργησέ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ᾠκειώθη 
καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα Ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε καὶ μετὰ τούτου πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει».  
Armstrong’s trnsl.;  Wolters translates as follows:  “being intent… upon Kronos 
…Soul has conceived toward him both an activity and an affinity, and in her passion 
for him has given birth to Eros, together with whom she now looks toward him.” 
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into a unity in soul and produce (ἐγέννησε) an active orientation (τὴν 
ἐνέργειαν) towards the good, and this is Eros.”154  The «ἔλλειψις» 
corresponds to the Penia-aspect of Soul; but «ἔλλειψις» of what?  Of 
the Poros-aspect of Soul, which is «τῶν λόγων ἡ μνήμη».  Actually, 
the Poros-aspect is the “logoi”, whereas their memory denotes again 
the upwards orientation towards them.  Now, «ἔφεσις» being in the 
middle has an ambivalent position, since it clearly corresponds to the 
Penia-aspect of Soul, but the orientation of the desire is determined by 
the recollection of the logoi.  However, in the previous citation from the 
first theological part it seems that the erotic activity is prior to the 
constitution of Soul’s erotic substance/entity.  On the other hand, in the 
passage from §9 it is the fulfilled substance of Soul that generates a 
posterior erotic activity.  In other words, whereas in the passage from 
§2 Aphrodite would act towards her progenitor filled with erotic 
passion for him and then generate Eros, in §9 the erotic activity seems 
to follow the self-constitution of Soul, which is the result of her 
separate and unqualified “desire”.  Is Plotinus contradicting himself?  
Or is he just careless with the details?  Neither.  To this challenge I have 
a twofold answer:  a) in his methodological remarks Plotinus has 
warned us about the distortion that a discursive/diairetic grasp of 
reality can yield.  b) Eros is the self-conscious desire of the intelligible, 
since, as I have stressed, it is through eros that Soul constitutes itself as 
                                                          
154 Ibid.,§9,46-48.   
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a proper entity, which means being orientated towards its 
source/principle.   
Let me now elaborate a bit on these two remarks.  My first point, 
although preliminary, reminds us that all these complications, which 
relate to the temporal sequences, denote complicated ontological 
structures.  Further, our language is restricted by various aspects of our 
discursive apprehension of reality.  Hence, the fact that sometimes 
Plotinus mentions things happening prior to others, whereas at other 
times he makes them posterior, may denote the higher degree of unity 
within the fundamental function of Hypostasis-Soul.  When this reality 
is put to words, the interpreter must not stop at the diairetic elements 
which discriminate various accounts of the same thing, but he should 
proceed to a synairesis that sees these accounts as complementary.  
Besides, as I just noted with respect to the passages in §2, Plotinus aims 
at showing that Eros is not only derivative, but also contemporaneous 
with Soul. 
I proceed to my second point which is the most vital.  In discussing 
the eye-simile, I suggested that the constitution of Soul is that of an 
erotic entity, always being in constant reference to the intelligible.  This 
is why in §9 Plotinus separates the «ἔφεσις» from Eros, qua the result 
of ἔφεσις, since exactly this former desire represents the first moment 
of inchoate Soul’s/Penia’s reversion which fills it with logoi.  This prior 
ἔφεσις of §9 clearly corresponds to the prior “erotic passion” of §2.  
Yet, as we have seen, the orientation of Soul is ceaseless, because there 
CHAPTER 1:  PLOTINUS AND ENNEADS III.5.[50]: “ON LOVE” 
68 
is the element of insatiability, as was emphasized in the section on §7’s 
tragedy (ch.1.1.5.).155  Soul can sempiternally be what it is, only with 
constant reference to the intelligible.  This is why it is an erotic entity.  
What is more, I do not contradict myself, either, having stated that the 
offspring of Aphrodite, which gazes at the noeton with its mother, is 
actually Soul itself from the aspect of its self-constituting orientation 
towards Nous.  I have repeatedly stressed that for an entity to be what 
it is, it must exist orientating its activity towards the higher realms.  
This is what the «ἐνέργεια» in the last passage from §9 denotes; it is 
this eternally self-constituting activity.  Furthermore, we can propose 
that: a) ἔφεσις is this ἐνέργεια that self-constitutes Soul at its first 
moment of reversion.  Thus, the element of Penia prevails here.  b) On 
the other hand, ἐνέργεια is also the eternal self-constituting activity of 
the ‘already’ fulfilled Soul.  Hence, at that time the Poros-aspect is more 
prominent.  But in both cases we have both elements working.  In this 
first reversion/activity, Soul must already have the Poros-traces to be 
“filled with passion” and generate Eros.  Yet, when it generates Eros, 
that is, when Soul is self-constituted, it stays forever gazing at Nous, 
hence the Penia-aspect is always present.  This is why “Eros is eternally 
and necessarily come into existence out of the longing of Soul for the 
                                                          
155 Compare also the view of Rist [1964],p.98: “Desire gives way to adoration, though 
the word used… is still… Ἔρως”. 
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higher and good, and from the moment there was Soul, there was 
eternally Eros.”156 
Finally, I need to close this section with an additional point on the 
substantial result of Soul’s erotic activity and desire for what lies above 
it.  Although not stressed by Plotinus in III.5, a distinction should be 
drawn between an (internal) product and an (external) by-product.  
The former is what I have been showing so far: Soul’s self-constitution 
as a proper entity, i.e. Eros.  The latter is the subsequent generation of 
Soul’s lower parts, which -via the ultimate generation of matter- leads 
to the formation of the physical cosmos.157  Hence, the substantial, 
derivative and external result of Soul’s erotic activity is not Eros, but 
what lies beneath Soul,158 as is the case with Soul’s generation from 
Nous’ contemplation of the One.159   
 
1.3. Nous and Eros  
                                                          
156 See supra (nn.59 and 63) on this passage.   
157 The procedure of the (de-)generation of logoi, which Soul projects to matter, is 
described in III.8.§§1-7.  Ibid.,§4,39-40, Plotinus states that “[e]verywhere we shall 
find that making and action are either a weakening or a consequence 
(παρακολούθημα) of contemplation”.  My ‘by-product’ captures the sense of 
«παρακολούθημα». 
158 This aspect is stressed by Stathopoulou [1999], e.g. p.87.  In view of the 
Neoplatonic thesis that the world is eternal we could paraphrase the aforecited 
phrase from III.5 in the following way: ‘Cosmos is eternally and necessarily come into 
existence out of the longing of Soul for the higher and good, and from the moment 
there was Soul, there was eternally cosmos.’ 
159 See also III.5.3,3-4. 
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What I have been showing so far is that the erotic generation of 
Soul from Nous is equivalent to the erotic relation that Nous has with 
the One.160  The reason I am now tackling specifically with Nous is 
twofold: a) its erotic generation verifies the synairetic reading I 
proposed with respect to Soul’s Eros in III.5.  b) More generally, it 
illuminates once more the importance that Eros has in Plotinus’ 
ontology.  Let me begin by drawing a general scheme drawn from 
other treatises, where Plotinus gives a more detailed description of the 
emanation of Nous from the external activity of the One.161  There, he 
speaks of two ‘moments’:162  first, we have the emanation of an 
“inchoate Intellect”, or “intelligible matter”, which is simple, but in a 
degraded-potential sense compared with the One’s actual simplicity, 
and hence can be compared to Penia from III.5’s Symposium-myth.  
                                                          
160 However, a complication in the analogy comes from the notion of Undescended 
Soul.  Whereas the One is ungraspable in its hyper-being by the lower hypostases, 
Soul, qua Undescended, partakes in Nous, having the same content as he.  However, 
qua Soul, it is external to Nous, as a different Hypostasis, which implies that it 
reasons on the same content in a different mode than Nous.  Thus, what differentiates 
Soul from Nous is the former’s “discursion” («διά-νοια»); Soul’s reasoning is not an 
intuitive “all-at-once” procedure as Nous, but it moves in distinct steps, e.g. by 
separating the cause from its result.  As we will see, this is an aspect of what Poros as 
Logos stands for in the Symposium myth.  Hence, the reason why Soul might feel in 
need of Nous and revert to it is less a matter of lack in respect of content; it is, rather, 
a matter of lack with respect to the mode of apprehension of the same content.   
161 For specific references see in the following notes.  On the whole, I follow 
Emilsson’s excellent account [2007], especially pp.80-90, where he gives a detailed 
commentary of the passage concerning Nous’ generation from V.3.10,8-11 and 16. 
162 No need to repeat that the discursivity of our human language imposes ‘diairetic’ 
restrictions to the description of such a procedure that transcends time, being eternal.  
If there seems to be any ‘splitting’ in different ‘moments’ and temporal relationships, 
all these are ways to denote only ‘synairetic’ onto-logical relations. 
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After this first emanation, inchoate Intellect reverts upon the One.  
However, this gazing at the One has as immediate effect Intellect’s 
thinking of itself,163 with the further result of Nous’ self-constitution as 
the World of Forms (cf. its Poros-aspect), i.e. as the proper second 
Hypostasis.  Nous’ being the best possible image of the One’s unity-
simplicity, has introduced unity in multiplicity.  It is notable that in this 
picture, Nous’ activity towards the One, expressing again an erotic 
intentionality, self-constitutes Nous’ being, that is, as a self-thinking 
that produces the «ὄντως ὄντα».  Hence, it is this eternal erotic 
reversion that constitutes Nous’ proper being, making Nous an erotic 
being.164  Of course, in this ‘erotic’ description of Nous’ generation there 
arises no question concerning any potential postulation of a separate 
Eros-entity.  Finally, although it is true that Plotinus does not usually 
describe the dependence of Soul to Nous in terms of Nous’ relation to 
the One, in the erotic-‘synairetic’ treatise III.5 he urges us to do so; since 
the present focus is on what it is to be an erotic entity, I hope that the 
analogies of the erotic reversions-activities and self-constitutions 
between the two lower Hypostases have become clear enough.165   
Nonetheless, even if I we can couch Intellect’s generation in terms 
of III.5’s Poros-Penia myth, in VI.7.[38], when Plotinus explicitly 
connects Nous’ being in relation to the One with the Symposium-myth, 
                                                          
163 See also Vernant [1990],pp.475 and 477. 
164 Cf. IV.7.[38].35,24: «νοῦς ἐρῶν».   
165 For a support of the idea that there is an analogy between Soul and Nous despite 
the fact that Nous is not Undescended as Soul is see Emilsson [2007],p.78 and n.9.  
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he does not mention Penia at all.  A reason might be that in 
Enneads,III.6.[26] Plotinus uses again the same mythical material with 
respect to the formation of the sensible world, where Penia is prime 
matter, and, as stated (already in 1.1.3.), for Plotinus sensible matter 
never fully gets form.  Hence, perhaps to avoid negative connotations, 
he chooses not to speak in terms of Penia, although he does so with 
respect to Soul in our treatise, which is later than the other two.  The 
III.5-case may be an indication that in the mediating level of Soul, 
between sensible and intelligible world, we can speak of an increase of 
indefiniteness, and hence the symbol of Penia is more apt. It is also 
notable that Penia in our treatise does have intercourse with Poros, and 
not with an image of it as in the Plotinian interpretation given in III.6.166  
Of course, the fact that Plotinus is ready to give multiple 
interpretations of a single source of mythological material in various 
treatises need not imply any inconsistency.  It reveals Plotinus’ 
dynamic way of de-allegorization, where the myths serve as useful 
tools of the presentation that Plotinus wants to give.  
Returning to how he treats the same myth in VI.7, Plotinus 
implicitly identifies Poros with Nous, and stresses the role of Poros’ 
drunkenness, which has already been mentioned.  It is worth citing the 
passage:   
“Intellect also, then, has one power for thinking, by which it 
looks at the things in itself, and one by which it looks at what 
                                                          
166 See III.6.14,7-18. 
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transcends it by direct awareness and reception, by which 
also before it saw only, and by seeing acquired intellect and 
is one.  And that first one is the contemplation of Intellect in 
its right mind, and the other is Intellect in love, when it goes 
out of its mind ‘drunk with the nectar’; then it falls in love, 
simplified into contentment167 by having its fill; and it is 
better for it to be drunk with a drunkenness like this than to 
be more respectably sober.”168   
We see once more that what constitutes Intellect qua Intellect is this 
passionate-loving gazing at the One, as if the result of a divine 
drunkenness.  If we can identify Poros with Nous here, then we have 
again a duality of mythological elements:  Poros and the nectar that has 
made him drunk.  This pair can correspond to the pair of Penia-
(drunken) Poros in the III.5-case.  Poros has the traces of the One and 
reverts upon its source in a way that he becomes mad from love, 
because he is constituted as an erotic entity, as being in constant 
relation to the source of his divine madness.  Further, as we have seen, 
(again in 1.1.3.), in the Symposium exegesis of III.5, the temporal 
distinctions are not so clear-cut: it seems that the result of Poros’ 
contemplation is his being drunk with the nectar, but we can also claim 
that the nectar that has filled him is the traces of the One which make 
                                                          
167 Instead of Armstrong’s “happiness”, since it is too strong a rendering of 
«εὐπάθεια».  An alternative translation is also “satisfaction”. 
168 VI.7.35.19-27: «Καὶ τὸν νοῦν τοίνυν τὴν μὲν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν, ᾗ τὰ ἐν 
αὐτῷ βλέπει, τὴν δέ, ᾗ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ, καθ’ ἣν καὶ 
πρότερον ἑώρα μόνον καὶ ὁρῶν ὕστερον καὶ νοῦν ἔσχε καὶ ἕν ἐστι. Καὶ ἔστιν 
ἐκείνη μὲν ἡ θέα νοῦ ἔμφρονος, αὕτη δὲ νοῦς ἐρῶν, ὅταν ἄφρων γένηται μεθυσθεὶς 
τοῦ νέκταρος· τότε ἐρῶν γίνεται ἁπλωθεὶς εἰς εὐπάθειαν τῷ κόρῳ· καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῷ 
μεθύειν βέλτιον ἢ σεμνοτέρῳ εἶναι τοιαύτης μέθης.» 
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Poros eternally revert upon its source and constitute itself.  What is 
more, if we take the drunkenness to be the result of Poros’ reversion, 
then we can see why sober Poros can be the equivalent of Penia in our 
case.169  Neither of them are yet filled with the divine traces/limits 
which are imposed by the (drunken) Poros in the III.5-case, and solely 
by the nectar in VI.7-case.  Finally, it is important to note that what 
emanates from the One, and any other ontological level in general, 
transfers the ceaseless ardent passion for reversion towards it.  Thus, 
since in III.5 this overflowing nectar is compared to the Logos-
(Drunken) Poros inseminating Penia, Dillon aptly remarks that “[t]he 
Way Down and the Way Up, in fact, spring together from this 
drunkenness…”.170 
A further problem, though, with my approach is how to account 
for Nous’ fulfillment contrary to Soul’s insatiability, while both entities 
are erotic.  Remember that in §7 Plotinus states that “only that truly 
achieves fulfillment, which also constitutionally possesses fulfillment.  
But that which craves on account of its inherent deficiency is like a 
leaky vessel”.171  Further, as the other abovementioned passages above 
                                                          
169 I have already remarked that Plotinus tries to avoid this straightforward 
connection.  This can be also a reason why in VI.7 he does not use the name of Poros, 
but he restricts himself to using one element from the myth only. 
170 Dillon [1969],p.38.  Cf. an analogous remark (but said of the One and the soul) e.g. 
in Rist [1970],pp.168 and 172; cf. also Rist [1999],p.382 (on Nous’ relation to the One.  
In ibid.,p.386 there is connection with the pseudo-Dionysian ecstasy, for which see 
infra, ch.3.1.2). 
171 III.5.7,21-24.  Lacrosse avoids the problem by contrasting things in different 
categories: Soul and her erotic activity.  See supra,n.113. 
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suggest, if Nous is already fulfilled then, how can he have desire for 
the Good?  To these legitimate questions I have two points in response.  
The first element I would like to exploit here is the eternity of Nous.  
One aspect of Nous’ way of being is eternity; i.e. a constant now, 
without any temporal extension/succession that characterizes the 
sensible realm.  This erotic-self-constituting reversion is an eternal now.  
This is an alternative way to understand the seemingly contradictory 
idea from Enneads,III.8, according to which Nous “always desires [cf. 
Penia aspect] and always attains [cf. Poros aspect]”,172 where the 
“always” denotes atemporal eternity.  Further, I have already 
mentioned (e.g. in n.160) that an element that distinguishes Soul from 
Nous, is the former’s discursivity in contrast to the ‘concentrated’ unity 
of Nous.  Temporality, however, implies extension and succession of 
different time-units.  Besides, this is why time is the “moving image of 
eternity”.  Within this temporal realm, the realm of Soul, we have seen 
that Soul, too, is an erotic unity, always being in reference to its 
intelligible source.  Nonetheless, in this case the “always” must be 
conceived not as eternal now, but as denoting sempiternity, that is the 
totality of time (-units).  Within this temporal framework, for an entity 
to be ‘always desiring and always attaining’ would be a stronger 
contradiction, since, if at one distinct moment Soul is fulfilled, why 
should it keep desiring its fulfillment?  True, we are not obliged to 
view Soul’s generation from a temporal perspective, although Plotinus’ 
                                                          
172 Cf. III.8.11,23-24: «ὥστε ἐν μὲν τῷ νῷ ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ 
τυγχάνων,…» 
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elaboration of the issue is not quite clear.173  On the other hand, a mild 
failure of one to attain what he strives for can make him pursue further 
and further to fully attain his object of desire.  Hence, in stressing the 
insatiability of Soul(’s Eros), in contrast to Nous’ satiety, Plotinus 
perhaps focuses on the different way of being for his two entities,174 
and at the same time he tries to block a counter-argument that would 
attempt to obliterate the position that Soul is sempiternally an erotic 
entity.  It is true that Soul is fulfilled by gazing at the intelligible; but, 
after its fulfillment, why does it not stop its seeing?  If it stopped at 
some points in time, and then it realized that it must revert again, then 
there would be times that the sensible realm would be really bereft of 
its ultimate source, which of course would be quite unacceptable for 
Plotinus and his anti-Gnostic polemic.  Consequently, if we are to 
account for Soul as desiring the noeton for the totality of time, perhaps 
the best solution is to emphasize the tragic nature of its existence, i.e. 
that it is (always) orientated towards its source, however never fully 
attaining it, and hence always desiring it.175 
                                                          
173 See also Μουτσόπουλος [1978],pp.170-171. 
174 Hence, my train of thought here perhaps is the same with Armstrong, although 
coming from the opposite direction; see Armstrong,p.190,n.1: “…The idea that the 
soul’s Love has a radical incompleteness, a permanent incapacity to be satisfied… 
has… something in common with the account of the ‘restless power’ in soul which 
produces time in III.7 [45] 11.”   
175 This is another reason why I believe that the Symposium-account in III.5 is more 
adequate of that of the first part, since seen from a certain perspective it can be 
applied to Soul’s specific way of being in contrast to Nous’ one. 
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Finally, my second point exploits the connection of parallel 
passages from chs.7 and 9.  Apart from the above citation from §7, in §9 
Plotinus states that “Intellect… possesses itself in satiety and it is not 
‘drunk’ in its self-possession, for it does not possess anything 
extraneous.”176  Moreover, as Καλλιγᾶς has crucially pointed out, this 
passage suggests that Nous does not get drunk from itself.177  Nous is 
instead filled from something higher.  As the world of Forms, Nous is 
complete in relation to itself, not with respect to its source, viz. the 
Good.  From that point of view, then, the §9 passage is perfectly 
compatible with that from VI.7 on Nous’ having love for the One.  As 
that passage had stressed, Nous indeed is sober when it thinks itself, 
i.e. with respect to its own nature.  However, as the same passage 
makes clear in the following lines, in order for this completeness to 
exist, Nous must be drunk from the power which stems from the One, 
and arouses his manic love for its source of being.  It is because Nous 
has a manic-loving aspiration for the One, that he can constitute itself 
and, hence, be filled (with respect to himself).  Consequently, Nous, 
seen from its erotic point of view, is analogically as insatiable as Soul is, 
and this is why he eternally exists as this erotic intentionality, which 
enables him to have himself in this complete state.  On the other hand, 
from a bird-eye view Nous is ‘more’ fulfilled than Soul, since Nous is 
the proper “ousia”, whereas Soul is a further degradation of that 
                                                          
176 III.5.9,18-19: «νοῦς δὲ ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ἐν κόρῳ καὶ οὐ μεθύει ἔχων.  οὐ γὰρ ἐπακτόν 
τι ἔχει.» 
177 Cf. Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.450,n.ad loc. 
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“ousia”.  Hence, in a contrast between Nous and Soul we could hold 
that Nous is fulfilled relatively to the unfulfilled Soul.  This is also how 
we are to understand the phrase from III.8 where is stated that “Nous 
always desires and always attains”.  Nous always desires because it is 
inferior to the One, but always attains what it is to be Nous, that is the 
best possible image of the One.  In this sense, we can see again why 
when I was using the Poros-Penia terms I claimed that there is 
flexibility in the use of the various elements of the myths.  Nous as the 
world of Forms is the (drunken) Poros; however, because it is inferior 
to the One, it can be said to be Penia in relation to its principle of form, 
and hence desiring it.  Alternatively, as we have already seen, we can 
express the same idea in terms of the two moments of Nous’ 
generation:  intelligible matter-Penia gets its formation-Poros (-proper 
Nous) by eternally gazing at the One.   
 
1.4. Conclusions 
Although Plotinus’ treatise is entitled “On Love”, our pre-
occupation in my former discussion has been with the ontology of Soul 
along with extensive references to the other levels of the Plotinian 
system.  With the proposal of the radical ‘synairesis’ of Eros with Soul 
or Nous it turns out that an inquiry into the ontology of Eros cannot be 
conducted without reference to the entity to which Eros belongs, and 
vice-versa.  In that way we have come to realize the quintessential role 
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that Eros plays in the constitution of an entity as such.  In a nutshell, 
approaching the problem of the ontological status of Eros, we have 
ended up with a better understanding of the ontological structure of 
Plotinus’ system in general, and more precisely, we have come to an 
answer to the problem ‘what is it to be an entity?’:  being erotic.  It is as 
if Plotinus were telling us that there is no way in which to address the 
problem of Eros without connecting it with the substantial entities;  or 
even stronger:  there is no way in which to speak about the ontology of 
an entity without addressing the aspect of Eros.   
Hence, having completed the above discussion, if we were to give 
an answer to Plotinus’ opening question of the treatise, i.e. whether 
Eros is an affection of soul, god or daimon, I would respond that, first 
and foremost, Eros’ deepest essence is none of these alternatives:  Eros 
is a self-constituting activity of Soul, or every inferior entity for what 
transcends it, expressed in its contemplation of the intelligible.  Hence, 
the issue of Eros cannot be examined separately from the fact that it is 
Eros of an entity.  This is also the reason why if we were obliged to 
select one of Plotinus’ alternatives, initially, we would be inclined 
towards the ‘affection’ one, qualified as a ‘substantial’ affection.  By 
that we would show the ‘erotic passion’ with which Aphrodite is filled 
so that she gives birth to Eros.  However, although there is no 
pejorative sense in the notion of ‘affection’ qua ‘affection’ in §1 of our 
treatise,178 we had better be more cautious since the ‘passivity’ of the 
                                                          
178 Although a negative sense arises in §7 as we will see. 
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affection is most of the times related to the interfusion of soul with 
matter, i.e. to the composite («συναμφότερον»).179  Instead, as Plotinus 
will declare in III.6 the immaterial world, as also prime matter are 
totally impassive.  Thus, Flamand comes much closer to Plotinus’ 
thought when he states that  
“[s]ans doute le propos essentiel de Plotin est-il plutôt de 
montrer qu’Éros, loin de se reduire à une passion, bonne ou 
mauvaise, est un dieu ou un démon, une réalité vivante 
étroitement apparentée à l’âme, capable d’en suivre ou d’en 
inspirer tous les mouvements, capable de l’orienter vers la 
beauté qui pour elle ouvre la voie au bien et au bonheur 
véritable.”180 
Flamand’s remark reminds us that III.5.[50] precedes treatise 
I.8.[51]:“On what are and whence come evils”, in which Plotinus 
encounters one of the most difficult problems posed against systems 
like the Neoplatonic one:181 how to account for the existence of evil in 
the world.  Part of Plotinus’ answer to the problem is that vice, 
connected to matter, is complete opposition to being, the total 
otherness, i.e. non-being.182  Contrary to this ‘non-real’, but existing in a 
                                                          
179 Hence, it has also the pejorative sense of something being external to an entity, i.e. 
not stemming by the entity’s own nature. 
180 Flamand [2009],p.418. 
181 Flamand (ibid.) reminds us also the difficult conditions under which Plotinus spent 
the last years of his life, i.e. the time when he wrote the aforementioned treatises (cf. 
Porphyry, Vita Plotini,2,10-23).  It is notable that the aforementioned treatises are 
followed by II.3.[52]:”On whether the stars are causes”, which tackles again with the 
problem of evil from its particular point of view. 
182 Plotinus’ symmetrical system is really a masterpiece: also the One is beyond being, 
hence non-being, albeit in the opposite direction.   
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sense, aspect of the world, then, in III.5 we see that Plotinus wants to 
stress so much the crucial reality-existence of Eros, that he comes to the 
point of referring to it as a divine entity in its own right. As we saw, 
Plotinus does so in order to account for the substantial self-constitution 
of an entity as such.  Further, then, if Eros corresponds to the self-
constituting reversion of an entity, then it is the antidote to the vicious 
«τόλμα» (“audacity”), which corresponds to the procession.  As it 
seems, Plotinus wants to stress that for an entity to be an entity, i.e. to 
exist, it is not enough to speak about its ‘audacity’, the ‘vicious’ will of 
an entity to belong only to itself.183  It must strive to come back to its 
progenitor and be self-constituted as an entity.  Hence, by realizing the 
impossibility of being οn its own, the entity becomes erotic.  Of course, 
I, like Plotinus, use here anthropomorphic language.  I have already 
stressed the necessary aspect of Penia’ reversion due to her Poros-
traces,184 and respectively I have mentioned that the formation of the 
lower levels of reality is the necessary outcome of One’s majestic 
                                                          
183 The anthropomorphic language used by Plotinus is conspicuous.  We should not 
forget, however, that according to the principles of his system both procession and 
reversion are necessary aspects of every entity.  Exceptions are the first term of the 
series, the One, which has no prior,  and the last term, prime matter, which proceeds 
from Soul, but is totally unable to revert;  hence, matter, the necessary source of evil, 
and non-being is non-erotic.  This is why it does not have real “existence”.  On the 
other hand, as we will see infra (e.g. n.191), in his positive assertions about the One 
Plotinus will be in a position to ascribe Eros to the One.   
184 In that context I stressed the notion of non-deliberation.  Hence, from such a point 
of view, a substantial view of Eros –«ψυχοπομπὸς», who does not deliberate in his 
upwards striving, and by doing so he spurs “souls on to the Beauty on high” 
(III.5.2,4-5), could be a justification for how to account for Plotinus’ image of entities 
‘deliberating’ to proceed out of their ‘fathers’. 
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power, expressed in its unintended over-flowing.  But even within this 
scheme Plotinus wants to elevate the erotic-‘synairetic’ element of the 
generation of reality, not the ‘diairetic’ one.185  What is more, if, after 
my whole argument, we can assert that beneath the references to the 
substantial Eros lies Soul’s erotic way of being, we could follow 
Plotinus’ language and propose the following:  if every level of reality 
has its specific name due to its ‘audacious’ procession,186 from the point 
of view of reversion there is a sole name for every entity: Eros.  
Everything is Eros in relation to the One,187 which «κινεῖ δὴ ὡς 
ἐρώμενον».188 
Indeed, Plotinus in VI.8.[39] will call even the One as “lovable and 
love and love of himself”.189  In this notable assertion we see Plotinus’ 
flexible language, as with the case of the meaning of “matter”.  One of 
the pivotal conclusions of III.5 is that love implies deficiency (Penia), 
hence it can have meaning only for an inferior in relation to its 
superior.  Further, Plotinus declares that “the Good is not desiring –for 
                                                          
185 Further, it is true that what each entity achieves after its procession is to become 
the best possible, but still inferior, image of its progenitor.  Additionally, the parallel 
with Empedocles’ principles-forces of Love and Strife is tempting. However, Plotinus’ 
version is vertical, not horizontal, and eternal.  In contrast, in Empedocles we have 
the circular succession of periods when Love or Strife prevail, the latter being quite 
unacceptable to Plotinus as a view.  See infra in my main text. 
186 According to one thesis put forward in the Cratylus there is a substantive 
connection between the name and the nature/essence of a thing…  
187 Lacrosse [1994],p.129ff. in his Conclusion speaks of “the omnipresence of love”, 
but he follows different, though not opposing, paths from mine.   
188 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Λ.7,1072b3: “it moves by being loved”. 
189 VI.8.15,1.  Cf. also ibid.,§16,12-16. 
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what could it desire?- or attaining, for it did not desire [to attain 
anything].”190  Thus, if there is no Penia in the One, Plotinus, in his 
optimistic view of Eros, is willing to ascribe to the One Eros, but Eros of 
itself.  Another reason why Plotinus reaches this conclusion is that in 
this treatise he chooses to be cataphatic regarding the One, hence he 
transposes language he usually uses for Nous to the case of the One, 
but in a more extolled way.191  Hence, from Aristotle’s god who loves 
himself and forms a basis for Plotinus’ doctrine of Nous, we have 
ended up with a rather Aristotelian picture, like the One-god of VI.8.192   
Furthermore, the fact that Plotinus chooses in the late III.5 to adopt 
an optimistic (-erotic) view of the generation of reality, rather than a 
                                                          
190 III.8.11,24-25. 
191 See e.g. VI.8.7,46-54; ibid.,§13,6-8 and §16,27-33, esp. l.32: «…οἷον… ἐγρήγορσις 
καὶ ὑπερνόησις…».  These are my answers against Pigler [2002], who structures her 
whole approach on VI.8.§§15 and 16 (i.e. top-down) rather than III.5 (i.e. from 
bottom-up).  However, I am in agreement with much of what she says and this will 
be revealed in the next chapter: 2.(1.), where I discuss Plotinus’ lack of incongruity 
with Proclus regarding the issue of providential eros.  See also the discussion of Rist 
[1964],pp.76-85, 96-97, 99, (with Rist [1970],p.166), Vogel [1963],p.22, with some not 
very transparent but pertinent remarks in p.24, Vogel [1981],pp.69-70, 74 (and n.49 in 
p.79), and Esposito Buckley [1992],pp.(42), 44-47 and 56, esp. p.45. 
192 Let us not forget that an indication of the power of an entity is the extent and 
importance of entities dependent on it.  We have seen that the by-product of the 
erotic constitution of an entity is the generation of further entities.  Within this 
framework it is natural that the One, being the ultimate source of reality, would be 
said to be an erotic entity, too.  Still, because it is ultimate, the erotic intentionality 
cannot be but self-directed...  Aspects of this idea are treated by Gerson [2006],p.55ff. 
esp.p.66.  In Gerson’s argumentation the Plotinian relation of Beauty to Goodness 
plays a central role.  For another Neoplatonizing interpretation of the relation of 
Beauty to the Good in Diotima’s speech see Beierwaltes [1986],pp.298-299; cf. 
ibid.,p.305. 
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pessimistic (“audacious”) one,193 is very important if one considers the 
significance that the notion of «τόλμα» had among the Gnostics and 
the Neo-Pythagoreans.  Hence, as various interpreters point out, 
although Plotinus “uses it in his early treatise On the three principle 
Hypostases (V 1 [10].1.4), and, somewhat more reluctantly, a bit later 
(see III 6 [26].14.8), … he seems to avoid it after his anti-Gnostic 
polemic”.194  This reference becomes even more relevant if one takes 
into account that Plotinus in his exegesis of the Symposium myth is 
quite possibly offering his ‘authentic’ reading of Plato contra the overly 
ascetic interpretations of Gnostics, who, as Καλλιγᾶς notes, conceived 
Eros “as a cosmogonical power responsible for the imprisonment of the 
divine light in matter”.195  With respect to the cosmological aspect, I 
have already noted that the erotic activity of Soul, apart from its self-
constitution, has as a by-product the further emanation of the logoi 
until the level of Nature forms the sensible world.  For the anti-Gnostic 
Plotinus the generation of the sensible world, this visible god, is not in 
itself the vicious outcome of the failure due to the weakness of higher 
                                                          
193 Although, as we saw, they are two sides of the same coin.  Besides, this is another 
aspect of Eros’ tragic nature. 
194 Καλλιγᾶς [1998],p.323, note on II.9:”Against the Gnostics”,[33].11,20-23.  This 
interpretive attitude stems from Dodds [1965],pp.24-26, esp. pp.25-26; cf. also 
Atkinson [1983],p.5.  In his more recent and elaborate note on V.1.1,3-9, Καλλιγᾶς 
[2013],p.223-224, does not stress this aspect.  In any case, Plotinus’ erotic dialogue 
seems to be a part of his ‘recantation’… 
195 Cf. Καλλιγᾶς [2004],p.408.  It is also interesting that for Καλλιγᾶς,ibid., this is a 
basic reason why Plotinus offers us the exegesis of a myth, a procedure that he 
perhaps was not very fond of.  In any case, Καλλιγᾶς’ remark gives an answer to 
why the scope of our treatise would appear to be narrower than many interpreters 
would expect. 
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entities.196  However, in the initial remarks of our exploration I noted 
that the daimonic Aphrodite-World-Soul corresponded to the human 
beings characterized by ‘mixed love’, and we also saw that Plotinus 
appreciated them, too, contra to any sort of Gnostic asceticism.197 
Now, this reference to the ethical point of view of the individual 
souls’ love, which was the central topic of Plotinus’ §1, is crucial.  It can 
show us why Plotinus stresses the divine existence of Eros and the 
important position it occupies in the Plotinian structure of reality.  We 
should not forget that Plotinus’ penultimate treatise198 considers the 
individual souls and in what sense our true self is not the composite, 
but is identified with the Undescended Soul.  However, if we are in fact 
Undescended Soul(s) how is it possible that people develop 
desires/loves ‘contrary to nature’, as we saw in Plotinus’ §1?  For one 
thing, we have stressed the necessity that underlies Soul’s, and also 
Nous’ erotic reversion towards what is beyond, and their subsequent 
                                                          
196 It is true, however, that sometimes Plotinus’ language reminds of the Gnostics.  In 
any case, we have to stress that the generation of the inferior levels of reality in 
unintended according to Plotinus.  As the myth depicts, Penia has intercourse with 
Poros when the latter is sleeping, i.e. without his choice to come into contact with 
Penia.  Yet , to be more precise, the Neopythagorean and Gnostic uses of «τόλμα» are 
not identical.  See Atkinson’s [1983] lengthy note,pp.4-6, esp. pp.4-5.  One of the most 
important differences is that although in both systems the notion is negatively 
coloured, in the Gnostics (at least the Valentinians) τόλμα represents the upwards 
movement of Sophia, who tries to unite itself with Nous, the “abortive” result of 
which is the generation of the demiurge and the material world.  Thus, although the 
product of τόλμα eventually refers to our familiar downwards movement, its cause is 
found in the opposite direction, something that forms an upright disagreement with 
the Neoplatonic world-view.   
197 See in the “Synopsis” (ch.1.1.1.) and nn.7 and 22. 
198 I.1.[53]: “What is the living being, and what is man?”. 
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self-constitution.  How is it, then, that particular souls199 deviate from 
the natural course of this vertical necessity?  Plotinus has given the 
answer very clearly in his relevant treatises (e.g. Enn.,I.8. and I.1.):  it is 
the interfusion with matter that impedes the function of our true-self 
and distances him from its genuine source.  Then, in terms of our 
treatise the exaggerated engagement with our bodily needs and for the 
sake of our bodily constitution makes us forget our true self, and hence 
its deep erotic constitution, as looking towards what is higher, not the 
opposite direction.  These ‘contrary to nature’, bodily desires cannot 
form expressions of our erotic aspiration towards the intelligible, but 
only perverted results of an individual that has ‘separated’ himself 
from his erotic constitution.   
Now, perhaps it is already apparent that in these observations we 
are doing nothing else than paraphrasing Plotinus’ remarks in §7.  It is 
only now that we have had an onto-logical training that we can 
appreciate why Plotinus after his first exegesis of the Symposium myth 
in §7 chooses to refer back to the issue of eros as “affection” of 
individual souls.  His statements can be also revealing as to the way 
Eros exists.  Hence, Plotinus declares that  
“the good men of this world direct the Eros which they have 
to the non-particular and truly worthwhile good, and do not 
have a particular Eros.  But those who identify with other 
daimons, identify with one daimon after another, leaving the 
                                                          
199 An important exception is World-Soul which is never dragged by matter; cf. e.g. 
IV.3.9,29-34, esp. ll.33-34. 
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Eros which they simply ‘have’ inactive, and instead 
developing their activity along the lines of another daimon, 
the one they have ‘chosen,’ in accordance with the 
harmonizing part of the activity-principle in them, namely 
Soul.  Those, however, whose longing goes out to evil things, 
have repressed, by the evil desires which develop within, all 
the Erotes within them, just as they repress, by the bad 
opinion which they acquire, their innate right reasons. Now 
the Erotes which are natural and in accordance with Nature 
are fair and good: those which belong to an inferior Soul are 
inferior as far as their worth and power goes; others are 
superior; all consist in Substance (πάντες ἐν οὐσίᾳ).  But the 
unnatural loves of those who have gone wrong –-these are 
affections, and are in no way Substance or substantial 
Existences (οἱ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν σφαλέντων πάθη ταῦτα καὶ 
οὐδαμῇ οὐσία οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεις οὐσιώδεις).  They are no 
longer brought forth by Soul, but come into existence as 
concomitants of vice, whereas Soul, for its part, only brings 
forth – in disposition and attitudes – things similar to itself.  
For it would seem to be generally true that the true goods are 
Substance (οὐσία) as long as the Soul acts in accordance with 
Nature, in limits. The alternatives to the good, however, do 
not derive their activity from Substance, but are nothing but 
affections (πάθη).”200   
This crucial passage shows why we should not be justified to see 
Eros as primarily an affection of Soul.  However, it is true that as 
Wolters notes, here Plotinus seems ‘confusingly’ to switch the sense of 
“affection” from a neutral one in §1 to a pejorative one.  However, 
according to our approach the problem with affection even in this 
passage is not that it is a «πάθος», but that it is an affection without 
                                                          
200 III.5.7,30-49. 
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ontological grounding.201  This is the reason why in §1 Plotinus begins his 
discussion talking about the “affection which we ascribe to Eros”.202  Of 
course, after all our discussion it turns out that Soul is in fact 
responsible, a necessary aspect of Soul being its erotic activity.  Hence, 
the souls that achieve in being co-ordinate with the Undescended Soul, 
i.e. their true self, have true-substantial erotic desires, which bring 
them in relation to Nous.  However, souls that are dragged by matter 
have forgotten who they truly are, hence their desires do not stem from 
Soul’s erotic desire for Nous.  This is why a perverted soul-composite, 
then, gives rise to perverted desires which lead soul deeper in the 
‘underworld’.  It is also very important that Plotinus has used here the 
baffling substantial vocabulary about Eros.  In so doing, he shows us 
the real incentives of speaking of Eros’ existence as a divine entity.  In 
so far as the perverted people remain remote from this self-constituting 
activity, they stop existing in a proper sense, hence, in a vicious circle, 
their diverse activities do not relate them with the realm above.  On the 
other hand, the loves produced according to nature converge in the 
function of getting us higher;  let us not forget that as Plotinus will state 
in §4, “the All-soul has an All-Eros, and… the partial Souls each have 
their own Eros.  But just as the relation of the microcosmic Soul to the 
All-soul is not one of separation, but of inclusion, so that all Souls 
constitute a unity, in the same way each microcosmic Eros stands in 
                                                          
201 Hence also my complement to the brief remarks of Osborne [1994],p.115. 
202 III.5.1,10-11. 
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this relation to the All-Eros.”203  In so far as our eros is co-ordinate with 
Soul’s self-constituting, and hence divine, Eros, then we have become 
true beings, erotic entities, Undescended Souls.204 
Now, since I have been giving some reasons as to why Plotinus 
wants to emphasize so much the importance of the existence of Eros, in 
a way that called for our careful reading, I want to give a final reason:  
in speaking about Eros as if it were an entity, Plotinus faithfully follows 
Plato’s example in the Symposium, where after Diotima’s encomium of 
love in the abstract, Alcibiades comes to complete it by his encomium 
to the instantiation of love, Socrates.205  Socrates personifies exactly the 
power of love that leads one towards the intelligible.  What is more, 
Diotima’s account is surrounded by the references to its particular 
instantiation, since in the description of the daimonic Eros, the off-
spring of Poros and Penia, one can find direct allusions to Socrates.206  
                                                          
203 Ibid.,§4,9-13.  Cf. also ibid.,ll.13-18. 
204 Of course, there are two side issues here, which could complicate the picture:  a) 
the existence of individual Souls in Nous; b) the great flexibility of individual souls 
not only to move deep down to matter, contrary to World-Soul, but also ascend even 
to the Union with the One, again in contrast with the rest of stable Hypostases-levels 
of reality. 
205 Cf. Συκουτρῆς [1949],pp.145*-146*.  It is interesting that Συκουτρῆς (see e.g. 
pp.159*-180*) much before Nussbaum’s relevant approach [2001], ch.6:pp.166-199, 
was aware of the importance of Alcibiades’ speech.  However, he never saw the 
problem of the individual as object of love in Plato, as Vlastos [1973],e.g. pp.28,32,34, 
famously did, exactly because the modern Greek philologist thought that Alcibiades’ 
speech completes Diotima’s account (cf. e.g. pp.151*,154* and 180*). 
206 This identification had already been observed in Antiquity, as Συκουτρῆς notes 
(p.142,n.1).  See also Osborne [1994],pp.93ff., esp. pp.94-95.  What is more, Plotinus in 
our treatise refers to some of these characteristically Socratic features of daimonic 
Eros in §5,20-21: «ἄστρωτον, ἀνυπόδητον, ἄοικον».  Wolters in his comments 
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Hence, Socrates can claim to know particularly the ‘erotic’ issues 
because he is an erotic entity.  At the same time, according to a 
potential Plotinian reading, his classic saying that ‘he does know that 
he does not know anything’ can show exactly Socrates’ realization that 
he is Penia in relation to the intelligible.207  Moreover, it is exactly this 
realization that Socrates tries to generate in his interlocutors, so that 
they try to convert their Penia into Poros.  Far from numbing them, 
then, Socrates wants to orientate them towards the intelligible; that is, 
he wants to make them erotic entities, too.  It is, then, perhaps for this 
reason why from lover, Socrates, the real lover of wisdom, can become 
the beloved;  in making the others to feel Penia in relation to him, he 
«κινεῖ δὴ [sc. them] ὡς ἐρώμενον».  Divine Plotinus’ erotic (Neo-
)Platonism might turn out to be more (Neo-)Socratic than the 
interpreters would allow him to be…  Let us now turn to an ancient 
interpreter, Proclus, to see what he makes of all these issues: is eros 
identified only with an ascending power?  Is its paradigmatic 
instantiation Socrates?  Does Socrates’ relation with other people, and 
in particular Alcibiades, tell us anything about Eros in the intelligible 
realm? 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(e.g.p.147 and especially p.189,n.73) seems to ignore the possibility of such a 
perspective. 
207 If Socratic ignorance was supportive of the Academic Skeptics’ view of Plato, I 
believe that it still survives in the Neoplatonic system, i.e. a dogmatic-positive view of 
Plato, under the guise of the ineffability and unknowability of the One.  See also 
Monrad [1888],pp.163ff., esp.pp.174-176 and 184-186.  Again, of course, it is via 
Plato’s realization (e.g. of the restrictions of language), and by way of Middle 
Platonists like Plutarch, that Socrates can be connected to Plotinus. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROCLUS ON THE FIRST ALCIBIADES 
 
In the Introduction to his magisterial edition of the Elements of 
Theology, E.R. Dodds cites the following passage from Proclus’ 
Commentary on the First Alcibiades as evidence of pseudo-Dionysius’ 
“slavish” imitation of the Platonic Successor:1 «καὶ θεοὶ τοίνυν θεῶν 
ἐρῶσιν, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι τῶν καταδεεστέρων, ἀλλὰ προνοητικῶς, καὶ 
οἱ καταδεέστεροι τῶν ὑπερτέρων, ἀλλ’ ἐπιστρεπτικῶς.»2  For my 
present purposes I want to suspend any judgement concerning the 
relation between the acknowledged Church Father and Proclus.3  
Instead, I will go backwards in order to contrast the penultimate Head 
of the Academy with the official founder of Neoplatonism.  One central 
element in my previous discussion of Plotinus was that Love implies 
deficiency («Πενία»); hence, only an inferior being would aspire to its 
erotic union with the superior ontological levels, not the other way 
                                                          
1 Dodds [21963],p.xxviii; here Dodds follows Koch [1900]. 
2 Proclus, Comm. on Alc. I, p.56, ll.2-4 Westerink [21962];  (henceforth, the citation of 
this work will be in the following form: On Alc.,56,2-4, where the first number 
denotes the pagination of Westerink’s edition, and the rest the lineation): “So gods 
too love gods, the superior their inferiors providentially, and the inferior their 
superiors, reflexively.” (The translation used throughout, although sometimes 
modified, is by O’Neill [1965]). 
3 See ch.3.  For presentations of Proclus’ system, apart from Siorvanes [1996], see more 
recently Μάνος [2006], esp. pp.101-251 and Chlup [2012].  See also Τερέζης [2005], 
which consists of studies occasioned by on Alc.,174,1-186,18, of which he gives a 
modern Greek translation, too (in pp.17-53). 
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round.  Eros was identified with the self-constituting reversion 
(«ἐπιστροφή») of an entity towards its progenitor.   
Now, Proclus in the aforementioned passage seems to violate this 
fundamental principle glaringly; it is not only the inferior beings 
(/gods) that can have (reversive) eros towards the superior ones, but 
also the other way round: eros can also be the descending (-
providential) love of the superior orders for the inferior ontological 
ranks.  Does this mean, then, following the Plotinian analysis, that 
apart from the standard relation of the lower for the higher beings, the 
superior beings are deficient, too, because in need of their inferiors?  
However, in that case the boundaries between ‘superiority’ and 
‘inferiority’ are completely blurred.  In what sense is an entity higher in 
the ontological rank if it needs its descendants?  And in that case, why 
do the ‘inferiors’ desire the ‘superiors’?  In response to this difficulty, I 
have to state from the very beginning that Proclus does not approve of 
any such compromise.4  It is a characteristic of all Neoplatonists that 
they give a hierarchical picture of reality: the existence of each 
ontological level depends solely upon its superior.   
If, then, we cannot accuse Proclus of any blatant inconsistency, 
does this mean that by his time we have had a fundamental shift in the 
notion of Eros?  Is it that Eros does not imply deficiency anymore, and 
that he has become, like Aphrodite, «ἀμήτωρ», i.e. the offspring of 
Πόρος alone, due to his love/provision for Πενία?  But how one can 
                                                          
4 Cf. also Μάνος [2006],p.230. 
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really square the notion of ascending eros with that of descending eros?  
Does Proclus have two completely separate stories about these 
opposing instances of love?  Moreover, is the gap between Proclus’ and 
Plotinus’ conception of Eros really unbridgeable?  In the following 
sections I will try to show not only the unity of Proclus’ highly 
systematic thought and the complementarity of his accounts, but also 
his real attitude towards Plotinus concerning our specific matter: 
although at first sight it might seem implausible, Proclus in fact 
explicates what is only implicit in Plotinus.5  My main focus will be on 
Proclus’ Alcibiades Commentary with the aid of the Elements of Theology.  
More specifically, my basic point is that the model of descending and 
ascending eros maps onto the familiar Neoplatonic scheme of 
procession and reversion.  Descending or providential eros is a species 
of providence and a by-product of reversive eros.   
My discussion of Proclus is divided into two parts.  In the first part 
(ch.2.1.) I emphasize the ethical aspect of Proclus’ views, while in the 
second part (ch.2.2.) I will dwell on metaphysical questions.  Hence, 
since in the chapter on Plotinus I was basically speaking about 
reversive eros, in the first part of the chapter on Proclus I will draw 
more on the nature of providential love.  I will give various examples 
of descending eros, whose illustration will help us understand the 
complementary relation of ascending and descending eros in Proclus, 
                                                          
5 Hence I disagree with Μάνος [2006],pp.230 and 225. 
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although for a definite and more elaborate answer the reader needs to 
wait until the second metaphysical part of my treatment.   
 
2.1. Providential and Reversive Eros: 
Proclus versus Plotinus?  
2.1.1. From Alcibiades’ reversive eros to Socratic love 
In this section I will establish the existence of reversive eros in 
Proclus and I will introduce us to Socratic love: although not to be 
identified with Alcibiades’ reversive love for Socrates, Socrates’ care for 
Alcibiades is erotic.  Thus, I begin with a passage where Proclus 
employs a trio known to us: Penia, Poros and Eros, who appear in the 
Platonic Symposium and reappear in Plotinus’ exegesis in Enn.III.5.6 
“…asking the right questions (τὸ… καλῶς ἀπορῆσαι) is the 
cause of facility in solution (εὐπορίας).  The poverty (πενία) 
within us is cause of our lack of resource (ἀπορίας), and love 
(ἔρως) arouses us to the search for perfect knowledge; but 
resource (πόρος) lies in the being and <intelligent substance> 
of the soul, since it is the son of Counsel (Μήτιδος7).  Our 
substance proceeds from above, from the divine intellect, but 
                                                          
6 These two parallels are noted by O’Neill ad loc. (n.438, although the reference to 
Plotinus should rather be to III.5.§§7 and 9, not 8 and 9).  O’Neill notes in the ‘Preface’ 
to his trnsl.-comm. ([1965], p.vii of the Prometheus Trust’s edition) that he is indebted 
for his Plotinian references to A.H. Armstrong. 
7 The ‘personal’ reference of πόρος here as the son of Μήτιδος shows clearly that at 
least the previous mentions of πενία, πόρος and ἔρως could have been printed with 
their first letter as capital, so that they more clearly denote the literary/mythological 
allusion.  (On the other hand, the second round of mentions to come in ll.8-10, being a 
sort of interpretation, would rather be kept as it is.) 
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what is potential within us is the poverty and indeterminacy 
of life.  Now when we are aroused to the love of the 
knowledge of ourselves, we behold the resource within us 
and the whole ordering of the soul.”8 
This excerpt is not concerned with the genealogy of eros per se, and 
hence it does not give an account of what eros is.  Instead, it is posed 
within the more restrained context of illustrating the form of enquiry 
(«εὕρεσις» on our own) as opposed to learning («μάθησις» by 
someone else).9  However, immediately there follows a second round 
of ‘de-allegorizing’ references10 which become much more reminiscent 
of Plotinus, since poros is associated with our intellectual substance, 
itself derived from Intellect, as are the λόγοι/λόγος in Plotinus’ case.  
What is more, penia’s relation to our intellectual ‘potentialities’, as well 
as indefiniteness, recalls the Plotinian approach.  Penia is related to the 
(generation of our) eros for the knowledge (of ourselves), which is 
equated with contemplation of our own “poros”, i.e. with the 
(recollection of the) inherent λόγοι in us.  All these elements are very 
close to Plotinus’ spirit and we could apply analogous remarks to those 
I made above concerning Plotinus.11 
                                                          
8 On Alc.,236,3-10. 
9 For Proclus’ views on these matters, the supremacy of enquiry against learning, and 
hence the superiority of those who “behold the truth of themselves,… while the 
weaker characters need in addition both instruction and reminders from others who 
possess perfection…” see On Alc.,176,18-177,18. 
10 See ibid.,236,6-10. 
11 Proclus had also composed a now lost Commentary on the Enneads.  For some extant 
information see Bidez [1937] and Westerink [1959]. 
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Thus, although the above excerpt does not primarily intend to 
clarify the nature of love, it does associate the notion of penia (-
deficiency) with eros, and it is certainly a deficiency that characterizes 
Alcibiades, who falls short of Socratic self-knowledge.  Although he 
didn’t, Proclus could have used this very simile also in more 
metaphysically-loaded passages, given the preeminent position he 
ascribes to ἔνδεια in relation to ἔρως/ἔφεσις in both the Alcibiades’ 
Commentary and the Elements of Theology.  Starting with the former, 
Proclus is crystal-clear when stating that «ἔστι… ὁ ἔρως ἔφεσίς τινος 
ἐρρωμένη καὶ σύντονος,12 καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐρῶν ἐφίεταί τινος οὗ ἐστιν 
ἐνδεές».13  These lines could have been written by Plotinus, as well as 
Plato.14  Granting the intimate relation between desire and love, the 
same idea is recapitulated in the Elements, although the word «ἔρως» 
and its cognates are absent from this introductory work:15 «τὸ γὰρ 
                                                          
12 Cf. On Alc.,336,23: «σύντονος γάρ ἐστιν ἔφεσις ὁ ἔρως», and ibid.,329,19-21: «τοῦ 
γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ὁ ἔρως καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις, διαφέρει δὲ ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὴν ἄνεσιν ἢ τὴν 
συντονίαν τῆς ἐφέσεως». 
13 Ibid.,328,15-329,1: “…love is a powerful and intense desire for something, and 
everything that loves desires something it lacks”. 
14 Cf. Plato, Symposium,199e6-200b2:  «…ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός; - Πάνυ 
μὲν οὖν ἔστι. -…τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὗ ἐνδεές ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ 
ἐνδεὲς ᾖ; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ θαυμαστῶς δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἀγάθων, ὡς ἀνάγκη εἶναι·».  Cf. also 
idem, Lysis,221d3-e2: «ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία, καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν φίλον ἐστὶν 
τούτῳ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ… τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ…  Τὸ δ’ 
ἐνδεὲς ἄρα φίλον ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ».  (Further, cf. Philebus,34e13-35a4, 
although admittedly the context and the purpose of the argumentation are different; 
cf. the thesis ‘pleasure as process [of restoration]’.) 
15 Cf. also Vogel [1963],pp.29 and 31.  NB that the formula ἔρως προνοητικός is said to 
be absent from Proclus’ Platonic Theology, too. 
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ὀρεγόμενόν του ἐνδεές ἐστιν οὗ ὀρέγεται».16  Consequently, we see 
that for Proclus, as for Plotinus, the notion of eros does imply 
deficiency-penia with reference to the object desired, and the hierarchy 
still exists:  the lover is inferior to the beloved to which it aspires, as in 
the case of Alcibiades’ inferiority to Socrates.  Thus, eros is related to 
the reversion of the lower entity to its higher principle.17  As Proclus 
puts it in the Alcibiades Commentary, “the whole order of love is for all 
beings the cause of reversion to the divine beauty”.18 
If then we can establish that ἔνδεια/πενία (of the inferior for the 
superior) continues to play a fundamental role in Proclus’ conception 
of ἔρως, is it not a pleonasm to speak about «ἐπιστρεπτικὸς ἔρως», as 
in the passage cited in the beginning of the chapter (2.)?  Presumably, 
the qualification means to distinguish “reversive” from «προνοητικός» 
eros, i.e. love of the superior for the inferior.  But in light of the 
Plotinian background this idea appears hard to understand.  Could 
Proclus ever think that there is any kind of ‘penia’ in superior entities 
                                                          
16 The Elements of Theology, (henceforth El.Th.),8,1: “… all appetite implies a lack of… 
the object craved”. (The reference’s first number denotes the proposition and the 
second Dodds’ lineation.  The translation used throughout, sometimes modified, is by 
Dodds [1963].)  Cf. his note ad loc.,p.195 with cross-references to Plato, Phil.,20D and 
Aristotle, E.N.,1094a1.   
17 Cf. Dodds’ note on prop.31,p.218, which could have been illustrated with the 
Plotinian-Platonic simile of Poros and Penia. 
18 On Alc.,30,14-15.  Cf. ibid.,29,1: «διὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν 
ἀναγόμεθα», and 129,22-24: “The phrase ‘my good friend (ὠγαθὲ), speak on’ makes 
Socrates an object of desire (ἐφετόν) to the young man, and turns the lover (ἐραστὴν) 
into the beloved (ἐρώμενον); for the good is the object of desire  and love (ἔρως) 
leads lovers (ἐρῶντας) towards the good, according to the account of Diotima 
[cf.Symp.204e-206a].”  Finally, see On Alc.,53,5-6.   
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with respect to the lower ones?  I have already shown in the 
introduction that this is not the case.  For Proclus «αὐτάρκεια» (‘self-
sufficiency’), viz. not being in need of anything else external to 
oneself,19 is a divine ideal.20  For example, when speaking about the 
Good in the Elements, he states that “[t]he unqualified Good lacks 
nothing, since it has not desire towards another (for desire in it would 
be a failure of goodness).”21  Hence, the nearer an entity is to the Good 
on the ontological scale, the more self-sufficient it is;22 and, thus, the 
more distanced it is from its inferior orders of reality.23  The same ideas 
are to be found in the Alc. Comm., too.24 
                                                          
19 Cf. On Alc.,107,4-6: «τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἑαυτῷ ἀρκούμενον, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρων ἐξηρτημένον, 
καὶ τούτων παντοδαπῶν καὶ ἀστάτων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς αὐτάρκους φύσεως.» 
20 Cf. El.Th.,9,18-24 with Dodds’ n. ad loc.,p.196. 
21 Ibid.,10,4-5.  Cf. Dodds’ note ad loc.,p.197, with various references as evidence to 
the traditional Greek idea “that God is not ἐνδεής”.  Compare also 
Plot.,Enn.,III.8.11,9-11 and 23-25.  Of course, since the One/Good transcends 
everything, it is also beyond self-sufficiency, ”for so it would be a principle fulfilled 
with goodness, not the primal Good” (: El.Th.,10,6-7; cf. Plot.,V.3.17,14).  See also 
El.Th.8,9-13 and 115,5: «ἀδύνατον, εἶναι τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐνδεές.» 
22 Cf. ibid.,9,24: «ὁμοιότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ αὔταρκες» and ibid.,40,14: 
«τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ συγγενέστερον τὸ αὔταρκες». See also ibid.,28,(10-11: «Πᾶν τὸ 
παράγον τὰ ὅμοια πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πρὸ τῶν ἀνομοίων ὑφίστησιν.») in conjunction with 
26,22 (: «ἀνελαττώτων ἄρα τῶν παραγόντων μενόντων, τὰ δεύτερα παράγεται 
ὑπ’ αὐτῶν»).  Consequently, with respect e.g. to the Henads, placed immediately 
below the One in the hierarchy, Proclus, ibid.,127,25-26 and 33-34 declares that “(a)ll 
that is divine is primordially and supremely simple, and for this reason completely 
self-sufficient (αὐταρκέστατον)… Being a pure excellence (prop.119), deity needs 
nothing extraneous (οὔτε οὖν τῶν ἄλλων δεῖται); being unitary, it is not dependent 
upon its own elements.”  See also Dodds,p.268 (: n. on prop.127 regarding the issue of 
degrees of self-sufficiency).  
23 However, as Dodds,p.196 puts it, “’self-sufficiency’ does not exclude a timeless 
causal dependence on a higher principle…. This is a particular application of the 
general doctrine that immanence is unintelligible without transcendence”.  Cf. also 
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Therefore, it seems that the Plotinian notion of ἐπιστρεπτικός ἔρως 
is incompatible with that of a descending love.  Does this mean that, if 
Proclus wants to be consistent, he must totally divorce the providential 
eros from the reversive one?  Or is there any possibility of 
accommodating the two within his system?  The answer is yes and it is 
well featured in the loving pair of Socrates and Alcibiades, since the 
complement of Alcibiades’ reversive eros is Socrates’ erotic care or 
providential eros.  While Socrates does fall short of higher entities, like 
his guardian-spirit, for which he must have reversive eros, he is not in 
need of Alcibiades.  
Let us see then what providential eros exactly is according to 
Proclus, because only then will we be able to make a fair comparison 
with Plotinus.  A good place to start is one of the initial substantial 
                                                                                                                                                                      
his note on prop.40(ff.), pp.223ff. on the notion of “self-constituted” 
(«αὐθυπόστατον»); on the notion of «αὐτοτελὴς ὑπόστασις» (“substance complete 
in itself”) see El.Th.64,29-31: «τέλειαι γὰρ οὖσαι [sc. αἱ αὐτοτελεῖς ὑποστάσεις] 
πληροῦσι μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἐκεῖνα [sc. τὰ μετέχοντα] καὶ ἑδράζουσιν ἐν ἑαυταῖς, 
δέονται δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν καταδεεστέρων εἰς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν», with 
Dodds’ n. in p.235: “…In Proclus its meaning [sc. of the term αὐτοτελὴς] seems to 
coincide with that of αὐτάρκης and αὐθυπόστατος.” 
24 See On Alc.,103,22-104,10 revolving around the basic idea that «…τὸ αὔταρκες 
πρώτως ἐν αυτοῖς τοῖς θεοῖς…», whereas the rest of the entities below are «κατὰ 
μέθεξιν αὐτάρκη».  Cf. ibid.,182,7-8 (: «τὸ αὔταρκες… τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στοιχεῖόν ἐστι») 
and ibid.153,10-11.  Another motif of the first passage is the intimate relation between 
εὐδαιμονία and self-sufficiency/«ἀνενδεές» found also in 109,15-16 and 102,22.  In 
107,13-18 and 152,15-153,1 one can ascertain that «αὐτάρκεια… περὶ τὰ ἔνυλα… οὐκ 
ἔστιν».  Finally, in 35,10 Socrates, being a true lover of Alcibiades, is characterized as 
«αὐτάρκης», contra the common lovers;  see infra on the connection between 
Socrates-Alcibiades’ relation and the ontological hierarchy.  On the contrast between 
divine and common lovers see also Τερέζης [2002],pp.58-68 and 69. 
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references to Eros in the Commentary.  The Successor, commenting on 
the opening phrase of the dialogue,25 states:  
“[T]he form of the discussion is most suited to the business 
of love.  For it is the property of divine lovers to turn 
(ἐπιστρέφειν), recall and rally the beloved to himself; since, 
positively instituting a middle rank between divine beauty 
and those who have need of their forethought, these persons, 
inasmuch as they model themselves on the divine love, 
gather unto and unite with themselves the lives of their 
loved ones, and lead them up with themselves to intelligible 
beauty, pouring, as Socrates in the Phaedrus26 says ‘into their 
souls’ whatever they ’draw’ from that source.  If, then, the 
lover is inspired by love, he would be the sort of person who turns 
back and recalls noble natures to the good, like love itself.”27   
As becomes clear from the continuation of the excerpt, the “divine 
lover” described here is Socrates.28  What is more, this «ἔνθεος 
ἐραστής» is said to be possessed by the god of Love, i.e. a higher entity 
in the ontological realm.  Further, it is assumed that Socrates patterns 
                                                          
25 See [Plato?], Alc.I,103a1-3: “I was the first man to fall in love with you, son of 
Cleinias, and now that the others have stopped pursuing you I suppose you ‘re 
wondering why I’m the only one who hasn’t given up”.  Regarding the authorship of 
Alcibiades I, I am in agreement with D.S. Hutchinson (see his Introductory note to the 
dialogue in Cooper [1997],p.558), pace the Neoplatonists, whose late curriculum 
ascribed an introductory position to the dialogue.  Cf. on Alc., e.g.1,3-5, Dillon-Gerson 
[2004],pp.xiv-xv and Dillon [1994],p.391.  For a background to the Platonic Alcibiades I 
and its readings in antiquity see Johnson-Tarrant [2012]. 
26 Plato, Phaedrus, 253a6-7. 
27 On Alc.,26,10-27,3: «…Εἰ τοίνυν ὁ ἐρωτικὸς τῷ ἔρωτι κάτοχός ἐστιν, 
ἐπιστρεπτικός τις ἂν εἴη τῶν εὖ πεφυκότων εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ὁ ἔρως, 
καὶ ἀνακλητικός.» 
28 On this and with regard to many of my following points see relevant essays in 
Layne-Tarrant [forthcoming].   
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himself upon the characteristic activity of that deity, which is to elevate 
the inferior beings of its rank towards the divine beauty.  
Consequently, a first conclusion one could draw from this comparison 
is that for Proclus, Socrates’ relationship to Alcibiades allegorically 
represents the relation between the higher and the lower entities of the 
ontological realm.29  By examining aspects of the way Socrates is 
associated with Alcibiades, we actually deal with the way the 
ontological hierarchy is structured, as reflected in our intra-mundane 
reality, and vice versa.30   
But the connection between ethics and metaphysics31 is deeper than 
that.  Indeed, Proclus holds that Socrates’ relationship to Alcibiades is 
no mere accidental reflection or ‘analogical’ mirroring of the intelligible 
world’s hierarchy.  He states that Socrates actually bestows divine 
providence on the young boy, owing to the bestowals of his guardian 
spirit, which partakes of the erotic order.32  Consequently, Socrates’ 
relation to Alcibiades is actually an expression of the divine within our 
intra-mundane reality.  The passage cited above also suggests to 
assume that there is a specific ontological relation between the divine 
                                                          
29 Cf. also Whittaker [1928],p.243.  
30 One can also suggest that Proclus is faithfully following the Symposium, in whose 
ultimate speech Alcibiades, in giving an encomium of Socrates, concludes the feast of 
speeches with a last praise to the god of love, as is embodied in Socrates.  This is the 
view of Συκουτρῆς [1949] e.g. pp.145*-146*.  For another more emphatic and elaborate 
example of Proclus’ strategy see On Alc., 37,16-39,5. 
31 See also Τερέζης [2002],pp.64, 66 and Baltzly [forthcoming],(p.1). 
32 See for instance on Alc.,63,12-67,18 (in conjunction with e.g. 28,18-29,1 and 
50,22-52,2).  More on this in the next part (ch.2.2.3.). 
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lover and Eros, since the lover receives bestowals which are ultimately 
derived from that very entity.   
As with Plotinus, we will be able to appreciate better what Proclus 
says about love if we try to locate this entity within the ontological 
scheme and try to understand its function.33  Here we may confine 
ourselves to the following rough sketch:34 as in the Symposium, Eros is a 
medium/mediator between the beloved, which is the Beautiful, and the 
lovers of it.  Love, due to its aspiration, is the first to try to unite itself 
with Beauty (reversive love), and constitutes the bond for the lower 
entities to arrive at that divine level (providential love).  What Eros 
actually does is to bestow on the inferior members of its rank its 
characteristic property, which is erotic aspiration.  In that way Proclus 
combines the two notions of ascending and descending love into one: it 
is in so far as Eros has an ascending love that it also enables the 
inferiors to be elevated, too.  If we insist on asking why Eros ever has 
this descending attitude at all, then the ultimate answer is that he is 
providential.  In other words Alcibiades can have reversive-ascending 
eros for Socrates and Socrates can have providential-descending eros 
for Alcibiades, while also having reversive eros for higher entities, like 
his guardian-spirit. 
                                                          
33 Martijn [2010] does the same thing with nature in Proclus’ system, focusing on his 
Commentary on the Timaeus.  
34 For an extensive treatment see the next part (ch.2.2:1.-2.).  See also recently Chlup 
[2012],pp.242-243.  
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Thus, it is an essential feature of the Proclean divine lover, i.e. 
Socrates, who patterns himself upon the god Eros, to elevate his 
beloved along with himself towards the intelligible Beauty.  The lover’s 
reversive eros does not seem to be incompatible with his providential 
love.35  To the contrary, in so far as the lover has a reversive eros, i.e. in 
so far as he is directed towards the intelligible realm, where Eros, 
Beauty and the Good lie, he is also providential towards his beloved.  
Finally, whereas Plotinus drew inspiration especially from the 
Symposium, Proclus follows the path of the Phaedrus, where among 
other things it is stated that “[t]hose who belong to… each of the… 
gods proceed … in accordance with their god  and seek that their boy 
should be of the same nature, and when they acquire him,  imitating 
the god themselves and persuading and disciplining their beloved  
they draw him into the way of life and pattern of the god,  to the extent 
that each is able,  without showing jealousy or mean ill-will towards 
their beloved; rather they act as they do because they are trying as 
much as they can, in every way, to draw him into complete 
resemblance to themselves and to whichever god they honour.”36   
                                                          
35 Cf. also Τερέζης [2002],pp.56-57. 
36 Phaedrus, 253b3-c2; cf. also Armstrong [1961],pp.108 and 117, (while in p.109 he 
suggests the conformity of the Phaedrus with Diotima’s account of ‘procreation’ in the 
Symposium), and Dillon [1994],p.392.  The translation of the Phaedrus is taken from 
Rowe [1988].  NB ll.b7-8: «οὐ φθόνῳ οὐδ’ ἀνελευθέρῳ δυσμενείᾳ χρώμενοι πρὸς τὰ 
παιδικά», since «φθόνος» is what the Platonic Demiurge lacks.  Besides, this is the 
basic characteristic that distinguishes the real lover from the vulgar one: the latter 
does not have any genuine eros, is related to what is at the bottom of reality, i.e. 
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2.1.2. From eros to the Demiurge and the statesman 
In this section I will give further illustrations of providential love 
by drawing analogies between Socrates as lover, Timaeus’ Demiurge 
and the Republic’s statesman.  In all cases, the upwards direction does 
not impede the interaction with Alcibiades, the Receptacle and the 
ideal city respectively.  I begin with the divine lover, whose 
providential attitude, with respect to both the intelligible and the intra-
mundane realm, is a recurrent theme in the Alcibiades Commentary.  It is 
worth giving some further illustrations of it:   
“[T]he souls that have chosen the life of love are moved by 
the god who is the ‘guardian of beautiful youths’ to the care 
of noble natures, and from apparent beauty they are elevated 
to the divine, taking up with them their darlings, and turning 
both themselves and their beloved towards beauty itself.  
This is just what divine love primarily accomplishes in the 
intelligible world, both uniting itself to the object of love and 
elevating to it what shares in the influence that emanates 
from it and implanting in all a single bond and one 
indissoluble friendship with each other and with essential 
beauty.  Now the souls that are possessed by love and share 
in the inspiration therefrom, …, are turned towards 
intelligible beauty and set that end to their activity; ‘kindling 
a light’ for less perfect souls they elevate these also to the 
divine and dance with them about the one source of all 
beauty.37 
                                                                                                                                                                      
matter, and does not care whether in fulfilling his passion he may harm the beloved.  
See the contrasts drawn in on Alc., 34,11-37,15 and 49,13-50,21. 
37 On Alc.,33,3-16.  For the Platonic quotations see the apparatus of Westerink ad loc.   
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There could hardly be a better expression of the way Proclus views, 
on the one hand, the combination of upwards and downwards eros, 
and, on the other, the intimate relation between the intelligible erotic 
pattern and its worldly instantiations.38  This special and complex 
relationship is illustrated also by the fact that when “men’s souls 
receive a share of such [sc. erotic] inspiration, through intimacy with 
the god [i.e. Eros, they] are moved with regard to the beautiful, and 
descend to the region of coming-to-be for the benefit of less perfect 
souls and out of forethought for those in need of salvation.”39  Note 
again the ‘self-sufficiency’ of the lover.40  It is true that the Symposium, 
and perhaps the Phaedrus, too, in some passages, give us the 
impression that the lover needs his beloved, because the latter 
constitutes the means/instrument for the former to recollect the source 
of real beauty and, thus, ascend to the intelligible,41 a claim that has led 
modern Platonic scholars to find ‘egocentric’ characteristics in Plato’s 
                                                          
38 Cf. also on Alc.,53,3-10: “[W]here there exists both unification and separation of 
beings, there too love appears as medium; it binds together what is divided, unites 
what precedes and is subsequent to it, makes the secondary revert to the primary and 
elevates and perfects the less perfect.  In the same way the divine lover, imitating the 
particular god by whom he is inspired, detaches and leads upwards those of noble 
nature, perfects the imperfect and causes those in need of salvation to find the mark.” 
39 Ibid.,32,9-13: «Καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ψυχαὶ μεταλαγχάνουσι τῆς τοιαύτης 
ἐπιπνοίας καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν οἰκειότητα κινοῦνται περὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ 
κατίασιν εἰς τὸν τῆς γενέσεως τόπον ἐπ’ εὐεργεσίᾳ μὲν τῶν ἀτελεστέρων ψυχῶν, 
προνοίᾳ δὲ τῶν σωτηρίας δεομένων.» 
40 Although Adkins [1963], e.g. pp.44-45 and 40 stresses that the Homeric ideal of self-
sufficiency survives, obscures and undermines both Plato’s and Aristotle’s treatment 
of friendship. 
41 Either on his own, which is the picture illustrated in the Symposium, or along with 
his beloved, as appears in the Phaedrus; cf. also Armstrong [1964],p.202. 
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account.42  Proclus, however, definitely rejects such an interpretation:  
the beloved cannot constitute –at least such a kind of- means to an end, 
since the divine lover already has communication with the higher 
realm.43  It is precisely this bond with the intelligible world that enables 
the lover to take providential care of his (potential) beloved, i.e. of a 
person fitted for that special care,44 and hence (try to) elevate the latter, 
too, to the former’s object of desire. 
According to the strong unitarian Neoplatonic reading of Plato, it 
becomes clear that for Proclus the relationship of the divine lover with 
his beloved, both in the Symposium and in the Phaedrus, is the exact 
analogue of the Demiurge’s relation to the Receptacle, and that of the 
philosopher-king to his own ‘political receptacle’.  The Timaeus’ 
Demiurge mediates -like eros- between the most beautiful intelligible 
                                                          
42 See for instance the classic criticisms by Vlastos [1973] and Nygren [1953],passim 
and pp.166-181.  With respect to Proclus’ relation to his Platonic past Nygren, p.574 
notes that “the idea of Eros has undergone a very radical transformation”. 
43 Proclus is quite explicit about that; cf. on Alc.,43,7-8: «Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ, ἅτε 
ἔνθεος ὢν ἐραστὴς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ νοητὸν κάλλος ἀναγόμενος…» (“Socrates, as 
being an inspired lover and elevated to intelligible beauty itself…”).  It is clear from 
the text that Socrates’ position is independent from his relation to Alcibiades.  The 
same holds for the Stoic sage, (although he does not have access to a transcendent 
realm), whose love is only pedagogical.  Cf. Collette-Dučić [forthcoming], pp.2 and 
9-10, whose insightful Stoic account has many affinities with my present Neoplatonic 
discussions –partly due to the common precedence of Plato(nism) for both schools.  
Cf. also Dillon [1994],pp.390-391, who notes the influence that Stoic systematic 
treatments of love should have had upon later Platonism. 
44 We should not forget that, as is repeated many times throughout the Commentary 
(see on Alc.,29,15; 98,13; 133, 17 and 20; 135,1; 137,2; 138,7; 139,6), Ἀλκιβιάδης is 
«ἀξιέραστος», i.e. worthy of love.  From that fact we conclude that not any chance 
person could be the object of Socrates’ providential eros.   
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living being and the Χώρα.  We could never think that he is assisted in 
grasping the former due to the existence of the latter.  Contrariwise, it 
is in so far as he contemplates the intelligible, and is also aware of the 
‘disorderly moving’ receptacle, that he projects the Forms into the 
latter, in order to set it in order, decorate it and fashion it as the best 
possible image of the intelligible.45  Now, if one presses the question 
more, and asks why the contemplation of Forms is not sufficient for the 
Demiurge, but he goes on to instantiate them in the receptacle, 
Timaeus’ answer is that the former “was good (ἀγαθός), and one who 
is good can never become jealous of anything”,46 whereby it is implied 
that the Ὑποδοχὴ was fitted («ἐπιτήδεια») for the Demiurge’s action 
upon it.47  Actually, the analogy between the divine lover and the 
divine craftsman is made explicit by Proclus himself.  Towards the end 
of the following passage the Successor makes the receptacle speak to 
                                                          
45 Hence, we could assume that the Demiurge is confronted with two instances of 
necessity.  The (good) one is the necessity which the intelligible paradigm imposes 
upon the Demiurge for further instantiations of it.  The second type of Necessity, as 
named in the Timaeus, is that presented by the Receptacle, whose constitution raises 
constraints as to the extent to which the Demiurge can instantiate the paragon-cosmos 
into the former.  The model described here has been fundamental for the shaping of 
the Neoplatonic picture of reality.  With respect to the second kind of necessity see 
especially Adamson [2011]. 
46 Plato, Timaeus,29e1-2: «Ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε 
ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος».  Cf. Proclus’ Commentary ad loc.: in Timaeum, I. 359,20-365,3 
(Diehl) and Dodds’ note on prop.25 of the Elements, p.213, with parallels in Plotinus as 
well.  See also Baltzly [forthcoming],(pp.15 and 20). 
47 Did not the receptacle possess the potentiality of becoming our physical cosmos, it is 
not clear whether the Demiurge would have acted in the way he did.  Further: were 
the Ὑποδοχή not ‘disorderly moving’ it is not clear that the Demiurge would have 
noticed its existence, and hence act, at all. 
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the demiurge, as a beloved would do to its lover.  Since I count this 
instance as the most moving and poetical moment of the whole 
Commentary,48 and because we have the opportunity to see another 
remarkable instance of the ontological analogy between Socrates and 
the intelligible entities with respect to the issue of goodness and 
providence, it is worth citing the whole passage: 
“[T]he young man seems to me49 to admire above all these 
two qualities in Socrates, his goodness of will  and his power 
of provision; which qualities indeed are conspicuous in the 
most primary causes of reality,  are especially displayed in 
the creative order, and initiate the whole world-order.  “For 
god,” he says, “having willed all things to be good, according 
to his50 power set the world in order”,51 by his will tendering 
the good to the whole universe, and by his power prevailing 
over all things  and everywhere extending his own creations.  
Socrates, therefore, faithfully reproducing these 
                                                          
48 For another example of Proclus’ moving and poetical images (although not mere 
metaphors) see his fragment from De sacrificio et magia, 149,12-18 (Bidez).  (I follow 
Καλλιγᾶς [2009],pp.16 and 31,n.1 in deleting the ‘according to the Greeks’ of the title 
«Περὶ τῆς [καθ’ Ἕλληνας] ἱερατικῆς τέχνης».) 
49 Proclus begins this important passage by mentioning that it is his view («δοκεῖ δέ 
μοι»).  Does this mean that here we have an instance where Proclus adds from his 
own view to the Neoplatonic tradition? 
50 O’Neill translates the «κατὰ δύναμιν» (not ‘κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν’) of the Greek text as 
referring to the Demiurge’s capacity to fashion his subject-matter upon the paradigm.  
Zeyl’s neutral rendering (in Cooper [1997], ad loc.): “so far as that was possible”, 
where it is not obvious whether this is ascribed to the Demiurge or what lies beneath 
him, is preferable.  However, Segonds [1985],p.197,n.5 sees in the background the 
Proclean triad «βούλησις-δύναμις-πρόνοια» (with further references in the literature) 
and in this sense O’Neill might be better off. 
51 Cf. Timaeus,30a2-3. 
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characteristics,52 set an ungrudging will and power over his 
perfection of inferiors, everywhere present to his beloved 
and leading him from disorder to order.  Now the young 
man wonders at this, “what on earth is its meaning,”53 and 
how Socrates is everywhere earnestly and providently (for 
this is the meaning of “taking great care”) to hand.  If what 
“was in discordant and disorderly movement”54 could say 
something to the creator, it would have uttered these same 
words: “in truth I wonder at your beneficent will and power  
that have reached as far as my level,  are everywhere present 
to me and from all sides arrange me in orderly fashion.”  
This spirit-like and divine characteristic, then, and this 
similarity with the realities that have filled all things with 
themselves, he ascribes to Socrates, viz: the leaving of no 
suitable time or place void of provision for the beloved.”55   
We can assume that the Receptacle’s abovementioned grateful 
speech for its decorator could be reiterated by the ‘political receptacle’, 
the body of the πόλις, if all classes were united to express with one 
mouth their gratitude towards their own decorator.56  We can assume 
that, because in the Commentary Proclus offers us, apart from the 
already mentioned analogies, many others for the relation of the lover 
with his beloved and that of the philosopher-statesman with its 
                                                          
52 Hence, we could also suggested that here Socrates is an analogue for divine 
providence, in so far as he allows us to come to know it. 
53 Cf. Alcibiades I,104d2-5; cf. on Alc.,120,10-13. 
54 Timaeus,30a4-5. 
55 On Alc.,125,2-126,3.  Cf. also ibid.,134,16-135,1 and Baltzly [forthcoming],(pp.20 and 
22). 
56 Of course, Plato himself gives us plenty of evidence, e.g. in Socrates’ introduction of 
the Timaeus, about the intimate relation between the Timaeus and the Republic, without 
that implying that there might not be also differences between them.   
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(beloved) state.  Further, the Successor’s language even in these 
political contexts clearly echoes the wording used for the demiurgic 
functions of the Timaeus.57   
These interconnections allow us to give a Proclean answer to the 
thorny question of the Republic: ‘why does the philosopher have to 
become a ruler of the city?’; or in other words: ‘why does the 
philosopher have to return back to the cave?’58  Plato (or better 
Socrates) has always puzzled the commentators with his response that 
“we’ll be giving just orders to just people”,59 since in the previous 
books justice has been defined in the ‘internal’ terms of the orderly 
relation of the parts of the soul within the individual.60  Proclus might 
                                                          
57 The following is a characteristic example; on Alc.,95,14-19: “For the lover must begin 
with knowledge and so end in making provision (πρόνοιαν) for the beloved; he is like 
the statesman, and it is abundantly clear that the latter too starts with consideration 
and examination, and then in this way arranges the whole constitution, manifesting 
the conclusions in his works.”  Let me add again that actually Proclus faithfully 
follows the (sometimes striking) similarity of vocabulary one can find in the Platonic 
works in question.  For instance, see Republic, VI.506a9-b1 and VII.540a8-b1.  Cf. also 
Baltzly [forthcoming],(pp.20-21). 
58 Glaucon puts it succinctly when he asks in Republic, VII.519d8-9: “Then are we to do 
them [sc. the philosophers-rulers] an injustice (ἀδικήσομεν) by making them live a 
worse life when they could live a better one?”  For the Neoplatonic answer to this 
challenge see also O’Meara [2003],pp.73-83, esp. pp.76-77.  O’Meara includes 
references to Proclus’ Alcibiades and Republic Commentaries.  Two further essays from 
Proclus’ Commentaries on Plato’s Republic which would seem relevant, XI: “On the 
speech in the Republic that shows what the Good is” (I. 269,1-287,17), and XII: “On the 
Cave in the Seventh Book of the Republic” (I. 287,18-296,15), are not helpful for my 
present purposes, because they are preoccupied solely with epistemological (and 
some metaphysical) questions.   
59 Republic,520e1-2. 
60 This difficulty is another evidence, I suppose, for the circularity of Plato’s 
argumentation as Williams [1999], e.g. p.258, has sharply remarked.   
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well have responded that Socrates just did not do justice to the readers 
by not presenting them with the whole picture;61 in fact, it is the 
goodness, in which the philosopher participates, which makes him, like 
the Demiurge, good,  «ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε 
ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος».62  As is evident from the passages cited above 
                                                          
61 One could claim that the same holds with respect to Socrates’ response to another 
notoriously thorny question, namely that of Cebes’ in the initial pages of the Phaedo, 
61d3-5: “How do you mean Socrates, that it is not right to do oneself violence, and yet 
that the philosopher will be willing to follow one who is dying?”  In other words, if 
philosophy is “practice of death” («μελέτη θανάτου», ibid.,81a1-2; cf. 67e4-5), then 
why should not we commit suicide, something that at least the early Stoics hesitantly 
resorted to?  Socrates’ answer has not been found quite satisfactory by interpreters.  
What he suggests in this early stage of the dialogue is that since, according to the 
language of the mysteries («ἀπορρήτοις», ibid.,62b3), “the gods are our guardians and 
that men are one of their possessions” (ibid.,62b7-8: «τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς 
ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι»), 
then “one should not kill oneself before a god had indicated some necessity to do so” 
(62c6-7: «μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς 
ἐπιπέμψῃ»), like that put to Socrates in the case of his legal (but illegitimate) 
conviction.  Unfortunately, Proclus Commentary on the Phaedo is lost, while his 
Alcibiades Commentary does not draw any parallel with that specific problem.  Still, 
there are general references to the Phaedo, since the latter shares the same principal 
position of both the Alcibiades and Proclus’ Commentary, i.e. that the man, and a 
fortiori the philosopher, is identified with his soul, the body being a mere tool of the 
former (cf. e.g. on Alc.,316,9-10).  My main point is that the true Platonic self, i.e. our 
intelligent soul’s relation to its body is homologous to the relation of the Demiurge 
with the Receptacle and the cosmos, of the philosopher-king with the state, and of the 
lover with his beloved, or in other words of the (Neo-Platonic) teacher with his 
student(s).  What is more, the parallel helps us to give a more complete answer to 
Phaedo’s aforementioned problem: it is exactly because the philosopher can 
contemplate the Forms, that he does not want to cut the indeed unfortunate relation 
with his body.  Cf. also what Socrates states in the Phaedo,67a1-b2, and Plotinus’ 
similar position towards suicide in his small treatise devoted to that topic, 
Enneads,I.9.[16]: ‘On going out [sc. of the body]’.  
62 Cited above (n.46).  Of course, as Proclus notes towards the end of the extant 
Commentary, the Just participates in the Good, the former being inferior to the latter 
(cf. e.g. on Alc.,319,12ff.).  Hence, every just instantiation is also good (but not vice 
versa), and, hence, the philosopher’s being just is at the same time good. 
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there is an organic relation between goodness and providence.  The 
‘better’ an entity is, i.e. higher in the ontological hierarchy, the more 
providential it is, i.e. its bestowals reach further down the scale, and 
hence it has a wider scope.  As with the Proclean divine lover, it is in so 
far as the statesman participates in the intelligible that he goes on to set 
into order its own ‘disorderly moving’ receptacle.63  Thus, Proclus is in 
line with the Platonic Alcibiades’ parallel between the relations of lover 
and beloved, on the one hand, and that of the statesman and the city, 
on the other.  The way the lover educates and fashions his beloved 
must be the paradigm of the philosopher-politician’s attitude towards 
the body politic.64   
And in any case, there is no question that the mature philosopher-
king would need the state in order to help him grasp the Forms,65 just 
as in the case of Proclus’ divine lover.  Now, whether this scheme of 
universal correspondence between the Demiurge, the philosopher-king 
                                                          
63 NB that the word «ἐπιμελεῖσθαι» used in Republic,520a6-9 is the same with 
Phaedrus,246b6: «πᾶσα ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου», the latter being a 
principal Neoplatonic source of evidence for the idea that soul(s) are providential for 
what lies beneath them. 
64 In that way we see how the Alcibiades provides a viable starting point for the 
transmutation of the existing political system into the ideal state. 
65 It is true, though, that according to the Proclean interpretation the fact that the 
philosopher returns to the cave is a verification of his having genuinely grasped the 
Forms.  Therefore, he descends to the ‘prison’ not because he has any need of its 
‘prisoners’, contra the vulgar lovers in relation to Alcibiades, but exactly because he is 
self-sufficient, and hence able to free them and elevate them to the truth, as far as 
possible.   
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and the divine lover66 exists in Plato is an open question.67  We might 
also question the ontological elaborations with which Proclus has 
invested Plato.  However, Proclus’ insight gives us a Neoplatonic 
justification not to view Plato as an ‘egoist’ with respect to erotic 
matters.  If this is so, then Proclus had already given a brave and 
articulate answer against Plato’s modern critics.  Finally, let me 
conclude by noting that in this Commentary Proclus spends a 
considerable amount of time attempting to prove that it was not in vain 
that the ‘daimonion’ let the Silenus try to elevate the son of Cleinias.68  
Unlike Socrates with Alcibiades, I do not suggest that we should 
necessarily be persuaded by Proclus.  Nonetheless, I hope that the 
present reflections may at least reveal a reason why it would be fruitful 
for Platonic scholars69 to consider in their discussions Neo-Platonic 
perspectives, as well.   
                                                          
66 In both Symposium’s and Phaedrus’ versions. 
67 What is more, I am acutely aware that the primary objective of current scholars, 
such as MM McCabe, (see e.g. McCabe [2008]) is not to draw general schemes or 
doctrines out of the whole Platonic corpus, but rather to engage in lively dialogues 
with individual works, as Plato himself urges us to do. 
68 See on Alc.,85,17-92,2.  The problem is that the guardian-spirit could foresee the end 
of this relationship; hence, why did it allow Socrates to associate with Alcibiades?  
After presenting some problematic solutions found in the tradition, Proclus focuses on 
the three following points: a) Alcibiades did become better; b) he will also be 
benefitted in another life; c) the daimon is good like the sun, since “he achieves his 
end in his activity”.  (In ibid.,91,10-15 Proclus uses also the example of Laius and the 
oracle.) 
69 See for instance approaches that in some respects are (unwittingly) akin to the 
Platonic Successor: Kraut [1973], Kraut [1992], esp. pp.328-329; Miller [2007], esp. 
pp.338-339 and n.28; Mahoney [1996].  Even Vlastos [1973],p.33, making a contrast 
with Aristotle’s god, acknowledges the providential attitude of Timaeus’ Demiurge, 
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2.1.3. From Platonic eros to Aristotelian friendship 
Having shown how Proclus’ combination of ascending and 
descending eros works in the same way for various Platonic dialogues, 
I continue in illustrating providential eros, this time by drawing its 
connections to «φιλία» (friendship).  Again some modern scholars70 
have proposed that, in fact, Plato in the Phaedrus gives us an account of 
friendship, whose perfect type, at least, surpasses the problems of 
ascribing egocentric incentives with regards to the erotic desire (ἔρως), 
since, even when natural beauty fades out, the friendly, spiritual and 
non-sexual affection between the members of the ideal pair can still 
remain.71  In that, of course, the commentators follow Plato’s own text 
which refers to the erotic relationship between lover and beloved as 
φιλία.72  So, for example, towards the end of his recantation, Socrates 
will state that “these are the blessings… so great as to be counted 
                                                                                                                                                                      
but he, contra Rist [1964],pp.30-31 (and 28 with [1970],pp.165-166, despite the right 
qualification of Vogel [1981],pp.65-66 and p.78, n.28) and Armstrong [1961],p.110, 
does not seem to imagine that this could have (at least a decisively positive) bearing 
on Plato’s views on inter-personal love…  
70 Most notably Sheffield [2011]. 
71 Cf. also Proclus, on Alc.,35,11-16, with many overtones from Pausanias’ speech in 
the Symposium,183e:  
72 What is more, the Lysis, a (maieutic) dialogue “on friendship”, brings sometimes 
ἔρως and φιλία very close to each other in terms of connotation; see e.g. 221b7-8 and 
e3-4; 222a6-7.  It is generally noted that ἔρως denotes a passionate desire for 
something contra the (calm) loving affection implied in φιλία.  Cf. e.g. Aristotle, 
EN,IX.10,1171a11-12: “This is why one cannot love several people; love tends to be a 
sort of excess friendship, and that can only be felt towards one person”. (Every 
Aristotelian translation comes from Barnes [1984]).  Cf. also EN,VIII.6,1158a10-13. 
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divine, which will come to you [sc. the beloved] from the friendship of 
a lover”.73  Hence, it is not only the beloved’s «ἀντέρως»74 which is 
actually thought of as friendship,75 as one would normally expect 
under the specific social and spatio-temporal circumstances,76 but the 
lover himself is called «ἔνθεος φίλος».77   
Now, as would be expected, Proclus, too, uses the terms ἔνθεος 
ἐραστής and ἔρως interchangeably with divine φίλος and φιλία, 
perhaps in a more systematic manner than Plato does.78  This is also 
important because of its consistency with the view of the divine lover 
as non-egoist and providential towards the beloved.  Of course, it is 
true that the Successor also sometimes praises friendship in a quite 
                                                          
73 Phdr.,256e3-4. 
74 See ibid.,255e1.  This word is coined by Plato to denote the ‘loving response’ of the 
beloved; it is translated as “backlove” by Nehamas-Woodruff (in Cooper [1997]).  
Proclus uses it twice in on Alc.:127,5 and 7. 
75 Cf. ibid.,255d8-e2: «…εἴδωλον (image of) ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων [sc. the beloved]· 
καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι.» 
76 See also Rowe’s [1988] note ad loc.,p.188.   
77 Cf. Phdr.,255b6-7; cf. also b1-2 and 253c5.   
78 Cf. the following instances: On Alc.,36,15; 38,8; 40,11; 140,7; 134,12, the last one 
contrasting the inspired lover («ἐνθέου φίλου») with the common one («πρὸς τὸν 
πολὺν ἐραστήν»).  Cf. also the similar case of Alcinous’ Handbook with a short 
prehistory in Dillon [1994],p.388 (and p.392).  On the other hand, Collette-Dučić 
[forthcoming],pp.1 and 6-7 stresses that for the Stoics a friendly relation is only 
between equals (that is the sages), while love is the asymmetrical relation of a sage for 
a young boy appearing to be beautiful.  (Cf. also ibid.,pp.4ff. and a forthcoming PhD 
thesis by Aiste Celkyte, supervised by Prof. S. Halliwell in St Andrews.)  Stoic 
friendship is the aim and effect of Stoic love.   
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Aristotelian manner.79  However, the above identification allows him to 
illustrate the lover’s positive disposition towards the beloved using the 
vocabulary of friendship.  Consider the following example: “[B]y 
addressing the subject of disproof as ‘dear’ (φίλον), he [sc. Socrates] 
anticipates the wound by his affection (τῇ οἰκειώσει) and at the same 
time shows that for him a purpose of purification is friendship, because 
‘no god is ill-disposed to men, therefore neither does he [sc. Socrates] 
do anything of this sort out of ill-humour (δυσνοίᾳ),’80 as he has 
observed in the Theaetetus,81 and because among the gods the agent of 
purification extends its operation to the imperfect out of goodness, not 
out of estrangement towards them.”82  What is striking about this 
passage is that, following the characteristic Proclean strategy of 
drawing parallels between Socrates-Alcibiades and the ontological 
hierarchy, it applies the terms of friendship to (higher) godly and 
                                                          
79 See for example ibid.,109,3-6: “for friends have the same relationship (λόγος) with 
each other;… Further, friendship is between good men of serious purpose (ἀγαθῶν 
καὶ σπουδαίων), but among villains moral character is not in evidence”.  Cf. also 
ibid.,221,16-222,2: “…This is the aim of virtue as a whole, so the Pythagoreans assert 
and also Aristotle who rightly observed that ‘when all people are friends we have no 
need of justice,’ and ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ are annulled, but ‘when everyone is just we 
still have need of friendship’ to unite us.”  For references to the relevant works see 
Westerink’s critical apparatus ad loc. and O’Neill’s nn.416 and 417.   
80 Cf. also Phaedrus,255b4: “…the goodwill (εὔνοια) that he experiences at close 
quarters from his lover amazes the beloved,…”;  cf. Aristotle, EN,IX.5,1167a3-4: 
“Goodwill (εὔνοια) seems, then, to be a beginning (ἀρχή) of friendship”, (almost 
identical to idem, EE,VII.7,1241a12 and 14), and EN,VIII.2,1155b33-34: “goodwill 
when it is reciprocal being friendship”. 
81 Cf. Theaetetus,151d1-2.   
82 On Alc.,228,23-229,4. 
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(lower) human entities,83 although famously Aristotle had declared that 
man cannot be friends with god, since there is no equality between 
them.84  Indeed, Proclus will be in a position to ground the thought that 
“if… all belongs to the gods, all belongs also to good men 
                                                          
83 In this light we should interpret the ascriptions of «φιλανθρωπία» (and 
«φιλάνθρωπον»: ‘well-disposition towards man’) to Socrates (in on Alc.,312,10 and 
81,3 respectively; cf. the use of Socrates’ «φιλοφροσύνη»-‘friendliness’ ibid.,25,7 and 
26,7).  Being a word widely used by Christian authors, e.g. pseudo-Dionysius (see 
infra, nn.117 and 118 in ch.3.2.), Plato uses the adjective in the superlative 
(«φιλανθρωπότατος») for Eros in Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium,189c8-d1, 
and in its basic form for god Cronus in Laws,713d6, whereas the substantive 
«φιλανθρωπία» is ascribed to Socrates in Euthyphro,3d7.  What is more, the word is 
included in the academic Definitions,412e11-13: “love of humanity, or kindness; the 
easy-going character state of being friendly to people; the state of being helpful to 
people; the trait of gratefulness; memory, together with helpfulness”.  Finally, let us 
not forget that according to the Symposium, 212a6, the man who has ascended to 
Beauty becomes «θεοφιλής» (‘beloved by gods’; cf. also the use of the same word in 
Republic VI,501c1, Philebus,39e11 and a statement from Socrates’ exchange with 
Thrasymachus in Rep.,I,352b1-2, according to which a just person is friend of the 
gods.). 
84 Cf. EN,VIII.7,1158b35-1159a5: “…gods…surpass us most decisively in all good 
things… when one party is removed to a great distance (πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος), as 
God is, the possibility of friendship ceases”, since “friendship is said to be 
equality”(«λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης»: ibid.,1157b36; cf. EE,VII.6,1240b2 and 
ibid,VII.9,1241b11-13) and, hence, “perfect friendship is the friendship of men who 
are good, and alike in excellence” (: EN,1156b7-8; cf. ibid.,1160a7-8 and 1161a33-36: 
“where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled there is not friendship either, 
since there is not justice; e.g. between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and 
slave”).  This Aristotelian conception is consistent with the Stagirite’s view of the 
Unmoved Mover.  On the other hand, see EN,X.8,1179a30-31, where, due to the wise 
man’s intellectual ‘assimilation to god’, it is declared that “[h]e, therefore, is the 
dearest to the gods (θεοφιλέστατος)”.  In this case Aristotle uses in the superlative 
the very adjective used (in the positive) by Diotima/Socrates/Plato, when it is declared 
that the man who will have ascended to the Beautiful, presumably through the 
‘Theaetetan assimilation to god’, will be ‘beloved by the gods’ (Symp.,212a6; cf. also 
Tim.,53d7).  In what way Aristotle is near to the Neo-Platonic sense will be clearer in 
what follows.  Finally, it is worth mentioning that, the friendship-theory of the 
Eudemian Ethics is interestingly different in some respects from the respective 
‘Nicomachean’ one.   
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(σπουδαίων)”85 on the assumption of the well-known Pythagorean 
maxim that “the possessions of friends are held in common”.86 
Of course, these differences from Aristotle ultimately stem from 
Proclus’ fundamental ontological equation of Eros with Friendship.  I 
will come back to the ontological issue later (in ch.2.2.5.).  For now it 
may suffice to say that when in the Commentary the Successor is 
confronted with two distinct traditions with respect to the god of 
Friendship («φίλιον»),87 the one in favour of φίλιος Zeus and the other 
of god Eros,88 Proclus characteristically unites/‘contracts’ the two, 
claiming that “Love is contained within Zeus”.89  Sometimes friendship 
seems to apply more to instances of a ‘horizontal’ union within one 
stratum of reality, hence between quasi-equal entities,90 whereas eros, 
denoting the deficiency of an entity, fits better a vertical scheme, in 
                                                          
85 On Alc.,165,3 and 2.  Of course, this statement should rather be read by way of 
analogy and to the extent that the σπουδαίοι partake in/are assimilated to the godly 
realm.  A good guide to understand this is the following passage from ibid,172,4-11.   
86 On Alc.,165,2-3: «κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ φίλων»; cf. O’Neill’s n.327 (and Westerink’s 
apparatus ad loc.) for references to Euripides, Orestes,735 and Porphyry, De Vita 
Pythagorae,33. This maxim appears quite a few times in Plato (see Lysis,207c10; 
Rep.,424a1-2&449c5; Laws,739c2 and), most notably in the end of the Phaedrus,279c6-7.  
(Cf. also Gorgias,507e5-6, although «κοινωνία» might have a more general sense 
there.)  For Aristotle see EN,VIII.9,1159b31-32, EE,VII.2,1237b33 and ibid.,1238a16.  
Finally, see the strong resemblance of this Proclean syllogism with one by Diogenes 
the Cynic apud Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum,37,5-7; (cf. also ibid.,72,1-3). 
87 See on Alc.,232,10-234,5. 
88 Cf. ibid.,233,11-12: «τῆς γὰρ φιλίας αἴτιος ὁ Ἔρως».  See also how Proclus 
introduces Empedocles’ divine principle of φιλία (see B29 Diels) in On Alc.,113,13-21.  
89 Ibid.,233,15.  I follow Westerink in writing «Ἔρως»/’Love’ with the first letter 
capital, since it refers to the god Eros. 
90 See also the Aristotelian flavour (at least in its beginning and end) of ibid,109,3-10. 
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which lower strata of reality desire what lies beyond them.91  Proclus 
thinks of friendship when speaking of love and vice versa.92 
On the other hand, Proclus’ diversion from Aristotle, as to the 
possibility of friendship between gods and humans, is not radical, since 
the Successor holds that there is an ontological hierarchy.  Not only 
that, but he also thinks that the hierarchical scheme is a condition for 
the possibility of (productive) love/friendship between entities of 
different levels.  This can be inferred from passages like the following: 
“The lover, then, must pay heed to any one fine point in the beloved in 
order that he may be both more perfect and immediately superior.  For 
in this way one would lead upwards, the other be led upwards, and the 
former would exercise providence with some fellow-feeling (μετά 
τινος συμπαθείας).”93  Hence, Proclus of course does not object to the 
                                                          
91 In fact, one possibility is not mentioned here, i.e. that of vertical-downwards eros.  
One could propose that Proclus had better use the term eros -implying deficiency and 
strong aspiration- for an entity’s upwards tension, whereas to the providential one he 
could have applied the sole (and ‘calmer’) term φιλία.  Still, this is a device that 
Proclus does not choose to exploit, since he calls both the lover and the beloved 
‘friends’.  What is more, it would be at odds with the usual vocabulary of the relevant 
texts of Plato’s era, where we have seen (e.g. nn.74 and 78) that the lover is supposed 
to have ‘eros’ for his beloved, although the latter’s affection to the former was termed 
‘friendship’.  Nonetheless, Proclus hardly uses the verb «φιλεῖν» to describe the 
aspiration of lower entities for the higher realm.  In this respect of upwards striving 
eros has a prominence, although it does not exclude φιλία from its semantic scope, 
but it just makes it much tenser.   
92 See the interweaving of the two notions early in the Commentary in on Alc.,26,2-5, 
alluding to De Oraculis Chaldaicis,p.25 (Kroll; cf. O’Neill’s n.50) and the Timaeus,32c1-4 
and 43a2 
93 On Alc.,140,17-20.  Cf. ibid.,123,8 and 12-13: “Well then,… the agent (τὸ ποιοῦν) 
must surpass the patient (τοῦ πάσχοντος) in essential being”.  What is more, apart 
from being a precondition for friendship, the hierarchical scheme still remains after 
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thought that gods are superior entities, and thus surpass human beings 
in excellence, but he follows an ontological reading of the Phaedrus’ 
type relation, where, as we have seen, a) the lover and the beloved 
stand for entities of different ontological strata, and b) they are also 
called ‘friends’.   
However, even in that respect Proclus is not very far from 
Aristotle’s perfect type of friendship between good, and hence equal, 
men.  The Stagirite assumes that there is a large gap between mortals 
and god(s), something which is consistent with his 
ontology-cosmological philosophy.  Nevertheless, a characteristic of 
especially the late Neoplatonists is the attempt to fill this vertical gap 
by postulating strata of mediating entities, i.e. levels of reality which 
can bridge the gap between the One and the material cosmos.  Now, 
what preserves the cohesion of this vertical continuum is the similarity 
between the entities in different strata.94  According to the Elements of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the elevation of both lovers, as the following passage suggests (ibid.,116,20-117,1): “it 
is never lawful for effects to escape from their causes and rise superior to the nature 
of the latter.”  Cf. also ibid.,146,1-3 and El.Th.,124,26-28.  As to the importance of this 
qualifying “some” see infra, ch.2.1.5.  ‘Sympatheia’ is an ontological term as well, 
correlated with (universal) «φιλία», used by the Stoics and then by the Neoplatonists 
(cf. infra n.99 and Dodds [1963],p.216). 
94 Cf. El.Th.,32,6-7: “But all things are bound together by likeness (συνδεῖ δὲ πάντα ἡ 
ὁμοιότης)…”. Cf. also in Proclus’ fragment from De sacrificio et magia, 148,23-149,1.  
NB that Proclus does not avoid the hierarchization of even the horizontal strata.  Cf. 
El.Th.,110,11-12: “For not all things are of equal worth, even though they be of the 
same cosmic order”.  Consequently, it is more faithful to Proclus to go with Dodds 
[1963],passim, who speaks of the horizontal strata as “transverse”.  Thus, it is perhaps 
easier to understand why Proclus so easily conflates eros with filia, and that even a 
horizontal friendship of the Aristotelian ideal type cannot take place in Proclus’ 
system.   
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Theology, a principle of the procession, and hence of the complementary 
reversion, is that it takes place through like terms.95  The same idea is 
reiterated and related to the issue of eros (/friendship) in the following 
passage96 from the Alcibiades’ Commentary: “[W]hat is completely 
uncoordinated (ἀσύντακτον) has no communion with its inferior, but 
love finds its subsistence among those who are able to commune with 
each other, since it itself is perfected through the likeness of the inferior 
to the superior, through the uniting (συνδέσεως) of the less perfect 
with the more perfect and through the reversion of what is made 
complete to the causes of completion.” 
We can deduce from this passage that actual and direct 
friendship/eros can take place only between adjacent entities, viz. 
between the cause and its immediate effect; that is, between the most 
similar possible entities.  As far as ascending eros is concerned it is true 
that every entity aspires for the Good.  Yet it actually approaches it 
through the former’s union to its immediate progenitor, as the Elements 
claim.97  Further, as far as downwards eros is concerned, we can 
assume that it directly relates adjacent entities, whereas providential 
eros for even remoter beings should be thought of as indirect.  In other 
words, an entity can be providential for its off-spring; but since the off-
spring gives rise to further entities, the providential preservation of the 
                                                          
95 Cf. El.Th.,28,10-11 and 28-34. Cf. also ibid,125,10-13 and 32,3-4: “All reversion is 
accomplished through a likeness of the reverting terms to the goal of reversion”.   
96 On Alc.,140,20-141,4.  Cf. also El.Th.,123,7-9. 
97 Cf. on Alc.,28,30-32. 
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former entails providential preservation of the latter, too.98  
Consequently, from Aristotle’s ideal case of ‘friendly’ equality (of good 
properties), Proclus switches to the idea of ‘friendly-erotic’ similarity.99  
The divergence is a small one, since equality does not exclude 
similarity.100  What constitutes a difference is the Proclean introduction 
of hierarchical similarity as a precondition for the (actual and direct) 
                                                          
98 According to Proclus an entity already contains its descendants κατ’ αἰτίαν (: as 
their cause). Cf. El.Th.,65 and οn Alc.,146,1-2: “the superior powers everywhere in a 
simple manner comprehend (περιειληφέναι) their inferior”.  Cf. also El.Th.,144,21 
and see in the next part (ch.2.2.).  Hence, the higher entity ‘knows’ its inferior(s) in the 
manner appropriate to the former, not the latter.  See El.Th.,124,10-13, with numerous 
parallels in On Alc. (e.g.87,12-17); cf. also El.Th.,121,10-12.  An interesting 
consequence, exploited by Medieval and early modern philosophers (cf. Dodds’ n. ad 
loc.,p.266), is that it gives an answer (perhaps unacceptable to us) to Vlastos’ objection 
about the individual, qua individual, as an object of love in Plato.  Vlastos 
[1973],passim, e.g. pp.24,26,28-33 observes that what the lover admires in the beloved 
is not its particular beauty, but the degraded image of the Form of the Beautiful; 
hence, the lover does not really appreciate the particularity of the beloved, but aspires 
to the abstraction of the Form.  But a higher entity’s more abstract mode of knowing 
the inferior is inevitable and necessary due to their ontological difference.  For the 
Neoplatonists the fact that the superior does not know the inferior in the mode of 
being of the lower is not a mark of deficiency, but denotes the superiority of the 
former.  In this way the Neoplatonists give their answer to Parmenides’ ‘greatest 
difficulty’, and can explain why the philosopher-king of the Republic can have 
knowledge, and not mere belief, of matters pertaining to the intra-mundane/political 
realm.  However, for a view (by E.P. Butler) that ascribes almost the highest position 
to individuality in Proclus’ system (cf. the Henads) see Hankey [2011],pp.33-36 and 
Hankey [2009],pp.122 and esp. 124-125. 
99 The history of «ὁμοιότης» and the “similia similibus” theory, starts already from 
the Presocratics (e.g. Empedocles; cf. also Dodds [1928],p.141), and has been evoked 
by many philosophers since then; (see for instance the relevant sections of Plato’s 
Lysis).  Cf. also Rep.,IV,425c2 and Gorgias,510b2-4 (with the note ad loc. of Dodds 
[1959],p.344). 
100 See also the Aristotelian reverberations in on Alc.,230,16-231,2.  In 
EN,VIII.7,1156b7-8 Aristotle himself speaks of similarity with respect to virtue 
between good men: “perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and 
alike in excellence (καὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων)”.   
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friendship or love to take place.101  What we see here is then a Proclean 
synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian perspectives, which in itself is the 
further outcome of Proclus’ equation of ἔρως with φιλία. 
 
2.1.4. Limiting the scope: 
from eros to providential eros 
I now move to examine Proclus’ composite concept of 
“providential eros”, and, hence, the relation between eros and 
providence.  I will argue that in Proclus’ idea of “providential eros” the 
emphasis lies not on ‘eros’, but on ‘providence’, whose existence is 
undeniable by every Neoplatonist.102  In all the passages I have cited so 
far, although Socrates is called ‘divine lover’ (or ’friend’), he is hardly 
ever explicitly said to be in love («ἐρᾶν») with his beloved.  Though 
this is the only logical inference, Proclus prefers constantly to 
emphasize Socrates’ providence («πρόνοια»)103 towards Alcibiades.  It 
                                                          
101 As to the aforementioned claim about humans being friends with gods, for Proclus 
the ascription of ‘god’ belongs to a wide range of entities.  See in the next part (e.g. 
ch.2.2.3.).   
102 This remark resembles in form Vlastos’ observation about the importance of the 
first constituent of the Timaeus’ formula, «εἰκὼς μῦθος» (“likely tale”: Tim., e.g. 29d2; 
cf. Vlastos [1965],p.382, acknowledged by Brisson [1998],p.129 and n.11). 
103 Apart from «πρόνοια» another standard word is «ἐπιμέλεια».  Another less 
commonly used word is «προμήθεια» (: “forethought”; the last Greek word has the 
double meaning that the English ‘providence’ has; not only having forethought, but 
also giving in advance) met four times in On Alc.: 54,12; 132,15; 159,7; 161,8; (cf. the 
god Prometheus/Προ-μηθεύς, who in the Protagoras’ myth, e.g. 320d6, is contrasted to 
Ἐπι-μηθεύς, and Rep.,IV,441e5, where the rational part of the soul is said to exercise 
«προμήθειαν» “on behalf [ὑπὲρ] of the whole soul”). 
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is this very fact that prompted me to highlight Socrates’ parallel with 
the Demiurge, and further with the statesman, although Plato, like 
Proclus, never characterizes the divine craftsman’s providence for the 
Receptacle as ‘love’.  This sheds light on the Successor’s approach to 
‘downwards-providential eros’.  Proclus’ principal aim is not to furnish 
us, further to the notion of ascending-reversive love, with a distinct 
account of eros per se, but rather to illustrate a distinctive case of 
providence which complements reversive love.  That Proclean 
providential eros is not the only instance of (divine) providence 
becomes plain enough from the following passage: “As, then, other 
souls established according to another god visit without defilement the 
region of mortals and the souls that move about therein -some help 
(ὠφελοῦσι) the less perfect through prophecy, others through mystic 
rites and others through divine medicine –so also souls that have 
chosen the life of love104 are moved by the god who is the ‘guardian of 
beautiful youths’105 to the care (ἐπιμέλειαν) of noble natures (τῶν εὖ 
πεφυκότων)”.106 
As becomes clear from the Elements, as well as from many previous 
citations, it is an essential attribute of gods to be providential, that is, to 
extend their bestowals (i.e. their divine characteristics) upon the 
entities that are dependent on them, and hence are of the same rank.  
                                                          
104 Cf. the eschatological myth of Republic X and the allocation of types of lives to the 
souls, their freedom of choice being preserved. 
105 That is, god Eros with Phaedrus,265c2-3; cf. Plot.,III.5.2,2-3. 
106 On Alc.,32,16-33,5. 
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Of course, Proclus’ system is not one-dimensional, like Plotinus’.  In 
other words, it does not only have a vertical dimension, but also a 
horizontal one, or, more accurately, a ‘transverse’.107  Hence, after the 
ultimate unity of the One (and the Indefinite Dyad), the stratum of the 
Henads already consists of a multiplicity of ultimate divinities, 
identified with the gods of ancient Greek mythology, in conjunction 
with the Chaldean Oracles and Orphic religion, each of them 
representing certain features which are bestowed upon the orders of 
their descendants.108  Nonetheless, also within the transverse dimension 
there are still relations of the type we see in vertical ranks, thus the 
superior entities communicate their characteristic features to their 
successors/inferior entities in the horizontal stratum.109  However, if 
this is true of the divine realm, we should not expect that the more 
deficient beings of the lower strata of reality, e.g. daimonic souls 
should preserve the unity in multiplicity of their highest progenitors 
untouched. Thus, the gifted ones succeed in preserving a sole 
characteristic, ultimately inherited by vertical procession from a 
Henad, which is Proclus’ understanding of the divine processions in 
the Phaedrus myth.110  Hence we saw in the former passage that some 
                                                          
107 Cf. Dodds [1963], e.g. pp.255, 270 and El.Th.,110,11-12.  See also the framework set 
out by Van Riel [2001]. 
108 For this rather general account see Dodds [1963],pp.257-260. 
109 Cf. El.Th.,97,9-10.  See also Dodds’ helpful diagram on propositions 108 and 109, 
(in p.255), where he shows how an entity derives each generic character 
horizontally/transversely, but its specific one vertically. 
110 See Phdr.,246e4-247a4 and cf. also Baltzly [forthcoming],(p.6). 
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souls instantiate their providence for the mundane world via medicine, 
others via prophecy, via ‘erotics’ (ἐρωτική) etc.  Consequently, we 
repeat that downwards eros is not a universal characteristic of Proclus’ 
system, but only a particular instance of (the universal fact of) 
«πρόνοια».111  Another useful way of putting this is in Aristotelian 
jargon: eros (or friendship) is only a species of the ‘providence’-genus.  
It is because and in so far as Proclus is interested in providence that he 
speaks of downwards eros.  This alone can already alleviate the 
apparent contrast between Plotinus’ ascending eros and Proclus’ 
descending one. 
Now, there are also exceptionally gifted souls which can preserve 
and combine in their providence more than one way, and one such 
figure is undoubtedly Socrates.  Proclus very early in the Commentary 
stresses that the Athenian gadfly is an expert in at least three ‘sciences’ 
(«ἐπιστῆμαι»):112 that of dialectics (διαλεκτική), of maieutic/midwifery 
(μαιευτική) and of ‘erotic’ (ἐρωτική).113  What are exactly these sciences 
                                                          
111 Cf. also Armstrong [1961],p.116.  The criticism of Armstrong ad loc. by McGinn 
[1996],p.199,n.30 seems self-contradictory when contrasted with ibid.,p.198, while my 
ch.2.2.4. will show how both authors can be right in a sense. 
112 As has been already clear, for the Neoplatonists there is no actual Socratic 
ignorance.  See also Layne [2009],passim. This is a mere ironical device.  Socrates is a 
«φιλόσοφος» to the extent that he has already succeeded in achieving communion 
with the intelligible realm.  If there is any subject that Socrates is unaware of, this is 
because no one can ever have knowledge of that.  A good example of this is the 
ineffability of the supreme gods, let alone of the super-transcendent One, i.e. the field 
in which Neoplatonism comes closer than ever to Skepticism… 
113 Ibid.,27,13-14.  O’Neill translates these three “sciences” as “those of philosophical 
discussion, elicitation and love”. 
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or ways of Socrates’ exercising providence?  According to the 
Successor, a very good illustration of Socrates’ midwifery, as a modern 
student of Plato could reasonably expect, is found in the Theaetetus,114 
where Socrates “proceeds as far as the cleansing away of the false 
opinions of Theaetetus, but thereafter lets him go as now being capable 
of discerning the truth by himself, which indeed is the function of the 
science of elicitation (μαιευτικῆς), as Socrates himself observes in that 
work”.115  For Proclus, Socrates’ ‘elenctic’ midwifery does have a 
definite positive result, since “through elicitation each one of us is 
revealed to be wise about subjects in which he is unlearned (ἀμαθής), 
by realizing the innate notions (λόγους) within himself concerning 
reality”.116  In other words, Socrates stirs Theaetetus up “through the 
art of elicitation to recollection (ἀνάμνησιν) of the eternal notions of 
the soul”, and hence the result is that his interlocutor is united with 
“the very first wisdom”.117  Proclus draws a parallel with the way the 
recipients of Socrates’ providence are elevated and come to salvation 
(«σωτηρία»)118 through dialectic and ‘erotic’.  As we have already seen, 
through eros Socrates elevates and unites individuals worthy of love 
“to essential beauty (αὐτοκάλῳ)”,119 while through dialectic he brings 
                                                          
114 Proclus’ Commentary on this remarkable dialogue is now lost.  
115 On Alc.,28,4-8; cf. Tht.,210b11-d1. 
116 On Alc.,29,2-3. 
117 Ibid.,28,16-17 and 19. 
118 Cf. ibid.,29,9. 
119 Ibid.,28,18-19; cf. 29,1 and 28,15-16. 
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round “to the vision of reality”120 those “who love to contemplate the 
truth”,121 and can be thus led “even as far as the Good”.122   
We can draw some important conclusions from the previous 
remarks:  first of all, it is clear that there are three distinct ways to 
ascend to the divine realm, namely «καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν» 
according to the Phaedrus.123  Via dialectic one is elevated to the Good, 
via maieutic one attains to Wisdom, and through erotic one is united 
with the Beautiful.  Hence, we are presented with three different 
methods, which are distinguished on the basis of the divine entity they 
aspire to, since, as becomes clear in the Commentary, the three 
aforementioned divine characteristics represent divine entities of 
different strata.  The Good even transcends reality, Wisdom should be 
posited somewhere on the level of Henads, whereas the Beautiful is 
located in the stratum of Being.  Especially in light of the fact that for 
Proclus, gifted souls can attain to the intelligible on their own, by 
independent discovery, without the aid of any teacher,124 it becomes 
clear that eros is not the only means of ascent.  Reversive eros is only 
                                                          
120 Ibid.,28,17-18. 
121 “τοῖς φιλοθεάμοσι τῆς ἀληθείας”: ibid.,29,5; cf. Rep.V,475e4.  Alternative 
rendering: “those who love the sight of truth”. 
122 On Alc.,29,4; cf.29,1 and Rep.VII,532a7-b5. 
123 Phdr.,246d8-e1.: “… the divine which has beauty, wisdom, goodness…”. [: trnsl. by 
Nehamas-Woodruff.  It must be a clerical mistake that in Rowe’s translation the 
attribute of ‘wisdom’ is dropped out ad loc.]  Cf. οn Alc.,29,8 and ibid.,51,8-9 and 11-
12.  For a different approach to the triad «ἀληθές-ἀγαθόν-καλόν» see Βασιλάκης 
[2009],pp.63-75 (and p.253, which is the equivalent in the English abstract). 
124 Apparently, this is how Socrates came to have access to truth.   
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one path to the intelligible realm, just as providential eros is only one 
among various instances of providence.  In both cases, what is 
characteristic of the ‘via erotica’ is that it denotes the attraction to 
beauty (either the Form of Beauty in the case of reversion, or beautiful 
particulars in the case of providence).125 
A further implication of the above remarks relates to Socrates’ 
capacity to adjust his teaching, by elevating “each individual to his 
appropriate object of desire”.126  Proclus compares Socrates with the 
divine in a manner already familiar to us: “[A]s in the godhead all 
goods preexist in the manner of unity,127 but different individuals enjoy 
different goods according to the natural capacity of each, so also 
Socrates embraces all the forms of knowledge within himself, but uses 
now one now another, adjusting his own activity to the requirements 
(ἐπιτηδειότητα) of the recipients”.128  This is why “it is through love 
that perfection comes, in the present work [sc. in the Alcibiades I], to 
those that possess this nature (in view of his possession thereof, 
                                                          
125 See also on Alc.,92,8-15. 
126 Ibid.,152,11-12; cf. ibid.,28,10-11.  Modern Pedagogy would be very proud of seeing 
already in Proclus an explicit mention of the fundamental tenet of the 
“individualization” of the learning process.  See also the section 151,16-156,15 of the 
Commentary, e.g. on Alc.,152,1-3 and ibid.,153,3-5.  This is connected with the way 
Raphael Woolf has accounted for the different picture of Socrates drawn by his two 
students, Plato and Xenophon in Peter Adamson’s podcast of the History of Philosophy 
without any gaps, episode 17, available at http://www.historyofphilosophy.net/Woolf-
Socrates -accessed on 01/11/2011. 
127 Since to take this utterance as a reference to the One, as O’Neill does, is a 
considerable step.   
128 On Alc.,28,11-15. 
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Alcibiades seemed to be worthy of love129 to Socrates)”.130  This point 
reminds us again the limited scope of descending eros in contrast to the 
universality of providence: although Socrates is providential to 
everyone,131 he is (providentially) erotic only to those natures that 
belong to the rank of Beautiful (and hence of eros, too), i.e. those who 
by possessing and aspiring to beauty can be elevated to Beauty itself.132   
Here, however, we should make a conceptual distinction with 
respect to the individuals’ being fitted/suitable (ἐπιτήδεια) recipients 
(of providence) and being of a certain nature.  Although the previous 
passage brings these two notions together, their function is not 
identical.  The specific nature of each individual denotes the ultimate 
source of its bestowals, and thus reveals the entity which is its desired 
object.  That is, Alcibiades, in partaking in the beautiful and erotic 
bestowals, (can) crave for the Beautiful.  On the other hand, 
ἐπιτηδειότης denotes the capacity of the individual to be elevated to a 
specific level of the intelligible.  In other words, the greater 
ἐπιτηδειότης a person has, the higher a level he can attain in the 
intelligible hierarchy.133  Now we can see why nature (φύσις) and 
                                                          
129 «ἀξιέραστος»; see supra,n.44 (in ch.2.1.2.) and on Alc.,58,9-59,18 as to why 
Alcibiades was ἀξιέραστος (:“eulogy upon the character of Alcibiades”). 
130 Ibid.,29,13-15.   
131 In the Apology Socrates’ action claims to be of the benefit of the whole city. 
132 See also infra in ch.2.2.(1.-2.). 
133 This point becomes clear when Proclus states that “according, then, to the measure 
of suitability (ἐπιτηδειότητος) that each person possesses, so he is perfected by 
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ἐπιτηδειότης come to be identified.  The reason is that each different 
desired object is located within a hierarchical structure, and a particular 
object of desire entails also a certain level of capability of ascent.  This 
remark can also help us understand more fully what Proclus means by 
separating individual natures into e.g. philosophical ones, erotic, 
musical ones etc.134  But it is only those already capable of and suitable 
for ascent that are elevated in the end.135  More optimistically, one 
might suppose that each individual has some capacity for elevation; 
but still, the varying natures of these individuals will still result in a 
strongly hierarchical picture of their possible destinations. 
In any case, as we have noted above, Socrates is particularly gifted 
in comprising in his own personality all different kinds of identity, so 
that he can benefit anyone, without exception.136  Nonetheless, since he 
is a single and unified personality, when exercising erotic providence 
he does not cease to be simultaneously dialectical and maieutic.  Hence, 
Proclus notes that, although “the activities of the science of love prevail 
throughout the whole composition [i.e. the Alcibiades I]”, along with 
this we can also “find the genre of philosophical discussion (τῆς 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Socrates and elevated to the divine according to his own rank (τάξιν).”  (: On 
Alc.,29,5-7.) 
134 See On Alc.,152,3-8. 
135 Cf. analogously the elitist attitude of Athenian Democracy. 
136 We could parallel Socrates with a teacher who is not only able to adjust his 
teaching according to the abilities of his/her student, but he can also teach them the 
subject which his student favours more, whatever that is (e.g. from ethical philosophy 
to mathematics). 
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διαλεκτικῆς) in this dialogue illustrated through the subject-matter 
itself, and everywhere” one “may detect the peculiar trait of elicitation 
contained in Socrates’ arguments”.137  I have already noted that 
Socrates belongs to this class of rarely gifted souls which have 
preserved untouched the characteristic “unity in multiplicity” of the 
divine entities, and hence can be ‘everything, but according to their 
own proper manner’.  Thus, in this advanced manner Socrates, 
according to Proclus, is in a state of exploiting midwifery and dialectics 
for achieving the aims of erotic, and even more, in exploiting the two 
former in an erotic way: “so in this dialogue he primarily demonstrates 
the science of love and practices in a loving manner both philosophical 
argument (διαλεκτικόν) and elicitation.”138 
Still it remains the case that erotic providence per se is of limited 
application, since it is necessarily directed only towards beautiful and 
love-worthy recipients.  With regards to this restriction of the scope of 
the notion of eros, some ontological references where Proclus evokes 
again the ontological and “hidden” hierarchical triad of Good, Wisdom 
and Beauty,139 may be helpful here.  Since the Beautiful has its 
counterpart in Eros, we might expect something analogous for the 
other two members of the triad.  According to the Successor, as Eros is 
dependent on the Beautiful, in an analogous way “Faith” («πίστις») is 
                                                          
137 On Alc.,27,15-28,1. 
138 Ibid,28,8-10.  Cf. ibid,29,16-30,4. 
139 See ibid,51,8-13.  
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related to the Good, and “Truth” («ἀλήθεια») to Wisdom; i.e. “the first 
founding the universe and establishing it in the good, the second 
revealing the knowledge that lies in all being”.140  This means that as 
Eros is the path for union with the Beautiful, ‘faith’ is the way to grasp 
the Good, and ‘truth’ the window for contemplating the Wisdom of the 
universe.141  In other words, faith and truth must exemplify the 
function of dialectics and midwifery, exercised by Socrates, for 
elevation to the divine.142  It follows from the analogy that Socrates is 
able to exercise them because he partakes in their bestowals, and 
patterns himself upon them, as he does with Eros, in the case of the 
consideration of beauty.  Consequently, it once again becomes clear 
that eros is only one of at least three ways to ascend/reverse to the 
divine realm.143   
Along with the reduction of the scope of both providential and 
reversive eros, another implication is erotic’s relative degradation, 
since it appears that dialectic/faith and maieutic/truth (for both the 
agent and the recipients of his providence) are more important ways to 
                                                          
140 Ibid.,51,16-52,1. 
141 Cf. ibid,52,10-13; cf. also Baltzly [forthcoming],(pp.13-14). 
142 I say that it “must” be so, because it is not explicitly mentioned by Proclus.  He 
only connects dialectics-midwifery-erotic science with the triad of good-wise-
beautiful, and the latter with faith-truth-eros.  It is a logical entailment that there 
should hold a direct relation as well between dialectics-midwifery-erotic and faith-
truth-eros. 
143 Besides, “‘everything’, says the oracle ‘is governed and exists in these three’; and 
for this reason the gods advise the theurgists to unite themselves to god through this 
triad.”: on Alc.,52,13-53,2; cf. De Oraculis Chaldaicis,p.26(Kroll). 
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ascend to the intelligible hierarchy, since the target-entities are ranked 
higher than the Beautiful, which is Eros’ final end.  Of course, things 
are not so clear cut, since the appreciation of beauty cannot be 
neglected in Wisdom and the Good.  Recollecting again the 
fundamental axiom that “all things are in all things, but in each 
according to its proper nature”, the two higher entities should be seen 
as “causally” (κατ’ αἰτίαν) beautiful, as also the Good is “causally” 
‘wise’.  However, it is still true that access to the (essential) Beautiful is 
marked as inferior to the path towards the (supra-essentially) Good.  
Nonetheless, Proclus notes the specific importance of beauty for our 
intra-mundane realm, since, following Phaedrus’ Socrates, “there is no 
lustre in the images here below of justice and moderation: but, as it is, 
beauty alone has received this prerogative -to be most conspicuous and 
most lovable.”144  The revelation of beauty in our world has an 
immediate and peculiar impact on human souls, so that it becomes 
easier for them to pursue that target, which may elevate them towards 
the source of beauty itself.   
Thus, it appears that beauty, and hence ‘erotic’ as the way to 
ascend to the Beautiful, have a particular privilege in comparison with 
the other two types of ascent.145  A soul must be extraordinarily gifted 
                                                          
144 Phdr.,250b1-3 and d6-e1 (in O’Neill’s trnsl. because) cited in On Alc.,320,11-14.  Cf. 
ibid.,328,6-14 (the quotation from the Phdr. reappearing in ll.10-11). 
145 One could use Aristotelian terminology and propose that the erotic ascent is “prior 
to us”.  True, it seems that Proclus would be happy ascribing a certain priority to eros.  
However, I am not certain if the analogue could survive after its exposure to closer 
scrutiny.  The main problem is that (descending) eros is a way with which the 
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in order to be attracted and elevated to Wisdom, or even the Good 
itself, both of which transcend Beauty.  On the other hand, not only has 
the erotic person better chances to succeed in his pursuit, but also “the 
union… with divine beauty… results” in “intimacy with the entire 
divinity”,146 which is “beautiful, wise and good”, as has been already 
noted (e.g. n.123).  In other words, even if this divine triad is 
hierarchical, the ascent to beauty, having “fed and watered the winged 
nature of the soul”,147 enables the soul to continue its ascent towards 
further and higher summits, which are the sources of Beauty.  Of 
course, this soul must be especially gifted/‘winged’ in order to 
appreciate the new summits that it has been able to behold from the 
top of Beauty.  However, the very possibility of indirect elevation to the 
Good via Eros’ union with the Beautiful makes the ‘via erotica’ a much 
more ‘practical’ way of ascent to the source of everything, than the 
labours involved e.g. in dialectics, which by ‘imitating’ faith forms the 
direct way to get hold of the Good, as far as possible.  This is not to 
suggest that there is only one way to ascend to the divine148 (whether 
                                                                                                                                                                      
intelligible communicates with what lies beneath.  Contrariwise, in Aristotle’s case 
what is prior to us is not prior in nature.  Besides, the Stagirite does not have the 
elaborate Neoplatonic hierarchies (e.g. of Good, Wisdom and Beauty).  Still, it is true 
that beauty and its correlate eros are among the things that have immediate effects in 
the human being, and can be exploited for an ascent towards the source of apparent 
beauty.  Consequently, from this point of view speaking of ‘erotics’ as ‘prior to us’ 
has a certain merit. 
146 On Alc.,29,15-16. 
147 Phdr,246e1-2; cf. on Alc.,29,10-11.  Cf. also Phdr.,ibid.,e3-4 and on Alc.,ibid.,11-12. 
148
 Besides, it is not clear whether the elevation from the Beautiful to Wisdom and 
Goodness necessarily has to be mediated by ‘truth’ and ‘faith’ respectively.  However, 
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directly or indirectly).149  Although beauty has a privileged position for 
the souls of our intra-mundane realm particularly, eros does not have 
the fundamental universality we had observed in Plotinus.  
Furthermore, this verdict holds for both directions of Proclus’ thought: 
both providential and ascending eros. 
 
2.1.5. Qualifying love:  
from manic eros to undefiled eros  
But what exactly is providence?  In this section I will juxtapose 
manic eros and Proclus’ ideal of undefiled providential eros.  The 
characteristic features of the Proclean notion will also provide us with a 
deeper insight as to the relation between providential and reversive 
eros -or providence and reversion more generally-; that is, how these 
two notions can be regarded as two complementary aspects of an 
entity’s single activity.  Let us, then, go back to the Elements and see 
how the notion of providence is initially introduced with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
even if the connections can be direct without their mediation, it is not certain that 
souls whose natural capacity was to attain to the Beautiful may be in a position to go 
even beyond that.  Rather, it seems that this indirect elevation to the Good via the 
Beautiful is a realistic option for souls with a capacity to be elevated to the source of 
all.  Of course, a further problem is that we can actually attain to such a summit only 
via theurgy; cf. again on Alc.,52,13-53,2.  As for the erotic souls, we have already 
given another reason why direct connection with Beautiful implies indirect 
communion, and hence “kinship/intimacy” with Goodness and Wisdom: Beauty is 
good and wise ‘by participation’. 
149 In any case, one could indirectly ascend to the Good (and descend to the 
Beautiful?) via Wisdom, which mediates between the two. 
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Henads’ existence:150  “Every god embraces in his substance the 
function of exercising providence towards the universe; and the 
primary providence resides in the gods.”151   
This proposition confirms our already formed picture with regards 
to providence as exemplified in the Platonic Demiurge and his erotic 
and political counterparts, and is parallel to the familiar issue of 
procession («πρόοδος») in Neoplatonic metaphysics. But apart from 
making explicit the relation between god(s), goodness and providence 
it tells us nothing more about the precise nature of this (divine) 
providence.  More informative is prop.122: “All that is divine both 
exercises providence towards secondary existences and transcends 
(ἐξῄρηται) the beings for which it provides: its providence involves no 
remission of its pure (ἄμικτον) and unitary transcendence (ὑπεροχὴν), 
neither does its separate unity annul its providence.”152   
One of the significant contributions of this proposition is its 
explanation as to how divine providence can be made compatible with 
the other fundamental Greek assumption about gods, which is their 
transcendence.  Indeed, as also Dodds notes, the gist of the Epicurean 
criticism against the idea of gods’ being providential for what lies 
beneath them was that it “credits the gods with an interest in an 
infinity of petty problems and so abolishes their transcendence and 
                                                          
150 See also Butler [2010].   
151 El.Th.,120,31-32. 
152 Ibid.,122,1-4. 
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makes their life πραγματειώδη καὶ ἐπίπονον.”153  However, for the 
Neoplatonic Successor “the especial glory of Platonism”154 consists in 
the preservation of both divine transcendence and providence.155  In 
other words, if, the ‘(hyper-)being’ of the gods entails both the fact of 
their transcendence as well as their providential attitude towards the 
inferiors, then thinking with the Epicureans that providence ‘pollutes’ 
divine transcendence or ‘eudaimonia’ is not the right way.  Rather, 
there can be a compromise between these two fundamental divine 
aspects, and this solution is realized in the concept of «ἄσχετος» and 
«ἀμιγής» πρόνοια, i.e. a providence that assumes “no relation” with its 
recipients, making the gods “undefiled” and “pure” from anything 
lower to them.   
Thus, the paradox156 of divine providence emerges since it is a kind 
of (causal) relation of the divine with the lower reality, without there 
being any actual relation (or interference) between them at all.157  We 
may even contend that while Proclus boasts to have solved this 
problem, he does not really give a solution just by insisting that the 
                                                          
153 Dodds [1963],p.264; cf. Epicurus, Principal doctrines, (p.94 Bailey, the Greek words 
cited meaning “laborious and wearisome”).  Cf. also idem, Letter to Menoeceus,123,2-
7(Arrighetti).   
154 Proclus, Platonic Theology,vol.1,ch.ιε΄,76,10ff; cf. Dodds [1963],p.265 and n.1. 
155 Contra Aristotle and the Stoics. Cf. again Dodds,ibid. 
156 The word is used in the superlative by Proclus in describing this phenomenon; cf. 
on Alc.,60,7.   
157 Cf. also El.Th.,prop.142,p.124,l.33-p.126,l.1 “But whatever is divine keeps the same 
station (τάξιν) for ever, and is free from all relation (ἄσχετόν) to the lower and all 
admixture (ἄμικτον) with it (prop.98).”   
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gods’ providence does not involve being tainted by involvement with 
what they care for.  Doesn’t this sound more like a begging of the 
question against the Epicureans?  The answer is no: the necessity of 
gods’ goodness and providence does not mingle with –but actually 
explains and is explained by- the necessity of their being transcendent, 
since both are necessary realizations stemming from a single nature, 
the super-nature of the gods.  Hence, although Proclus in the previous 
proposition stresses as much as possible the universality of divine 
providence as a way of confirmation of the existence and nature of 
divinity, he emphasizes that “in exercising providence they [sc. the 
Henads/gods] assume no relation to those for whom they provide, 
since it is in virtue of being what they are that they make all things 
good, and what acts in virtue of its being acts without relation (for 
relation is a qualification of its being, and therefore contrary to its 
nature).”158 
Now, it is exactly this paradox of undefiled and non-relational 
providence that Proclus stresses when describing the (erotically 
providential) relation of Socrates and Alcibiades as mirrored in the 
structure of the intelligible hierarchy, and vice versa.  Τhe following 
passage from the Alcibiades Commentary could almost be commentary 
on the aforementioned proposition of the Elements.  One should read it 
with particular attention to the multiple verbs and adjectives that 
                                                          
158 Ibid.,122,13-17. 
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reveal what the pure transcendence («ἄμικτος ὑπεροχή») of prop.122’s 
non-relational (ἄσχετος) πρόνοια is:   
“The more accurate accounts say that there are two principal 
elements in divine and spiritual providence towards the 
secondary beings: (I) that it passes through all things from 
the top to the bottom, leaving nothing, not even the least, 
without a share in itself, and (2) it neither admits into itself 
anything it controls nor is it infected (μηδὲ ἀναπίμπλασθαι) 
with its nature nor is it confused with it (μηδὲ 
συμφύρεσθαι).  It is not mixed up (ἀναμίγνυται) with the 
objects of its provision just because it preserves and arranges 
everything (for it is not the nature of the divine or spiritual to 
experience the emotions of individual souls), nor does it 
leave any of the inferior beings without order or 
arrangement159 because of its distinct superiority over all that 
is secondary, but160 it both disposes everything duly and 
transcends what it disposes; at the same time it has the 
character of the good and remains undefiled (ἄχραντος), it 
arranges the universe yet has no relation (ἄσχετος) to what 
                                                          
159 Note the dense usage of words denoting Demiurgic functions (cf. also on Alc.,54,4: 
«κοσμεῖν», and ibid,l.9: «κοσμητικἠ»), while Proclus paves the way to describing the 
relation of Socrates and Alcibiades.   
160 Following O’Neill’s minor deletion of «διὰ ταῦτα» “as a dittography”.  Cf. his 
n.122 ad loc. 
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is arranged by it; it passes through everything and mingles 
with nothing (ἀμιγὴς πρὸς πάντα).”161 
Proclus wants to stress not so much the universality of providence 
per se, but the way in which this very idea is compatible with the fact 
that it “transcends” everything in its “distinct superiority”162 over the 
inferior beings.  Hence, among other designations, he speaks of divine 
providence as «ἄχραντος» (‘undefiled’), «ἄσχετος» (‘without relation’) 
and «ἀμιγὴς» (‘mingled with nothing’) with respect to its recipients.163  
Proclus’ obsession with ‘purity’ is exemplified and explained by the 
fact that he assigns to it a distinctive position among the (primary) 
‘divine attributes’.164  As he states in the Elements, the characteristic of 
purity («καθαρότητος») is “to liberate (ἐξαιρεῖν) the higher from the 
lower” beings.165  “For the divine purity isolates (τὸ ἀμιγὲς ἐνδίδωσι) 
all the gods from inferior existences, and enables them to exercise 
providence toward secondary beings without contamination (τὸ 
                                                          
161 On Alc.,53,17-54,10.  These thoughts are introduced on the occasion of some of the 
opening lines of Alc.I,103a,3-4: “-and also [sc. you are wondering] why, when the 
others pestered you with conversation, I never even spoke to you all these years.”  
The same idea is reiterated in a more concise form some pages later in the 
Commentary, ibid.,60,3-11. 
162 Cf. also on Alc.,199,9-11 and El.Th.122,2-3 and ibid.,140,5-7. 
163 See also on Alc.,167,18-19 and 251,14-15.  As to the strict ontological separation 
between superiors and inferiors see El.Th.124,27-28. 
164 For an introduction to the doctrine of divine attributes («θεῶν ἰδιότητες» referred 
to in on Alc.,30,8ff.) see Dodds [1963],pp.278-279.   
165 El.Th.156,32-33. 
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ἄχραντον);… Purity,166 then, being a good, is found primarily among 
the gods”.167   
We could imagine an objector claiming that there is no Platonic 
background for Proclus’ emphasis on purity.  Still, in terms of 
vocabulary at least, Proclus has in mind a main Platonic erotic 
dialogue, the Symposium, where Diotima declares that «θεὸς δὲ 
ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μείγνυται».168  Of course, in the Neoplatonists’ elaborate 
theologies there are many other strata which are inferior to the proper 
gods, but still higher than incarnate human beings.  However, Plato’s 
succinct allusion here to an ontological separation between different 
levels must have had a strong impact on Neoplatonic figures with such 
‘pure’ dispositions, such as Proclus.  By maintaining the fundamental 
tenet of separation, the Neoplatonists were able to generalize it and 
apply it to more particular, subtle and fine-grained distinctions within 
                                                          
166 The topic of purity is also related with the issue of ‘purificatory’ virtues (cf. e.g. 
Plot.,I.2.3,8, and the interpretation of Phaedo,69b8-c3), and the relevant Chaldean and 
Orphic rituals, which were means towards the reversion to the (undefiled) god(s), as 
Dodds,p.280 points out.  He also mentions the information given by Marinus (: 
student and biographer of Proclus; cf. Vita Procli sive de felicitate,§18), that his master 
used to bathe at sea ‘unshrinkingly’ at least once in a month up to an advanced age.  
While Socrates was not a great friend of bathing or washing (see Aristophanes, 
Clouds,835-7 and idem, Birds,1554-5 apud Συκουτρῆς [1949],p.10,n.2), in the 
beginning of the Symposium (174a2), i.e. a dialogue about love, he was “just bathed” 
(«λελουμένον», even having “put on his fancy sandals”, ibid.,a3!).  Cf. also Osborne 
[1994],pp.98-99 and n.60. 
167 El.Th.,156,ll.26-27 and 4-5.  Divine purity is seen by Proclus as the ‘specific’ form of 
the generic “protective” («φρουρητικόν») cause or attribute, for which see ibid.,154,1-
9. 
168 Symp.,203a1-2: “Gods do not mix with men”, hence the roots of the Parmenides’ 
Greatest Difficulty.   
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the intelligible realm.  The same attitude to the aforementioned 
Platonic citation is revealed in the final stages of Diotima’s ‘mysteries’.  
Recapitulating the characteristics of the Form of Beauty, which has just 
been said to be unaffected by the processes of coming to be pertaining 
to our worldly realm,169 the priestess declares that it is “absolute 
(εἰλικρινές), pure (καθαρόν), unmixed (ἄμεικτον),170 not polluted by 
human flesh or colors or any other great nonsense of mortality”.171  
Certainly a Neoplatonist could make a lot of this recurrent theme of 
ontological purity in Diotima’s teaching, which is verified by the 
(in)famous episode of Socrates’ and Alcibiades’ lying on the bed 
together on a cold winter-night,172 while nothing happened between 
them.173  As the Form of Beauty was said to be “not polluted by human 
flesh”, so did the philosopher Socrates…  
Now, we have already seen (in ch.2.1.1.), too, that Proclus is (too) 
faithful to Plato’s parallel between the ontological and the mundane 
praise of eros.  So, it is not surprising that immediately after the 
fundamental passage from the Alcibiades Commentary cited above, 
                                                          
169 See Symp.,201e1ff. 
170 NB that Anaxagoras’ Nous was said to be «ἀμιγής» and «καθαρός», too.  Cf. 
Anaxagoras, A:55,5 and 100,8 DK; cf. also 61,7; 56,3 and 100,11.  In A56,1-2 Nous is 
called both «ἀπαθής» and «ἀμιγής».  On the other hand, Plotinus’ insistence on Eros 
being a ‘mixture’ (cf. supra,ch.1.1.5.) is because he treats reversive, not providential 
eros.  It is the inferior entities that desire their union (ἕνωσις) with the superior(s), not 
the other way round. 
171 Symp.,211e1-3. 
172 See ibid.,217c4ff. 
173 Ibid,219c7-d2. 
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describing the divine-undefiled providence as realized in the 
metaphysical sphere, Proclus picks up on the Symposium’s shift, and 
continues to clarify and confirm the issue of undefiled providence at 
the level of Socrates’ erotic relation to Alcibiades.  Besides, this was 
actually the reason why Proclus invoked the issue of divine providence 
in the first place; he aimed to explain Socrates’ relation to his beloved.  
This is, then, what the Neoplatonist writes: 
“This spiritual and divine providence, then, Plato clearly 
attributes to the beneficent174 forethought (προμηθείᾳ) of 
Socrates for the less perfect, both maintaining its vigilance 
and stability (as regards the beloved) and its full use of any 
opportunity for zeal, and at the same time its detached 
(ἄσχετον), unadulterated (ἀμιγῆ) and undefiled (ἄχραντον) 
character and its refusal to touch (ἀνέπαφον) what belongs 
to him…–let this be evidence to you175 of his detached 
(ἀσχέτου) and unentangled (ἀμιγοῦς) solicitude for his 
inferior.  For the first relationship of man to man is to speak 
to him; so the failure to have even this communication with 
the object of his provision reveals him as completely 
transcendent and unrelated to his inferior.  So at the same 
time he is both present to him and not present, he both loves 
and remains detached (καὶ ἐρᾷ καὶ ἄσχετός ἐστι), observes 
                                                          
174 «ἀγαθουργῷ»: cf. El.Th.122,20-21: “…the highest is not that which has the form of 
goodness (ἀγαθοειδές) but that which does good (ἀγαθουργόν)”, with Dodds’ 
thoughtful n. ad loc. (p.265): “This is not… an assertion of the superiority of πρᾶξις to 
θεωρία.  For Neoplatonism divine πρᾶξις is θεωρία, or rather perhaps its incidental 
accompaniment (παρακολούθημα Plot.III.viii.4…)”.   
175 Here (as well as in other instances; see e.g. on Alc.,65,19), Proclus speaks directly to 
his student or reader.  Since Plato never does that directly, while Aristotle hardly ever 
(see the exception e.g. of Metaphysics,Λ.5,1071a22 and 28), this gesture might have 
been a consequence of the conventions and practicalities served by the literary genre 
of a Commentary.  
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him from all angles yet in no respect puts himself in the same 
class.176  Now if their behaviour assumes this manner even in 
the case of divine men, what must we say about the gods 
themselves or the good spirits?”177 
This remarkable passage reiterates and confirms the status of (the 
possibility of) divine providence in the intra-mundane realm, 
employing similar or even the same basic terminology to the previous 
passage about the gods (e.g. ἄσχετος, ἀμιγής, ἄχραντος 
providence).178   
However, within these designations of providence Proclus adds 
one which perhaps would be rather odd if applied to the intelligible 
realm.  This word is the adjective «ἀνέπαφος» (untouch-ed/-ing; sc. 
forethought -on Alc.,54,15), and the oddity would arise, because, as the 
context makes clear, it implies the existence of (material) bodies, which 
of course are absent from the immaterial intelligible kingdom.  Thus, 
we can plausibly infer that Proclus alludes to the central episode of 
Alcibiades’ narration in the Symposium.179  Still, there need not be only 
sexual connotations to the word.  For Proclus the fact that, while the 
vulgar lovers ‘pestered’ Alcibiades with conversation, Socrates was 
                                                          
176 Again, the paradox of divine providence. 
177 On Alc.,54,10-55,7.  
178 The peculiarity of Socrates’ divine relation to Alcibiades becomes a running theme 
of the Commentary.  In the light of confirming what providence among and by the 
gods is, see for instance on Alc.,36,5-7. 
179 O’Neill in n.123 supports my reading, since he helpfully glosses the idea of on 
Alc.,54,15 as Socrates’ refusal “to touch Alcibiades physically”, and he refers to 
Alc.I,131c, e.g. c5-7. 
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silent towards Cleinias’ son,180 is an undeniable evidence of Socrates’ 
undefiled providence.181  Hence, the absence of verbal communication 
presents itself as an alternative, although perhaps weaker,182 
visualization of what detached and non-relational providence is.183  
What the Neoplatonists read in the episode of the Symposium was not a 
condemnation of sex per se, but rather an instance of Socrates’ 
(providential) refusal to engage with everything, if possible, that 
pertains to our worldly, and hence bodily, existence.  
One immediate result of the above point of view is that the so 
much praised erotic madness («μανία») of the Phaedrus184 looks now, 
perhaps, even more alien to us.  For one thing, it cannot be anymore a 
‘mania’ in the way we would conceive and feel it, despite Proclus’ 
reassurance that “one kind of enthusiasm (μανίας) is superior to 
moderation (σωφροσύνης), but the other falls short of it”,185 the former 
                                                          
180 Cf. again Alc.I,103a3-4. 
181 Of course, in the end Socrates did speak with Alcibiades, when he thought that the 
appropriate time («καιρός»; cf. Proclus’ relevant discussion in on Alc.,120,14ff.) had 
arrived, otherwise there would be no Dialogue at all!  
182 In on Alc.,55,1-2 Proclus notes that “the first relationship of man to man is to speak 
to him”.   
183 Proclus pursues further the issue of Socrates’ silence immediately after addressing 
the mythological anthropomorphisms of gods.  See on Alc.,56,5-16. 
184 See Phdr.,244a5ff., especially 245b1-c1.  Since “the greatest of goods come to us 
through madness, provided that it is bestowed by divine gift”, (ibid.,244a7-8), 
Socrates’ giving four examples of it, among which the erotic species, we could safely 
infer that divine mania is identified with divine providence by Proclus. 
185 On Alc.,48,20-21. 
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corresponding to the divine lover, the latter to the coarse multitude.186  
The re-signification of the former type in the context of detached 
providence, which in the ideal case would exclude even 
communication via language, brings to the forefront another 
dimension noted by critics of Plato, and more generally of ancient 
Greek philosophy: that of ‘disinterested affection’.187  There are two 
senses that need to be distinguished here: (a) Socrates, or any 
providential force, does not actually care about the recipient but just 
automatically gives forth.  This is not how I use the phrase 
‘disinterested affection’, and I have given a negative answer to this 
contention in section 2.1.4.  (b) The providential force does care in the 
sense that it needs some recipient or other, but doesn’t care which 
recipient is going to receive its providence since any fitting (say 
                                                          
186 See the whole context in ibid.,48,16-49,3, where the initial puzzle is that “all lovers 
in so far as they are enthusiastic have suffered somewhat the same experience, 
although some are distinguished according to the superior kind of enthusiasm, others 
according to the inferior.” (: ibid.,48,18-20.)  For the negative side of mania, relating it 
to ignorance («ἀμαθία»), because “just as the madman (μαινόμενος) knows neither 
himself nor others, so also the doubly ignorant” (: ibid.,293,15-16), see ibid.,293,14-22 
(on the occasion of Alc.I,113c5.  Etymologically, both «μανθάνω/μάθησις» and 
«μαίνομαι/μανία», as well as «μαντεύω-μάντης-μαντεία», stem from the same root: 
«μαν-»). 
187 Vlastos [1973],p.6 ascribes ‘disinterested affection’ to Aristotle, but he is not 
actually critical there.  In ibid., p.33,n.100 he applies it to Plato and notes it could be 
egoistic.  Remes [2006], who treats ingeniously Plotinus’ ethics, speaks of 
“disinterested interest”, as her title suggests; (see also ibid.,pp.3, 17, 20, 22 and cf. p.7).  
This formula can be seen as alternative, and in some contexts even preferable, to 
“disinterested affection”.  In the abovementioned article Remes basically explains and 
shows the merits of a Neoplatonic ethical theory through Plotinus’ lenses.  My critical 
approach to come is akin to some of the questionable aspects she mentions in 
ibid.,p.23. 
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beautiful) recipient will do.  This is the sense in which I am interested 
here,188 and that captures Proclus’ ideal type of (manic) loving 
providence.189  Thus, the (Neo)-Platonic tradition seems well-armed to 
avoid the arrows of egoism.  Nonetheless, we may question whether 
‘disinterested affection’ can describe the functions of the divine, and 
whether it should serve as a model for us.  In other words, the 
hierarchical picture of ontological reality on the one hand prevents 
egoism, because it enables providence to be other-directed, but on the 
other hand it supports disinterested affection to the extent that 
undefiled providence explains the way two different ontological levels 
can relate with each other.  Of course, I repeat that from Proclus’ 
viewpoint the above critique launched against Plato would not be 
received as an accusation at all.  Proclus would happily respond that 
this is exactly what he meant by reducing love to an instance of 
undefiled, detached and pure providence.  However, there are two 
-rather isolated- instances in the Commentary where the explicit 
implications of his conception may reveal it as problematic, at least for 
us. 
                                                          
188 As will be also clear from the following analysis my critical attitude should not be 
identified with the thesis of Verdenius (which has some affinities with the concerns of 
Vlastos [1973] about lack of particularity and is) presented and criticized by 
Armstrong [1964],pp.205-206. 
189 Imagine the situation of a parent who satisfies every financial need her child has 
(e.g. for clothing, food and education), although she lives in a different place and 
avoids seeing, let alone hugging, it. 
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Ιn the context of the discussion as to why Socrates’ guardian spirit 
allowed him to associate with Alcibiades, although it could foresee that 
the young man would not be finally benefitted by the Athenian 
gadfly,190 and having invoked several arguments191 and examples,192 
Proclus concludes his discussion thus: “So So<crates also achieved 
what was fitting (καθήκοντος)>;193 for all the actions of the serious-
minded man (σπουδαίου) have reference to this:194 if he has acted, then, 
beneficently and in a divine manner, he achieves his end in his activity 
(ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ τέλος ἔχει), even if that in him195 which admits of 
                                                          
190 See on Alc.,85,17ff. 
191 For example, the classic one by which the failure to receive the divine and good 
bestowals is attributed to the receiver’s inability. See Proclus’ related simile with the 
sun and what can share in its light in on Alc.,90,22-91,6 (with O’Neill’s n.213). 
192 See another classic example of Laius, father of Oedipus, and the renowned Delphic 
oracle, in on Alc.,91,10-15, with O’Neill’s n.214. 
193 The content of the angle-brackets (except for ‘also’) is supplied in Greek by 
Westerink; see his apparatus ad loc. 
194 Ο’Neill accepts the reading «αὐτὸν».  However, he regards it as an exceptional 
case of neuter with enclitic ‘ν’, thus, being able to refer it to «τοῦ καθήκοντος» of l.15.  
Cf. his justification in n.216*. 
195 Westerink prints here «αὐτοῦ» with manuscript N(eapolitanus; see p.ii of his 
Introduction).  O’Neill,n.217* explicitly agrees and takes the clause (: ‘which admits… 
activity’ = «τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτοῦ») to be referring to Socrates, noting the 
dependence of «αὐτοῦ» upon «ἐνδεχόμενον»  However, his translation would make 
more sense if we read with Dodds «αὐτῷ», and this is what Segonds [1985],p.75b 
prints ad loc.  We could also rewrite as follows: “καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ [ἐν]δεχόμενον [αὐτοῦ] 
κατὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς ἐνέργειαν <αὐτοῦ> τετελείωται’, deleting ‘ἐν-’ and transposing the 
«αὐτοῦ» after «ἐνέργειαν», so that the αὐτοῦ refers to Socrates’ activity, whereas the 
‘δεχόμενον’, to the recipient, i.e. Alcibiades, something which perhaps underlies 
Dodds’ choice, too: ‘even if the recipient has not been perfected in accordance with 
his (sc. Socrates’) external activity’.   
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external activity also has not been perfected.”196  Although the text is 
not fully clear, it seems safe to say that it is not for the sake of the 
recipient that providence (i.e. “external activity”) takes place, but rather 
the other way round: it is for the sake of its taking place, that a (fitted) 
recipient must be found, since providence is necessarily an intentional 
activity.  This seems to suggest that Socrates might not be so interested 
in Alcibiades’ perfection for the sake of Alcibiades, but only to the 
extent that the latter is expedient as a receptacle for Socrates’ external 
and overflowing activity.  In that way, Socrates’, or his divine 
analogue’s  ‘affection’ must be qualified.  All the more so, since 
Alcibiades’, or his cosmic equivalent’s failure of perfection does not 
seem to imply anything about Socrates’ complete status.  After all, as 
we noted from the very beginning (e.g. ch.2.1.2.), Socrates does not 
need Alcibiades in order for the former to recollect the intelligible.  In 
other words, the lover’s affection cannot be but ‘disinterested’.197  
This suggestion can be supported by another excerpt, where 
Proclus comments on a small phrase abstracted from Socrates’ initial 
                                                          
196 On Alc.,91,15-92,1. 
197 In other words, Alcibiades assumes the place of a preferred “indifferent” 
(«ἀδιάφορον») for the Stoic-like sage Socrates.  The Neoplatonic sage seems 
wholeheartedly sympathetic (so to speak, since his own ideal is identified with the 
Stoic impassivity) to the view expressed in the Stoic archer analogy (see e.g. Cicero, 
De Finibus,III.§22, with n.12 of Annas [2001] ad loc.,p.72): the preferred indifferent 
forms only a target so that the sage can perform a virtuous action, no matter whether 
the target is accomplished (e.g. the preservation of his health), the actual target lying 
within the virtuous activity itself.  This is also the gist of Collette-Dučić 
[forthcoming],pp.12-17, (despite p.6), esp. pp.14-15. 
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exchanges with Alcibiades.198  Proclus explains why Alcibiades was 
“worthy of love” («ἀξιέραστος») and suited («ἐπιτήδειος») for 
Socrates’ care, as well as the importance of the lover’s knowing the 
individual nature of his beloved.199  This is, then, what Proclus notes: 
“The phrase ‘so I persuade myself,’ seems to me to show clearly that 
the divinely-inspired lover, if he sees the beloved suited for conversion 
to intellect, helps him, in so far as he is able;200 but if he finds him small-
minded and ignoble and concerned with things below, he [sc. the 
lover] turns back to himself (εἰς ἑαυτὸν) and looks towards himself 
(πρὸς ἑαυτὸν) alone, taking refuge in the proverbial ‘I saved myself.’201  
                                                          
198 See Alc.I,104e8-105a1. 
199 See on Alc.,133,17ff. 
200 It is not very clear to whom this qualification applies: to the lover or the beloved?  
It would be more natural for Proclus to be referring to the beloved’s deficiency, not 
the lover’s.  However, as O’Neill’s and Segonds’ translation reveals, every other 
nominative to be found in the passage refers to Socrates with much more certainty.  
Hence, although somehow odd, it might seem that the present qualification applies to 
the subject of the other clauses, i.e. Socrates.  Still, as the semi-colon in l.20 makes 
clear, we have two parts in ll.19-22: the first dominated by «μέν», the second by «δέ», 
while our phrase belongs to the first one.  Τhe structure of the second part need not 
reflect in its detail that of the first part; besides there are not specific verbal or 
syntactical analogies.  Thus, if only the ‘μέν’-clause refers to the “worthy of love” 
(ἀξιέραστος -see e.g. ibid,133,17), “suited” and by no means “ignoble” or “small-
minded” Alcibiades, who nonetheless we know that finally failed in converting to 
intellect, then we could still plausibly hold that the subject of «καθ ὅσον ἐστὶ 
δυνατός» is the ‘beloved’ not the lover.  
201 Cf. Archilochus, frgm.6 (Diehl) with O’Neill’s n.286 ad loc.  Just one page before, 
Proclus used the adjectives «σμικρᾶς… καὶ ἀγεννοῦς (φύσεως»; cf. on Alc.,138,4) to 
describe a young man for whom Socrates “would have long ago given up his love” 
(cf. Alc.I,104e8 and on Alc.,138,2-4), in contrast to what is proclaimed about 
Alcibiades in the Platonic dialogue. 
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For the persuasion and self-directed activity are an indication of this 
knowledge (sc. τῆς ἐρωτικῆς).”202   
It is noteworthy that in both instances we are dealing with an 
actual beloved,203 not a candidate one.  The first case, that of Alcibiades, 
recapitulates what we have been seeing the non-egoist and 
providential divine lover doing, so we need not dwell on this.  The case 
where the potential beloved turns out to be ignoble is more interesting 
in that it succinctly illustrates the nature of the lover’s self-sufficiency.  
From this description it turns out not only that the divine lover is not in 
need of his beloved, but actually that he is not very much troubled 
about the other person and his/her final perfection either (and an 
analogous point would hold in the cosmic context).204  Of course, we 
should not lay too much weight on the slightly surprising use of the 
proverbial ‘I saved myself’, because the lover is in any case, and 
regardless of the beloved’s fate, already saved.  We can exclude the 
egoistic accusation that the lover has used the beloved for the former’s 
ascent, and then stopped caring about his ‘ladder’: the lover did not 
need the beloved right from the beginning.  The beloved’s failure to 
keep pace with him –or, in the words of the previous citation, the fact 
that “even if that in him which admits of external activity also has not 
                                                          
202 On Alc.,139,18-140,2.   
203 This is plain when reading «αὐτόν» in on Alc.,139,21, which refers to the «τὸν 
ἐρώμενον» of l.19.  In other words, Proclus in both cases speaks about one beloved, 
whose instantiation however is at least dual, and hence refers to different particulars. 
204 Imagine a very good teacher or lecturer who delivers talks without being 
interested in whether his audience understands or is benefited by him.   
CHAPTER 2:  PROCLUS ON THE FIRST ALCIBIADES 
153 
been perfected”- does not seem to have any impact on the tranquility205 
of the lover’s internal and self-directed activity. This, I conclude, is 
indicative of what disinterested affection would mean.   
Perhaps then the lover was not much interested in being 
providential for the sake of the beloved, but rather for the activity’s 
sake, since providence is necessarily an intentional activity.  In this 
case, although the beloved is not necessary requirement for the divine 
lover’s self-realization, he is reduced to a means for the manifestation 
of the lover’s self-realization.  Moreover, in our passage the lesser 
importance of this ‘instrumentality’ is evident in that the divine lover 
presumably can perfectly do alone with himself, as well.  Thus, even if 
there were affection between the lover and his beloved (in both cases), 
this must have surely been disinterested, on the lover’s behalf.  Of 
course, it is natural enough to turn one’s back on someone who does 
not or cannot follow.  Nonetheless, it is a question whether we would 
like to posit that as an ethical ideal.206   
To conclude, it seems that Proclus’ divine and divine-like entities 
are closer to Aristotle’s non-altruistic god, who “moves” only “by 
                                                          
205 Cf. the Hellenistic ideal of «ἀταραξία». 
206 We would not do justice to Proclus if we did not mention a ‘positive’ side-effect of 
disinterested affection.  On the occasion of Alc.I,114d7, where Alcibiades calls 
Socrates “insolent” («ὑβριστὴν»), Proclus comments: “The fact, too, that Socrates 
does not reject the name of ‘insolent’ shows his lofty grandeur and contempt for 
everything inferior (τὸ περιφρονεῖν ἁπάντων τῶν χειρόνων)…” (: on Alc.,313,10-
12).  The case is quasi-analogous to a father who, in not paying any particular respect 
to his child’s existence and needs, would never be accused of exercising e.g. corporeal 
punishment upon it…  
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being loved”,207 than the vocabulary of providential eros would allow 
us to hold.  Since for Plotinus, too, the One is a final as well as efficient 
cause,208 we find that his position is quite close to that of Proclus in this 
respect.209  Finally, undefiled providential eros gives us a further hint as 
to its relation to reversive eros: both are aspects of one entity’s activity, 
because the upwards tendency (which makes the providence 
undefiled) has as a by-product providence, whether erotic or of a 
different sort.  But as I promised above, we need to move to more 




                                                          
207 Cf. Metaphysics, Λ.7,1072b3.  While Moutsopoulos [1998] notes the similarities 
between Proclus and Aristotle in this respect with reference to the Platonic Theology, 
for Proclus’ criticism of the “Unmoved Mover” see his Commentary on Tim.,I.267,4-12 
(cited up until l.6 by Dodds [1963],p.198).  Cf. also his Comm. on Parm.,922,1-20 (as a 
part of the Greatest Difficulty’s exegesis; lemma: Parm.,133b4-c1/on Parm.,919,24-35), 
and Dodds [1963],p.213,n.1. 
208 Some Neoplatonists, in particular Ammonius, son of Hermeias, went that far so as 
to contend that, after all, that was also Aristotle’s position.  Cf. Verbeke [1982],p.46 
and n.9 (in p.242). 
209 Hence, we can apply here what Dodds says on the occasion of El.Th.130, i.e. that 
“[t]his doctrine, like so much else in Pr.[oclus], is but the hardening into an explicit 
law of what is implicit in Plotinus” (Dodds,pp.269-270; cf. ibid.,p.xxi).  Cf. also Rist 
[1964],pp.215-216, Rist [1970],pp.168 and 172, Gersh [1973],p.127, McGinn [1996],p.197 
(although contrast ibid.,pp.198 and 199), Esposito Buckley [1992],pp.40-41, 44-46, 58, 
and Armstrong [1961],p.113; my treatment though can give some answers to the 
latter’s reservations about Plotinus in ibid.,pp.114-115 and 117, as well as make 
clearer what Esposito Buckley [1992],p.57 means when speaking of “the absence of 
providential care on the part of the Plotinian One” [my italics]. 
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2.2. Locating Eros in the intelligible hierarchy 
When describing the Proclean ideal lover, I noted that a description 
of the position of the Eros-divinity in the intelligible universe would 
help us in understanding the phenomenon of providential eros.  The 
time has come.  In what follows I will not only situate Eros in the 
Proclean hierarchy, but I will trace its presence in the lower entities that 
participate in it and in its ancestors.  Further, I will show the 
ontological connection of Eros with Friendship.  One of the upshots of 
this chapter will be to show that Eros is to be found almost in every 
corner of Proclus’ system.  Along the way I will have the opportunity 
to make constant comparisons with Plotinus. 
 
2.2.1. Divine Eros and its function 
One of the important differentiations between Plotinus and Proclus 
is the complexity of the hierarchy: the Platonic Successor has a much 
more baroque picture of reality than the Neoplatonic founder.  For 
example, contrary to Plotinus’ frugal approach, Time and Eternity are 
hypostasized in Proclus’ system.210  Thus, we should not be surprised if 
Eros possesses a distinctive position in the Proclean hierarchy, whereas 
in my discussion of Plotinus I proposed a “synairetic” reading which 
contracted Soul (or Nous) with Eros, and hence did away with a 
separate existence of Love.  In this section I will discuss Eros’ location 
                                                          
210 This tendency goes back at least as far as Iamblichus. 
CHAPTER 2:  PROCLUS ON THE FIRST ALCIBIADES 
156 
according to the Alcibiades Commentary, and what this tells us about the 
metaphysical role that Eros plays. 
To begin with we need to go back to Plato, and more specifically to 
the Symposium.  Proclus makes special use of two ideas found in 
Diotima’s teaching.  The first one is that of ‘mediation’.  “Everything 
spiritual (δαιμόνιον), you see, is in between god and mortal”,211 says 
the medium from Mantineia, and adds that “[b]eing in the middle of 
the two, they round out (συμπληροῖ) the whole and bind fast the all to 
all”.212  Later I will speak more about daimons in Proclus, and see that 
Proclean Eros is first and foremost a god.  Still, its divine status does 
not negate its role as a mediator.  Besides, we had asserted the same 
thing when treating Plotinus’ image of divine Eros as the eye of a lover 
which mediates between the object seen and the image in the lover’s 
mind.  Thus, there is a loose and a strict sense in which «δαιμόνιον» 
can be used, and Proclus opts for the loose here.  After all, Diotima 
speaks of “a great spirit”.213   
The second idea exploited by Proclus is found in the dialectical 
interchange between Socrates and Agathon.  There the gadfly makes 
the poet admit that Eros is love of beauty.214  Although for the time being 
I am not interested in Socrates’ conclusion that Eros must be bereft of 
                                                          
211 Symposium,202d13-e1. 
212 Ibid.,202e6-7. 
213 Ibid.,202d13.  This verbal formula comes up frequently in Proclus’ Commentary; 
see e.g. on Alc.,64,8. 
214 Cf. Symp.,201a9-10. 
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beauty, we need to keep in mind the particular connection between 
eros and beauty (and not e.g. justice or goodness).  Applying this idea 
to the former point about mediation, and granting that mortals desire 
to become like the divine, then eros must mediate between Beauty and 
the admirers of beauty.  Moreover, its mediation forms the ‘bridge’, i.e. 
the condition that enables the latter group attain to the former. 
Indeed, this is what Proclus states when turning to the “more secret 
doctrines”215 about Love: “This god (θεὸν) one should not think to rank 
either among the first of the things that are or the last; he is not among 
the first because the object of love is beyond love, and he would not 
rightly be ranked among the last because what loves participates in 
love.  One must establish him mid-way (ἐν μέσῳ) between the object of 
love and lovers: he must be posterior to the beautiful but precede the 
rest.”216  In these few lines we have a succinct statement both of the 
position of Eros in the hierarchy and of its role, but we need to 
elaborate on these two issues.  Let us start with the first one. 
If Eros’ position is relative to the position of the Beautiful in the 
hierarchy,217 then locating the latter will help us stipulate with greater 
precision the location of the former.  So, with relative confidence we 
                                                          
215 On Alc.,50,22-51,1: «τῶν ἀπορρητοτέρων… λόγων».  Concerning eros: for the 
«θεωρία περὶ τὴν λέξιν» (“consideration of style”) see ibid.,25,19ff., and for the 
«ζήτησις τῶν πραγμάτων» (“actual investigation of the realities”; cf. O’Neill’s 
“Addenda et Corrigenda”,pp.460-461) see on Alc.,30,5ff. 
216 Ibid.,51,1-6. 
217 Cf. also ibid.,329,24-330,1: “since love is immediately of beauty”; «(προσεχῶς γὰρ 
ὁ ἔρως κάλλους ἐστί)». 
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can assert that the Beautiful is to be found at the first level of the 
Intelligible Triad,218 i.e. Being.  One might have the inclination to situate 
it lower, at the bottom of the Intelligible Triad, i.e. in Nous, based on 
Proclean passages like the following: “the beautiful marks off 
(ἀφορίζει) the intelligent (νοερὰν) substance (for this reason intellect is 
an object both of love and desire, as Aristotle says;…)…”.219  Elsewhere, 
he notes that ”the beautiful [is] in the intellects (ἐν νοῖς)”.220  
Nevertheless, despite this claim which expresses the presence of beauty 
on the Intellectual level,221 just a few lines before Proclus states that the 
beautiful “ [is situated] secretly among (ἐν) the first of the intelligibles 
(νοητῶν) and more evidently at the lower limit of that order”,222 
«νοητόν» being a usual description of Being.223  In order for beauty to 
characterize the Intellectual Forms, (the source of) Beauty must be prior 
to this immanent expression.  Besides, when Proclus writes that “the 
good delimits (ἀφορίζει) all divine being (οὐσίαν)”,224 regardless of 
                                                          
218 See Being-Life-Nous: the threefold unfolding of the Plotinian second Hypostasis. 
219 On Alc.,317,22-318,1. 
220 Ibid.,320,2, opting for a pedantic translation of «ἐν» instead of O’Neill’s “on the 
level of”, although he might be thinking of Aristotle’s «ἐν» in the sense of “accidental 
to”. 
221 Usually called: «τὸ νοερόν». 
222 On Alc.,319,14-15. 
223 Being precedes Intellect and thus is only «κατ’ αἰτίαν» the object of thought.  (Ι 
have already referred to this fundamental Neoplatonic principle, e.g. in n.98 of 
ch.2.1.3., and will adduce it later as well.)  Cf. also οn Alc.,221,1-2:  “Since it is 
beautiful (καλόν), it participates in the intelligibles (νοητῶν) also –for there lies the 
primary beauty (κάλλος), which proceeds therefrom to all things.” 
224 Ibid.,318,4-5, although now O’Neill prefers “delimit” instead of “mark off” for 
«ἀφορίζω». 
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whether we take «θεία οὐσία» to denote Being or the Henads, this 
cannot mean that the ineffable Primal Unity is immanent in these 
posterior principles.  Furthermore, at another passage he stresses the 
superiority of Beauty by beautifully calling it “form of forms and as 
blooming above all the intelligible forms”.225 
How much does this help us to locate Eros?  For one thing, Love, 
qua mediator of Beauty and lovers of beauty, cannot be found at the 
secret levels superior to Being.  But what about the long scale of beings 
that reaches the level of the worldly lovers?  Where exactly shall we 
place Eros?  Proclus is explicit: Love “is the primal [entity] dependent 
(ἐξηρτημένος) on beauty”.226  Love is immediately tied to the Beautiful, 
like in the pictorial representations of Eros’ being next to his beautiful 
mother, Aphrodite.  It is not difficult to understand the reason for this 
immediate connection of the two entities.  “Etymologically, whether it 
is called ‘beautiful’ (καλὸν) because it summons (καλεῖν) unto itself, or 
because it charms (κηλεῖν) and beguiles whatever is able to gaze upon 
it, it is by nature an object of love (ἐραστόν)”.227  What is lower than the 
beautiful falls short of it and thus desires it, irrespective of the desiring 
entity being placed high, in the intelligible realm or low, in the sensible 
world.  Everywhere in this rank of desirers, desire for the beautiful is 
presupposed.  Therefore, Proclus needs to postulate the primal Erotic 
                                                          
225 Ibid.,111,14-15: «εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ὡς ἐπανθοῦν ἅπασι τοῖς νοητοῖς εἴδεσι». 
226 Ibid.,112,1.  
227 Ibid.,328,11-13. 
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desire ‘before’ these desirers that partake in the desire.  Since this 
desiring continuum starts immediately after the manifestation of 
Beauty in the hierarchy, Proclus is compelled a) to place Eros 
immediately after the Beautiful, and thus b) to make it the first 
desirer.228 
More precisely, Proclus calls it a “Monad”,229 which comes third 
after two other Monads: Faith (Πίστις) and Truth (Ἀλήθεια).  Each of 
these other entities is attached to a target-entity that precedes Beauty, 
i.e. to the Good and the Wise respectively.  Hence, the Proclean triad 
“faith-truth-eros”230 is attached to the Phaedrean divine triad of 
“beautiful, wise, good“,231 as its necessary complement.232  One can 
compare the way that Eros is attached to Beauty to the relation of Faith 
with Goodness.  Because I have dealt with this issue in a previous 
section (ch.2.1.4.), I will not pursue it further here.  Besides I am 
particularly interested in the third Monad, Eros.  What we need to keep 
                                                          
228 A Proclean reminiscence of “self-predication”. 
229 Not a Henad.  In the simple scheme of the Elements of Theology Dodds [1963],p.209 
notes that Henads are the tops of vertical series, whereas Monads the first terms of 
horizontal strata.  The use here is a bit more complicated.  -Still, although not exactly 
Henads, Good, Wisdom and Beauty, can be viewed as initiating vertical ranks. 
230 See e.g. on Alc.,51,15-16.  This triad appears in the Chaldean Oracles, too; see 
Hoffmann [2000].  Regarding the addition of hope to the triad see Beierwaltes [1986], 
n.6 in p.311 and Hoffmann [2011]. 
231 Phaedrus,246d8-e1; cf. on Alc.,29,8.  For Proclus Plato has put the terms in 
ascending order.  In terms of priority it should be the other way round; hence the 
verbal order in the complementary triad of Faith etc. 
232 See two useful diagrams in Μάνος [2006],pp.64 and 224 respectively, and a table in 
Tornau [2006],p.219; see also his analysis of the Proclean triad(s) in ibid.,pp.218-223, 
with the bibliography provided in n.81 (p.219). 
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in mind though is that, as with the other members of these triads, Love 
is the natural complement and necessary accompaniment233 of Beauty.  
Indeed, on these grounds one could draw a further parallel:  
Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium uses the image of a 
«σύμβολον» (“matching half”)234 in order to express the 
complementarity of the two lovers, although the analogy goes back to 
Empedocles.235  It is likewise appropriate to speak of Proclean Eros as 
the «σύμβολον» of Beauty, qua the latter’s natural counterpart and 
follower.  To be sure, the two are not the same level of entity, as in the 
case of Aristophanes’ lovers, and Love does not complete the 
perfection of Beauty.  The latter is Beautiful not because there are 
entities loving it, but rather the other entities love it because it is 
Beautiful.  Still, even from this one-sided and asymmetrical point of 
view, the de facto existence of the one implies the existence of the 
other.  The specialty in Eros’ existence being totally dependent on 
another entity, namely Beauty, lies in that Eros is not a mere intentional 
entity, but the hypostatization of intention itself.  If in this case the 
subject and the activity (intention-desire) are conflated, we can define 
Eros only in terms of the ‘external’ intended object. 
                                                          
233 Or “by-product”/«παρακολούθημα» in more Plotinian language;  cf. supra nn.157 
and 174 in chs.1.2.4. and 2.1.5. respectively. 
234 Cf. Symp.,191d4 and 5. 
235 Empedocles, B63 DK; I owe the reference to Συκουτρῆς [1949], p.88,n.1, which is a 
comment on the aforementioned Platonic passage.  Συκουτρῆς explains the social 
convention after which the expression is taken.  
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Now, having defined the relative position of Eros we are 
confronted with another question: is it directly dependent on Beauty in 
terms of a transverse or a vertical series?  In other words, should Eros 
be situated next to the Beautiful, albeit at the level of Being, or at a 
lower level that participates in Being?  The answer is the second 
alternative, and in order to verify it we need to return again to the 
“more secret doctrines” about love.  Proclus writes that Eros “has its 
primary and hidden subsistence in the intelligible intellect (νοητῷ 
νῷ)”.236  A few lines below he repeats that “speaking about the 
intelligible intellect (νοητοῦ νοῦ) the theologian [sc. Orpheus] 
mentions ‘dainty Love and bold Counsel (Μῆτις),’…; and concerning 
the intelligent (νοεροῦ) and unparticipated intellect ‘and Counsel, first 
begetter, and much delighting Love’…”.237  These passages show that 
Eros is an Intellect,238 hence its dependence upon the Beautiful is within 
a vertical rank.  Thus, according to Dodds’ scheme regarding 
propositions 108-111,239 Eros should derive a generic characteristic from 
                                                          
236 On Alc.,66,7-8. 
237 Ibid.,66,11-67,3.  For the quotations see Orphica frgm.83 and 168,9 (Kern) with 
Westerink’s apparatus.  The last quotation reappears in on Alc.,233,16.  By referring to 
Μῆτις in connection to Love, as Plato does in the Symposium myth, Proclus would 
satisfy Lacrosse [1994], p.63,n.185, who notes on the occasion of Plot.’s III.5.7,24-25, 
that Plotinus, too, could have referred to Eros’ grand-mother in his exegesis of the 
Symposium.  
238 See a helpful table given by Brisson [forthcoming],p.18 (Annex 1), where he puts 
together a description of the hierarchies of: Proclus, the Chaldean Oracles and the 
Orphic Rapsodies.  As is noted by Brisson,p.10, Φάνης in the third Orphic rank 
(second of the Intelligible-Intellect), is also known as Eros.  See also the remarks of 
Quispel [1979],pp.196-201. 
239 Dodds [1963],p.255. 
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the level of Beauty, but a specific characteristic from the antecedent 
terms in his own stratum.240   
Nonetheless, these quotations generate further problems, since 
they speak of both an intelligible and an intellective (/intelligent) 
intellect, which represent different levels of the Proclean hierarchy.  
There are various ways to remedy this problem and the easiest is to 
suggest, as Proclus does, that Eros exists only «κατ’ αἰτίαν» in the 
intelligible intellect, “for if it ‘leapt forth’ therefrom it is causally 
established therein”.241  Hence, «καθ’ ὕπαρξιν», i.e. existentially, Eros 
is an intellective intellect.  A further problem though is that in the usual 
accounts of Proclus’ system Life mediates between the strata of Being 
and Nous.  If Eros is a nous, can we still hold that it is directly 
dependent on Beauty?  Indeed, at one point Proclus does mention Life 
in such a context, stating that “among the intelligible (νοητοῖς) and 
hidden gods it [sc. Love] makes the intelligible (νοητὸν) Intellect one 
with the primary and hidden beauty according to a certain mode of life 
(ζωῆς) superior to intellection (νοήσεως)”.242  As if the aforementioned 
problem were not enough, the passage also implies that Eros can 
exercise causation upon an entity which precedes it in the hierarchy –
                                                          
240 Characteristic that ultimately derives from the Monad, i.e. the Unparticipated first 
entity of a transverse series.  Compare supra,n.229. 
241 On Alc.,66,8-9.  For the quotation cf. De Orac. Chald.,p.25 (Kroll), again with 
Westerink ad loc.   
242 On Alc.,64,14-16 (although O’Neill renders «νοήσεως» as “intellectual 
perception”);  in the next few lines (64,16-65,1) Proclus continues thus: “(and therefore 
the Greek theologian terms such love blind: ‘Cherishing in his heart blind swift 
Love’)…”.  See also O’Neill’s n.145 ad loc. 
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even if in a transverse series-, namely by causing unity between 
intellect and the even higher Beauty.  Let me tackle this last problem 
first.  Although I will discuss eros’ function shortly after, for my 
present purposes it suffices to invoke the distinction between «κατ’ 
αἰτίαν» and «καθ’ ὕπαρξιν» again.  The erotic tendency for Beauty 
resides already in the intelligible intellect, but causally.  This intellect’s 
desire for Beauty not only orientates it towards the object of desire, but 
has also the further consequence, or ‘by-product’, of the generation of 
Eros, i.e. the manifestation of the desire itself.  With this picture we 
come very close to a potential interpretation of Plotinus that I rejected, 
namely that when Heavenly Aphrodite/Soul is filled with eros for her 
progenitor (Nous), she also gives birth to Eros.  With respect to Proclus’ 
interpretation now, we might suggest that Eros unites his preceding 
intellect only in virtue of manifesting the inherent erotic tendency in 
this prior nous.243  What is more, we can connect this answer with the 
discussion of the previous problem about Life.  This term is also a 
mediator between Being and Intellect and in a way exemplifies the 
mediating function of Eros.244  Again the «κατ’ αἰτίαν» formula can 
                                                          
243 It might be for this reason that Proclus in the Platonic Theology,VI.98,17-20 states 
that: «Ἡ δὲ Ἀφροδίτη τῆς δι’ ὅλων διηκούσης ἐρωτικῆς ἐπιπνοίας ἐστὶν αἰτία 
πρωτουργός, καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν οἰκειοῖ τὰς ἀναγομένας ὑφ’ ἑαυτῆς ζωάς.»  One 
could expect Proclus to identify the goddess of Beauty with the Beautiful itself, but 
this is not what he opts to do.  Rather Aphrodite is cause of the erotic inspiration (as 
intelligible nous) that unites the posterior entities with the Beautiful, which is even 
higher than Aphrodite.  For the place of Aphrodite in Proclus’ system see Lankila 
[2009].  In the Hymn Proclus devotes to her, she is called «ἐρωτοτόκος» (Love-
bearer).  Cf. Hymns,2.13 (Vogt) and Lankila,p.23 and n.6.  See also n.12 in ch.1.1.2. 
244 Cf. also Segonds,n.2 ad prim.loc.cit.,p.156. 
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come to our rescue.  Eros manifests Life when bringing into unity 
different elements.  Thus, strictly speaking «καθ’ ὕπαρξιν» Eros is not 
directly dependent upon Beauty, which is on the level of Being, but 
only in virtue of and through the erotic feature that causally subsists in 
Life.  On the other hand, we might want to go further than that and 
assert that Life exemplifies not so much a stratum of reality, as the vital 
force and power that links the activity of Intelligence with its object 
(Being), or indeed the activity itself.  In that way Eros, even «καθ’ 
ὕπαρξιν» and on the level of nous, can be both vertically and directly 
dependent upon Beauty, despite Life’s mediation. 
Note though that whether in vertical or horizontal relation to 
Beauty, Proclus needs to reconcile his remarks with the Symposium: if 
Eros is closely dependent on Beauty and if it is a fundamental 
Neoplatonic principle that procession is realized through likeness,245 
then Eros cannot lack beauty, at least to a large degree.  After all, to 
take Agathon’s side, Eros is a god; how could a god be ugly?  A 
sophistic retort could be that qua Eros for Beauty, the former lacks the 
latter, but not qua divine entity not.  Another more Neoplatonic 
response might be that Proclus does not disagree with the Symposium, 
but refines it: from absolute lack of beauty, Proclus switches to relative 
absence; Eros is ugly in so far as he is not as beautiful as the Beautiful 
itself.  Still, in absolute terms he can be called Beautiful.  We have 
                                                          
245 See supra,nn.94, 95 and 99 in ch.2.1.3. for references and analysis. 
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already seen246 the importance of the old “similia similibus” idea.  An 
entity can communicate with another due to the similarity that 
characterizes them.  Of course, one might wonder about the proportion 
of the intensity of the desire.  If I am not very thirsty I am not dying to 
drink water.  After intense physical exercise under the Mediterranean 
sun, however, I really desire to drink.  The intuition says that less 
affinity with the object of desire implies looser desire.  Nonetheless, we 
should not forget that for the Neoplatonists it is the similarity between 
object and subject that enables them to come into ‘contact’.  And when 
two entities are closer to one another, the inferior can appreciate better 
the status of the higher entity.  In other words, it is because I have 
studied the ingenious complexities of Bach’s fugues that I have a 
greater desire to listen to them again, while a music fan not steeped in 
this world might not be dying to listen to The Art of the Fugue again.  It 
is not accidental that I have made similar observations on the occasion 
of the last lines of Plotinus’ erotic treatise.247  And as with Plotinus, 
Proclus’ aforementioned qualification of the Symposium presents him as 




                                                          
246 In 2.1.3., n.99.   
247 See infra, ch.1.1.3., e.g. on n.57. 
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2.2.2. Eros as a mediator 
I said before that one of the principal ideas that Neoplatonism 
owes to the Symposium is the idea of eros as mediator.  This is a 
recurrent theme in Proclus’ Commentary:  “What effects this bond of 
union (σύνδεσμον) between the inferior and the superior if not love? 
For this god the Oracles call ‘the binding (συνδετικὸν) guide of all 
things,’248…  Furthermore love itself is ‘a mighty spirit,’ as Diotima 
says, in so far as everywhere it fulfils (συμπληροῖ) the mean role (τὴν 
μεσότητα) between the objects of love and those hastening towards 
them through love.  The object of love holds the first position, what 
loves it the last, and love fills (συμπληροῖ) the middle (μέσον) between 
the two, uniting (συνάγων) and binding with (συνδέων) each other the 
desired object and what desires it…”.249   
There is, however, a puzzle here.  I suggested before that due to the 
position ascribed to Eros in the Symposium, love was a ‘bond’ by being 
a ‘bridge’ that unites gods with mortals.  Still, in the Neoplatonic 
refinement of Eros’ position, we located it immediately after the 
Beautiful.  Even if it is a mediator, Eros is not equally distanced from its 
object of desire and the rest of desiring entities.  The scales lean on the 
side of Beauty, not of the beautiful particulars.  How is Eros an 
effective bond, then, and of what sort?  One might propose that it is a 
mediator only between Beauty and whichever entity is directly 
                                                          
248 See O’Neill,n.142 ad loc. 
249 On Alc.,64,3-6 and 8-13. 
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posterior to Eros.  What about the entities lower in the complex 
Neoplatonic hierarchy then?  Do they indirectly relate to Eros by 
depending on the entity/-ies right after him? 
These questions, like those of the previous section (2.2.1.), reveal 
the limitations of an intellectual ‘topography’, i.e. the difficulty of our 
discursive mind to conceive intelligible structures that transcend it.  
Still, they also prompt us to think harder about the sense in which Eros 
is the bond of universe.  We need to step back, then, and reflect on the 
following:  how can an entity desire Beauty?  Since Eros is the 
exemplification of the desire for Beauty, posterior entities must 
participate in Eros in order to have this erotic appetite.  In fact, this is a 
fundamental characteristic of Proclus’ system: entities high in the 
hierarchy bestow their characteristic feature on the posterior entities.250  
The latter either participate directly in the originators of this feature, or 
indirectly by participation in entities participating in these originators 
and so forth.  The important conclusion, though, is that before we can 
think or speak about the possibility of a desiring entity, we need to 
postulate the immediate cause of desire: as we have seen, this is not the 
Beautiful, the ultimate cause of erotic desire,251 but Eros himself.  
Hence, we need to be careful when speaking of the “bond” between the 
object and the subject of desire: prima facie it seems that within such a 
pair of beloved object and loving subject Eros intervenes 
                                                          
250 See for the erotic case e.g. ibid.,30,14ff.   
251 Cf. e.g. ibid.,31,1.  A desire must be desire for something.  See supra in 2.2.1., (e.g. 
n.214). 
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subsequently252 in order to enable the unity of the pair by filling and 
bridging the gap.  Still, this is a misleading oversimplification: rather it 
is the necessarily anterior existence of Eros that enables the desiring 
entity to be what it is in the first instance, i.e. a desirer.  We can speak 
of a ‘pair’ only due to the ‘intervention’ of Eros, i.e. because there is a 
triad; or because the real primal pair is Beauty and Eros (i.e. the desire 
for Beauty), whereas everything else is secondary.  In other words, the 
idea of “mediation” is logically posterior to Love.  Eros is not Eros 
because he is a mediator; rather, he is mediator because he is Eros.  
First and foremost though, Eros is a bond because he craves his own 
union with Beauty.   
Now we are better prepared to understand what Proclus means 
when writing that Eros “binds together (συνδετικὸς) what is divided, 
and unites (συναγωγὸς) what precedes and is subsequent to it, and 
makes the secondary revert (ἐπιστρεπτικὸς) to the primary and 
elevates (ἀναγωγὸς) and perfects (τελεσιουργὸς) the less perfect”.253  
The conglomeration of so many «καὶ» does not denote addition of 
different functions.  Rather, these «καί» are explicative, each adjective 
making more precise what the previous ones denote:  Love is a 
“binder” in so far as he is “reversive”, i.e. he reverts the inferiors to the 
superior.   
                                                          
252 The language used does not indicate temporal, but onto-logical relations. 
253 On Alc.,53,4-7 (with the addition of some “and” lost in O’Neill’s translation). 
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And what does it actually mean to ‘revert the secondary’ etc?  This 
erotic function describes the bestowal of the erotic feature, viz. desire, 
as was described above.254  But what does this act of bestowal amount 
to?  To providence, as we have seen in previous sections (e.g. chs.2.1:4 
and 5).  It is ultimately due to providence that Eros does not 
‘grudgingly keep for himself’ his defining characteristic, but 
necessarily gives an inferior image to his participants.  Hence, we 
should not be misled by the language used when Proclus repeats that 
Eros reverts the secondary etc, as if there was any downwards 
intentionality at play.  Strictly speaking, Eros is only oriented upwards 
in so far as he falls short of Beauty.  The downwards orientation is to be 
explained not in erotic terms, but in terms of providence.  After all, as 
we have seen, to be a god, as Eros is, is to be a ‘goodness’, and this 
means to be providential,255 and more precisely detachedly 
providential.256  In other words, it is not that Eros is providential for the 
inferior beautiful particulars because he loves them; rather, because he 
loves Beauty, he is also providential towards beautiful particulars, 
which are fitted for the reception of the erotic desire.257  Consequently, 
                                                          
254 See also Μάνος [2006],p.231 with n.60 (and n.57 in p.230). 
255 See e.g. El.Th.prop.120 and supra, ch.2.1.5. 
256 See also on Alc.,31,10-12: “let us perceive its [sc. the love-series’]… hidden summit 
ineffably established among the very first orders of the gods and united to the most 
primary intelligible beauty apart (χωριστῶς) from all beings”. 
257 Or “providentially erotic towards beautiful particulars”.  Eros in the downwards 
sense denotes only its connection with and direction to instantiations of beauty; not 
that it falls short of this beauty. 
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Eros’ being a bond for what comes after him is just a by-product of his 
own being, which consists in striving for the Beautiful.   
With the above remarks I have given another answer as to how 
Proclus can simultaneously and coherently entertain the idea of 
providential and reversive love.  Now, before I finish, there is one more 
thing I want to clarify with respect to the function of erotic mediation: 
in a looser sense of the term, almost all entities in Proclus’ system are 
mediators.  Save for the First Principle, the Good, and its polar 
counterpart, Matter, every entity in the complex hierarchy is between 
two others, either in horizontal or vertical series.  What then makes 
Eros different, viz. a mediator and a bond in the precise sense?  This 
must be the dynamic element.  Eros can be characterized as the 
movement towards the completion of a target or the fulfilling of an 
entity.  Ironically then, Eros’ mediation sows the seed of its own 
annihilation: if every posterior entity has a desire for Beauty, then this 
implies a desire to overpass the medium of Eros in order to get to 
Beauty.  Proclus’ universal laws governing procession and reversion do 
not allow this abruption of order, and the hierarchy is preserved in the 
end.258  Whatever the final result however, erotic mediation entails and 
implies existence within a net of dynamic relations; not a system of 
inert rest, but of a rest in motion or a motionless motion.259 
                                                          
258 See also the combination of erotic characteristics with other divine properties (in on 
Alc.,30,8ff.). 
259 See of course Gersh [1973], who devotes an Appendix (I: pp.123-127) to eros in 
order to connect it with the concept of activity as expounded in the main body of his 
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So, there are two elements we have to retain from the preceding 
discussion: a) that in a sense Eros is a ‘universal’ mediator that ‘binds 
together’ Beauty and beautiful particulars desiring Beauty; b) that the 
insistence on entities that desire their fulfillment via their erotic 
aspiration to beauty brings us close to Plotinus’ synairetic reading.  
Whatever the scheme of Proclean participation, at least most of the 
entities that are posterior to Beauty, can be seen as lower instantiations 
of eros, in that they strive for Beauty, with the subsequent result of 
their self-fulfillment.  These thoughts bring us back to my remarks 
about Plotinian Soul and Nous as being erotic with respect to the One. 
To recap, I have expounded Proclus’ main points about the location 
and function of god Eros.  Love is an Intellect that is dependent upon 
Beauty, which shines at the level of Being.  Moreover, what actually 
Eros does is to implant its own characteristic, i.e. desire for beauty, to 
the lower entities of his rank.  Thus, he becomes a mediator, as Diotima 
would put it, between Beauty and the lower desiring entities.  Among 
the examinations of these matters, I have raised several particulars 
issues, such as Proclus’ affinity to Plotinus, and I have also re-
addressed the way that Proclus can combine the formula of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
study.  His succinct and enlightening remarks would be still clearer, I believe, if he 
had stressed eros’ particular connection to Beauty, as shown in my discussion, and 
included, but left unexploited, in a Proclean passage cited by him in ibid.,p.126.  This 
would also give another dimension to his answer to the issue of eros’ absence from 
other Proclean writings, as was noted by Vogel [1963],pp.29, 31 and Vogel [1981],p.71 
(while I do not agree with many of the distinctions she makes in ibid.,p.72). 
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providential and reversive eros when characterizing a single entity like 
Eros. 
 
2.2.3. After Eros 
Now I want to address a more particular problem: not whether 
there are erotic entities posterior to Eros; we have seen that this is 
possible due to the direct or indirect participation of the former to the 
latter.  Rather, I want to explore whether the divinity of Eros is unique 
in Proclus’ hierarchy.  In this way, I will be re-addressing the 
traditional problem tackled by Plotinus in his erotic treatise: whether 
Eros is a god or a daimon, the Plotinian solution being that the ‘son’, 
i.e. the self-fulfillment, of goddess Aphrodite is god, whereas that of 
the daimonic one(s) is a daimon.  After all, Plotinus was trying to bring 
into consistency various Platonic statements about the divine or 
daimonic status of Eros that can be found in the Symposium and in the 
Phaedrus.  Proclus has exactly the same concern, on the occasion though 
of the presence of both alternative statements within a single work, the 
Alcibiades Major.260  As we will see, although Proclus has a different 
agenda than Plotinus, there are affinities between the two. 
I asserted before that as with Plotinus, so with Proclus: despite 
Eros’ being a proper god, contra the symposiasts Socrates and Diotima, 
                                                          
260 See Alcibiades I,103a5 «δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα»; 105d5, 105e5 and 124c8: «θεός».  
Proclus formulates this problem explicitly in on Alc.,46,9-12 and 78,10-17, although 
the specific reference is to Socrates’ guardian-spirit. 
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Love is a mediator, with the Symposium.  In fact, it is exactly this divine 
feature that has set the example for the class of daimons.  Proclus notes: 
“it [sc. the erotic series] has pre-established in itself the pattern of the 
whole order of spirits, possessing that intermediacy among the gods 
that the spirits (δαίμονες) have been allotted ‘between’ the realities of 
‘gods and mortals.’”261  Of course, the idea of daimonic mediation 
should be interpreted along the lines that erotic mediation was 
approached earlier: daimons receive bestowals by the higher gods and 
‘transfer’ them to inferiors such as human souls.  Ultimately, the 
bestowing of these properties arouses the desire in these lower entities 
for their divine ancestors, a process that results in the self-fulfillment of 
the desirers. 
Fair enough; but even if we do have mediating spirits262 after Eros, 
can we have Love after Eros?  Proclus has two main points in support 
of the idea that we can.  The first and basic one is an elaboration of the 
                                                          
261 On Alc.,31,5-8 (with O’Neill’s “Corrigenda”, p.464); cf. on Alc.,67,12-13 and 
Symp.,202e1.  Hence, the reason why Proclus calls Socrates both a daimonic and an 
erotic person; see on Alc.,63,12-64,4 and 67,9-18, esp.63,13 and 67,16. 
262 As Plotinus devotes a discussion on daimonology in III.5.6, so too Proclus, 
although the latter’s scheme is much more baroque than Plotinus’.  See for example 
the six-fold classification given in On Alc.,71,8-72,14.  I am not going to touch this 
general issue though.  Let the reader interested in this subject be sufficed with the 
following references: “about the spirits in themselves [: on Alc.,68,4-70,15], further 
about those that have become our common guardians [: ibid.,71,1-78,6], and thirdly 
about the spirit of Socrates [ibid.,78,7-83,16].” (This outline is given in 
ibid.,67,19-68,1.)  Within this stretch of text Proclus refers to Plotinus, critically or not.  
Further relevant sections from the Alcibiades Commentary are: 40,15-42,4; 63,12-64,4 
and 67,9-18; 114,1-13; 158,3-159,10; 198,12-199,19; 281,15-282,9. 
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Platonic doctrine of homonymy263 within the frame of the Proclean 
emanationist system.  He observes that “every intra-mundane god 
rules over some order of spirits, on which he immediately bestows his 
own power,...  About (περὶ) each of the gods is an untold multitude of 
spirits, priding themselves on the same names (ἐπωνυμίαις) as the 
gods who govern them; for they rejoice in being called ‘Apollos’ and 
‘Zeus’ and ‘Hermes’ because they represent (ἀποτυπούμενοι) the 
peculiar characteristics of their own gods.”264  Thus, in our case we can 
have daimons each of which can be called Eros, because they partake in 
the rank of god Eros and, hence, they feature the erotic identity of 
recalling noble natures back to Beauty, albeit in a more deficient way 
when compared with divine Love. 
Proclus’ second and ancillary point reminds us that if we can have 
multiple erotic daimons, there is nothing preventing us from having a 
vertical multiplicity of erotic gods, as well.  We have seen that Eros is 
an Intellect; moreover, there are still levels inferior to Eros, and 
superior to the daimonic strata, that can be termed divine.  Therefore, 
the entities on these levels that partake in Eros can be termed gods, too.  
Beyond this standard picture, though, the particular point that Proclus 
makes, which concerns Socrates’ guardian spirit, but can be extended 
to our case as well, is the following:  “the (guardian) spirits of godlike 
souls who have chosen an intelligent and elevating life are of a certain 
                                                          
263 See Phaedo,78d1-e5 and 102b1-2. 
264 On Alc.,68,16-69,3.  
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godlike (θεῖοι) number superior to the whole class of spirits and 
participating primarily in the gods.  For as there is spirit on the level of 
gods, so there is god on the level of spirits.  But whereas in the former 
case the substance (ὕπαρξις) is divine and the analogy (ἀναλογία) 
spiritual, on the level of the spirits, the specific character is instead 
spiritual, and analogy indicates the divine likeness of the essential 
nature; for because of their superiority over the rest of the spirits, they 
often appear even as gods.  Naturally, then, Socrates calls his own 
guardian spirit a god, because it was one of the foremost and highest 
spirits”.265  So, Proclus’ actual point relates not so much to the various 
godly strata, but to the clarification of what goes on in the strata near 
the borderline between godly and daimonic.   
To understand what he suggests we need to have in mind a three-
fold classification he has drawn a bit earlier in the Commentary.  
According to this distinction there are daimons a) by analogy («κατ’ 
ἀναλογίαν»), b) by relation («κατὰ σχέσιν») and c) substantially 
(«κατ’ οὐσίαν»).266  A substantial daimon (c-type) is an entity properly 
and literally belonging to this mediating class of spirits within Proclus’ 
hierarchy, and is defined by specific substance and activities.  On the 
other hand, a daimon by analogy (a-type) can also be an entity which is 
godly in substance.  Its providing for its immediately inferior entity, 
though, makes it analogous to the function of a substantial spirit, hence 
                                                          
265 Ibid.,79,3-12; see also ll.1-3 and 12-14.  Cf. ibid.,158,3-159,10, esp.158,3-17. 
266 See ibid.,73,18-75,1.  The distinction appears within the section on guardian-spirits. 
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the «κατ’ ἀναλογίαν» label.  Now, a daimon by relation (b-type) can 
be an entity which lies inferior to daimons, e.g. a human soul like 
Socrates, and is so strongly related to its guardian spirit, that he acts 
and enjoys the unperturbed blessings of this participation as if he were 
a substantial daimon himself.  With regards to the previous quotation, 
despite Proclus’ double use of «analogy», he is interested in both a- and 
b-type cases.  When he applies the spirit analogy to divine beings, he is 
reiterating his a-type case of daimon.  But when he suggests that there 
are spirits (with regard to their substance) which have an analogy to 
the divine, he is characteristically misusing the terminology set out 
above.  This second use of analogy picks up the b-type case (‘by 
relation’).  Still, in that case Proclus is not speaking about b-type 
daimons, but b-type gods.  A b-type god must be a spirit whose affinity 
with the divine realm is so strong that it appears to be as a god when 
compared with other daimons.  Thus, according to the passage, we can 
have a) by analogy daimons, qua mediators, on the level of gods, i.e. 
Eros; and b) also daimons who are found at the summit of the spiritual 
strata and are by relation gods, due to their close kinship e.g. with 
Eros.267   
The conclusion of this discussion is that, unsurprisingly, Proclus 
can exploit various features of his Neoplatonic edifice in order to 
maintain both a) that there is a unique and divine entity called Eros, 
and b) that there is a multiplicity of entities, either godly or daimonic 
                                                          
267 See also ibid.,158,3-17. 
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and ultimately human, that can be called and are Eros, albeit in an 
inferior degree and by participation.  Although this is not exactly what 
Plotinus did in Enn.III.5, he too was able to maintain both the divine 
and daimonic status of Eros.  Plotinus, though, did not draw any direct 
line between the Erotes of the different levels.  Eros owed his status to 
the entity to which was attached.  Hence, prima facie, the relation of 
divine and daimonic Eros was indirect.  Still, according to my 
synairetic reading, where eros is unified with his ‘mother’ Aphrodite, 
i.e. Soul, the direct dependence can be preserved: Eros becomes the 
expression of Undescended Soul’s and World-Soul’s being, both of 
which are directly related to each other.  As so often, Proclus’ system 
turns out to be more baroque, although the basic Neoplatonic idea is 
the same.   
Let me finish with another affinity between the two Neoplatonists.  
In Plotinus’ treatise there is a discussion of the individual daimonic 
Erotes that are attached to individual souls, and we have already seen 
Proclus addressing similar issues although in different ways.  
According to my synairetic reading again, Plotinus’ individuals would 
fulfill their potentials in realizing themselves as Erotes.  In Proclus’ case 
I have repeatedly noted that Eros does not have the universality that 
we find in Plotinus.268  Nevertheless, in the Proclean case, too, there are 
entities which can be defined through their erotic function.  A 
paradigmatic example is Socrates, who enjoys a strong bond with his 
                                                          
268 See supra (e.g. 2.2.1.) on Eros’ particular attachment to Beauty. 
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daimon, which is a god by relation, and participates in the god Eros.269  
True, I have noted Socrates’ exceptionality in that he combines other 
non-erotic features, as well, exemplifying them at the best possible 
degree.  But in so far as he maintains a particular connection with Eros, 
as is implied throughout the Commentary, and by extending the 
abovementioned Proclean theory of homonymy, we could suggest that 
Socrates, qua divine lover, fulfills his existence by being (called) a 
daimon by relation, and more specifically, (a lesser) Eros.  In the end, it 
seems that the initial qualification of the present section was 
misleading: to speak of a proper erotic entity, i.e. an entity whose 
function is erotic, whether it features other characteristics or not, is to 
speak of a lesser Eros.  Moreover, to assert that there are such Proclean 
individuals is to come close to the aforementioned Plotinian 
conclusion.  In other words, the example of Socrates, Plato’s teacher, 
forms a point of contact between the two Neoplatonists: should we be 
surprised? 
 
2.2.4. Before Eros 
Among the ‘more secret doctrines about eros’ Proclus states that 
“the intelligibles (νοητά) on account of their unutterable union have no 
need of the mediation of love; but where there exists both unification 
and separation (διάκρισις) of beings, there too love appears as 
                                                          
269 See also references in previous notes 261 and 262, e.g. on Alc.,158,20-159,10. 
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medium”.270  After all, there is a separation between Beauty and what 
desires beauty, and we have already seen that for Proclus “the object of 
love is beyond love”.271  Nevertheless, if the beloved object is anterior to 
Eros, cannot this mean that we can seek for erotic traces in the 
intelligible hierarchy ‘prior’ to the actual existence of Eros?  The basic 
presuppositions of the Proclean system allow for a positive answer.  
First of all, by the already invoked principle of similarity, according to 
which “all procession is accomplished through a likeness of the 
secondary to the primary”,272 why should we only infer that Eros is 
beautiful, and not that e.g. the Beautiful is erotic, as well?  As to the 
sense in which Beauty is erotic, we may move to the second and more 
important Neoplatonic principle of the modes of being.  I have already 
referred to the ‘existential’ and ‘by participation’ modes with regards to 
the two previous sections (2.2.1.-3).  Now it is the time for the third, but 
most exalted, mode, the ‘causal’ one («κατ’ αἰτίαν»).  According to it 
“we see the product as pre-existent in the producer which is its cause 
(for every cause comprehends [προείληφε] its effect before its 
emergence, having primitively that character which the latter has by 
derivation [δευτέρως](prop.18))”.273  Actually, Proclus himself makes 
                                                          
270 On Alc.,53,2-4.  Cf. El.Th.,38,22-23, where Proclus notes that if mediation is needed 
in procession, it will be needed in reversion as well. 
271 On Alc.,51,3.  See supra, e.g. nn.216 and 217 in ch.2.2.1. 
272 El.Th.29,3-4. 
273 Ibid.,65,15-17.  This proposition should be examined in conjunction with the 
famous prop.103, which states that “[a]ll things are in all things, but in each according 
to its proper nature…”.  Cf. also ibid.,56,(4-6) and prop.118 (regarding the Henads; 
see infra). 
CHAPTER 2:  PROCLUS ON THE FIRST ALCIBIADES 
181 
explicit reference to this principle twice regarding the generation of 
Eros in the Alcibiades Commentary.  For instance, he notes that “if it [sc. 
Eros] ‘leapt forth’ therefrom it is causally (κατ’ αἰτίαν) established 
therein [sc. ἐν τῷ νοητῷ νῷ]”.274  For obvious reasons I was compelled 
to anticipate this discussion in my first section (2.2.1.), where I also 
tried to show how Eros’ direct and vertical relation with the Beautiful 
can be preserved.  Thus, in what follows I will exclude references to the 
levels of Nous and Life, but I will not stop at the Beautiful.  The «κατ’ 
αἰτίαν» mode of being of a characteristic cannot be confined solely to 
the ontological level immediately prior to the manifestation of this 
feature.275  If gods “have every [sc. attribute] in a unitary and supra-
existential mode (ὑπερουσίως)”,276 and if ultimately the Good is the 
cause of everything –or everything «κατ’ αἰτίαν»-, it will be relevant to 
look briefly at the Good and the Henads, too.  My criterion for 
verifying the above assumptions will be the Proclean ascription of 
characteristics and functions to these entities that are found in or are 
closely connected with Eros. 
Let us start with Beauty, the object of erotic desire.  As we noted 
earlier, Proclus connects this substantial feature of Beauty’s nature with 
the etymology of the word «Καλόν», which “is called ‘beautiful’ 
because it summons (καλεῖν) unto itself, or because it charms (κηλεῖν) 
                                                          
274 On Alc.,66,8-9.  Cf. also ibid.,51,13-14. 
275 See also El.Th.,props.56 and 57. 
276 Ibid.,118,7.  Cf. also ibid.,158,23.  (The allusion is to Henads.) 
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and beguiles whatever is able to gaze upon it”.277  At the risk of 
repeating myself, we need to remember that there at least two 
conditions enabling an entity to desire Beauty: the immediate cause of 
erotic desire, i.e. Eros, and the ultimate cause which is the Beautiful.  In 
the previous sections I emphasized the former cause.  Now is time for 
the latter.  When ‘calling back’ the entities that are fitted for such 
reversion, i.e. those participating in the rank which originates from 
Beauty, in fact the Beautiful ‘reverts’ (viz. ἐπιστρέφει) these entities.  In 
other words, it is not only Eros that “makes the secondary revert 
(ἐπιστρεπτικὸς) to the primary and [hence] elevates and perfects the 
less perfect”.278  It is first and foremost Beauty that supplies the 
presuppositions to the inferior beautiful entities in order to desire their 
own source.  I will not stress again that this is a clear instance of 
(undefiled) providence, and should be disconnected from 
anthropomorphic conceptions and downwards intentionality.  On the 
other hand, instead of noting that within this framework Eros seems to 
be downgraded into the more instrumental role of just supplying 
further preconditions for this ‘call’, I will assert that Eros himself 
exemplifies the actual («καθ’ ὕπαρξιν») return (of himself and hence of 
his inferiors), whose ultimate cause («αἰτία») and source is to be found 
                                                          
277 On Alc.,328,12-13.  For cross-references to Greek literature that mention either 
etymologies, starting with Cratylus,416b6-d11, see Westerink’s apparatus ad loc. and 
Segonds,p.454,nn.2 and 3 ad loc.  To these add Chrysippus, Fragmenta Moralia, 
(III.)208,6 (Arnim; apud Stobaeus Ecl.II,105 Wachsmuth). 
278 On Alc.,53,6-7. 
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in Beauty.279  Besides, as we saw in the beginning of the present section, 
“where there exists both unification and separation of beings, there too 
love appears as medium”.280   
This might also be the case why in the still higher realm, where 
there is only unification of multiplicity, we can have entities that 
exemplify what Eros does, although without his intervention.  More 
precisely, on the Platonic occasion of the connection between the just 
(«δίκαιον») and the advantageous («συμφέρον»),281 Proclus writes that 
“Socrates united the just with the good via the beautiful, since this is 
the medium (μέσον) and bond (σύνδεσμος) of union between them.  
‘The fairest of bonds (δεσμὸς),’ says Timaeus ‘is that which unites as 
closely as possible both itself and whatever is combined with it.’282  
Much more, then, than any other bond, the beautiful is itself connective 
(συναγωγόν) and unitive (ἑνωτικὸν) of these two, the just and the 
good.”283  To call specifically the Beautiful “medium” and “bond” that 
is “connective” of other entities amounts to repeating exactly the same 
ascriptions with which Proclus, following the Symposium, has 
characterized Eros earlier on in the Commentary.284  Of course, I noted 
before that almost all entities in Proclus’ system are in a way mediators.  
                                                          
279 Thus Beauty is both providentially and causally erotic. 
280 On Alc.,ll.3-4. 
281 Proclus’ lemma is from Alc.I,115a1-10. 
282 Tim.,31c1-3. 
283 On Alc.,322,12-17.  Cf. also ibid.,318,9 and 320,6-7. 
284 See e.g. ibid.,53,4-5; 64,3-6 and 9-12; 67,12-13 and supra (e.g. ch.2.2.2.). 
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The explicit mentioning of Beauty in this regard and within this 
Commentary, though, should make us suspicious as to Proclus’ 
motives, which must be to emphasize the bond between Beauty and 
Eros, and the (κατ’ αἰτίαν) foreshadowing of erotic characteristics in 
Beauty.  On the other hand, one might object that even if it is also a 
mediator, Beauty lacks the dynamic element I had noted above with 
respect to Eros.  Although true, we should not forget that famously 
everything, including Beauty, desires the Good,285 hence the dynamic 
element is everywhere present in Proclus’ system in various degrees.  
Secondly, to complete an earlier quotation and connect the end of this 
paragraph with its beginning, “the intelligibles on account of their 
unutterable union have no need of the mediation of love”.286  Where 
there is no gap, Beauty’s pre-erotic role is enough.  Consequently, I 
hope that the above references enable us to see how Beauty’s function 
anticipates the actual characteristics of Eros, so that we may call the 
former «κατ’ αἰτίαν» Eros. 
By means of Beauty then, let us now ascend right to the top.  
Around the middle of the extant Commentary the Successor asserts 
that “[t]he good…, if it is lawful to speak of it in this way, proceeds 
down to the lowest level, and illuminates all things and conserves 
(σώζει) them, arranges them and turns them back (ἐπιστρέφει) to 
                                                          
285 Cf. e.g. El.Th.,8,31; 12,18; 113,10-12.   
286 On Alc.,53,2-3.   
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itself”.287  Proclus is careful to remind us of the ineffability of the First 
Principle which is due to its absolute simplicity.  Thus, the multiplicity 
of characteristics given should not be seen as a plurality of predicates, 
but as different aspects of what it is to be good from our point of 
view.288  Still, in prop.13 of the Elements Proclus gives a longer list: “[i]t 
belongs to the Good to conserve (σωστικὸν) all that exists (and it is for 
no other reason that all things desire it [ἐφετὸν]); and… likewise that 
which conserves and holds together (συνεκτικὸν) the being of each 
several thing is unity… And… it belongs to unity to bring and keep 
each thing together (συναγωγόν ἐστι καὶ συνεκτικὸν) ,...  In this way, 
then, the state of unification (τὸ ἡνῶσθαι) is good for all things.”289  
Combining the gist of the previous two passages we may conclude:  by 
bestowing unity, Goodness is «συναγωγόν, συνεκτικόν» and, thus, 
«σωστικόν», and this amounts to making things return to it 
(ἐπιστρεπτικόν), i.e. desire it (ἐφετόν).290  Naturally, all of these 
attributes, which culminate in the notion of desire qua return of the 
desirers to the Good, are connected with Providence with which I have 
dealt elsewhere.  What I want to do now is to recall that most of the 
above characteristics (in this verbal form) are used by Proclus also for 
                                                          
287 Ibid.,181,11-13. 
288 Compare what I suggested above about the plurality of characteristics ascribed to 
Eros.  The same can be said here. 
289 El.Th.,13,26-29 and 32-34. 
290 Cf. also on Alc.,317,5: «ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔφεσις σωστικὴ τῶν ἐφιεμένων ἐστίν.» 
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Eros, and more specifically for providential eros.291  This is not at all 
surprising, since I had already observed that providential eros is a 
species of providence.  Now we have come to ascertain the same thing 
from a different angle: the Good is causally erotic; alternatively, Eros 
forms a specification of the function of the Good, since he exemplifies a 
particular desire (ὄρεξις), which is erotic, for an entity lower to the 
Good, i.e. the Beautiful.  Eros implants ἔρωτα (for the Beautiful), while 
the Good ἔφεσιν (desire) for itself.292  Moreover, regarding the desire 
for the Beautiful (which is ἐραστόν), I noted both the ultimate and 
immediate cause of it.  In contrast to the Καλόν, which cannot ‘call’ its 
desirers back without the mediation of Eros, the Good pre-
encompasses the duality of ultimate and immediate cause of desire.  It 
is the ultimate ‘caller’ and the one that implants this desire for return.  
Were it not for “Faith”,293 I would propose that the duality of 
Beautiful-Eros exists causally in the unity of the Good, although it is 
not very clear to which respects Faith is analogous to Eros.  Besides, to 
my knowledge, nowhere in his system does Proclus hypostatize 
«Ἔφεσις» (desire for the Good), which, unlike Faith, is the direct 
                                                          
291 Apart from passages quoted above, see also ibid.,55,13-14: “such love is provident 
and preservative (σωστικὸς) of the beloved, able to perfect (τελειωτικὸς) and 
maintain (συνεκτικός) them”. 
292 Towards the end of the extant Commentary Proclus speaks of the Good as both 
«ἐραστόν» and «ἐφετόν», and he notes that “love is an intense desire” (on 
Alc.,336,23; cf. ibid.,329,17-24 and 328,14-329,2).  The main reason for this, however, is 
that on the level of soul the good, the beautiful and the just are interchangeable in 
contrast to the divine hierarchy (see ibid.,330,2-14.).  Because my interest in this 
section is in what comes before god Eros I am not dealing with this issue at all. 
293 See supra, ch.2.1.4. 
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analogue of Ἔρως, and this tells in favour of my suggestion that the 
pair of Beauty and Eros is foreshadowed solely in the Good.  Finally, I 
need to remark that the Good causally exemplifies Eros only in its 
descending attitude, not the ascending one, although the latter is more 
basic in that it is the reason for the former.  The reason for this, 
however, is that the Good is so fulfilled that its unity is the archetype of 
what Eros is eternally striving to do, i.e. to be completely united with 
its object of love.  In this way, there is no ascending attitude in the 
Good, because the only way for it is self-concentration, the by-product 
of which is the providential attitude for everything that comes after it.  
Without surprise again, after convergence in the bottom, Proclus meets 
Plotinus at the top, too, since according to the Neoplatonic founder the 
Good is “love of himself”, the explanation and the by-product of this 
being exactly the same as just noted in the case of Proclus.  A 
discrepancy would be that while Plotinus does not qualify, for Proclus 
it would be fair to say that the Good is eros (and καλόν) only κατ’ 
αἰτίαν. 
Proceeding now to a more severe discontinuity with Plotinus, we 
can verify my previous remarks concerning the One’s causally erotic 
function by looking at the subsequent level of the Henads.  We have 
descended to a level of reality which mediates between the supreme 
Good and Being, where the Beautiful lies and shines.  Although the 
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exact status of the Henads is still a matter of debate,294 I will stick with 
the traditional interpretation according to which the Henads unfold the 
absolute unity of the One:  by being separate entities-unities they 
bridge the gulf between the utter simplicity of the One and the 
multiplicity of Being.  This unfolding of the Good’s unity entails the 
original and actual manifestation of divine characteristics («ἰδιότητες») 
each of which might be represented by various Henads, and all of 
which reappear in successive layers of reality (Henadic295 or not).296  
Τhere are four main groups of divine attributes each of which contains 
a generic and a specific form.  It is in the third group that I am 
interested for my present purpose.  It is labeled by Dodds as 
“conversive causes”297, because its two members are the “causes of all 
divine reversion (ἐπιστροφῆς)”.298  In other words, the reversive and 
causally erotic function of the One, which we have been talking about, 
is ‘initially’ and existentially («καθ’ ὕπαρξιν», or rather super-
                                                          
294 See for instance Van Riel [forthcoming], where he makes a persuasive case for the 
Henads being immanent characteristics of gods at the level of Being and henceforth. 
295 A difficult point to understand, indeed.  See Dodds [1963],p.278, n. on 
props.151-159. 
296 This procedure involves also “interweaving” (συμπλοκή) of characteristics.  See an 
example with particular reference to eros within the triad faith-truth-eros in on 
Alc.,52,2-10.  
297 Dodds, ibid.  Alternatively: ‘reversive causes’. 
298 El.Th.,153,34.  For the difference between the general cause, “perfective” 
(«τελεσιουργόν») and the specific one, “elevative” («ἀναγωγόν») see ibid.,158,25-29: 
the elevative reverts things only to their superior principles, and hence Eros must be 
connected primarily with it.  In fact, Proclus makes the Ἔρωτες responsible for 
«πόθων ἀναγώγια κέντρα» in his second Hymn,ll.3 and 5; cf. also Dodds [1963],p.281 
n. on prop.158). 
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essentially) manifested at the level of the Henads,299 and precisely its 
third group.300  If the One is causally erotic, then all the more so are the 
conversive causes which are closer than the One to Eros.  Reversely, 
Love appears now more as an immediate specification of the reversive 
function of Henads, than of the One itself.  What is more, in the 
Alcibiades Commentary Proclus explicitly connects Eros and its function 
with the divine attributes.   
The particular way he puts things, however, might be problematic: 
after having mentioned several of the divine characteristics, all of 
which fall under three of the four aforementioned groups,301 and while 
waiting for the mention of our third-‘conversive’ group, Proclus 
actually mentions “the whole order (τάξις) of love”, which “is for all 
beings the cause of reversion (ἐπιστροφῆς) to the divine beauty,…”.302  
So, is it that the “erotic order” is identified with the conversive causes?  
Is it another name for them?  But then, is the conversive group causally 
or substantially erotic?  We can remedy this anomaly in various 
ways:303  first of all, these theological enunciations appear quite early in 
the Commentary, and do not belong to the section of the “more secret 
doctrines” about love, where one should expect greater precision.  
                                                          
299 See also El.Th.158,23. 
300 Cf. also ibid.,144,24-27. 
301 See on Alc.,30,8-14. 
302 Ibid.,ll.14-15. 
303 According to the brief exposition of Riggs [2009],pp.83-85, esp. p.84, this is far from 
an anomaly.  However, my treatment so far can allow for agreement with what he 
focuses on. 
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After all, the specific Commentary itself was the first to be taught in the 
late Neoplatonic Curriculum and served as an introduction addressed 
to students not well-versed in Platonic theology.  Besides the 
abovementioned (in ch.2.2.2.) limitation of an ‘intellectual topography’, 
Proclus is not meticulous about exhaustive consistency across different 
works, which may have been written in different periods of his life, or 
even within the same work.  In any case, though, it is not necessary to 
take that particular reference to the erotic order as interchangeable with 
the reversive causes, which strictly are causally erotic.  A good reason 
for thinking this is that in the above passage Proclus does not omit to 
mention the end of erotic reversion, viz. the union with divine Beauty, 
which, as we have also seen, is situated below the Henads.  Could it be 
that Eros reverts his posterior entities only to an entity which is below 
him?  This untenable suggestion would lead us to many difficulties.  
For instance, what about the exemplification of desire in Eros?  What is 
his own beloved object?  To deny the answers I gave to these questions 
in the previous questions, e.g. that Eros, being an intellect is dependent 
on Beauty, shining at the level of Being, would unnecessarily make the 
edifice collapse and present Proclus as inconsistent with what he says 
some pages later in the Commentary.  But in fact, if we take the 
mention of the «θεῶν ἰδιότητες»304 as referring to Henads, we need not 
assume the same for Eros.305  First of all, after the statement of members 
                                                          
304 On Alc.,30,8. 
305 Actually, with van Riel’s interpretation it would not be a problem if the divine 
attributes were not positioned at the level of the Henads, and in this way Eros could 
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of the three abovementioned Henadic groups, and before stating the 
erotic order, Proclus adds the case of “others [viz. other divine 
attributes] again in charge of some other function and preserving 
(σώζουσαι) the universe through the communication of themselves”.306  
This case could refer to one of the conversive causes, especially given 
the mention of «σωτηρία» (preservation-salvation), which we have 
seen explicitly connected with the reversive function of the Good.  
Furthermore, the whole enumeration of the divine attributes forms the 
first element of a comparison which is completed with the mention of 
Eros.  Proclus writes that “[a]s (ὥσπερ) the individual natures (θεῶν 
ἰδιότητες) of different gods have revealed themselves as differing,…, 
so (οὕτω) also the whole order of love is... the cause…”.  He makes a 
comparison: referring to the functioning of the divine attributes we are 
assisted in understanding Eros’ own function, and this is highly 
reasonable if, as I expounded above, a particular group of Henadic 
attributes anticipates the erotic order.  Finally, to the justified question 
why Proclus did not name any of the two conversive causes then, we 
might retort that, apart from my initial qualifications, the Neoplatonist 
might have wanted to give a pre-eminence to the topic of Eros, which is 
one of the principal themes of the Alcibiades according to his 
Commentary.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
have been practically identified with them.  However, I do not want to complicate the 
picture so much.  Let us bear in mind the limitations of our human perspective noted 
above. 
306 On Alc.,ibid.,ll.12-14. 
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To conclude: having preserved the causal erotic function of the 
conversive divine attributes, we have verified the causal erotic aspect 
of the Good, which, as an object of desire, is imitated by the causally 
erotic Beauty, qua the immediate object of love.  Thus, the off-spring of 
the present and the two previous sections is that despite Eros’ 
specificity, we can still find him from the bottom to the top of Proclus’ 
system.  Such an erotic omnipresence has been enabled mainly through 
the exploitation of the three modes of being: «κατ’ αἰτίαν, ὕπαρξιν and 
μέθεξιν».  After all, Proclus had already prepared us: «Πάντα ἐν 
πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ».307  Even if Plotinus’ would not put 
things this way, I do not think that he would be disappointed with this 
outcome of Proclus’ erotic approach.   
 
2.2.5. Eros and Friendship 
Given the omnipresence of eros from top to bottom of the Proclean 
system, we have so far concentrated largely on the vertical dimension 
of that system.  Yet we should not exclude the horizontal dimension.  A 
distinctive feature of Proclus’ system is that it unfolds in both these 
directions.308  Again, as I have shown previously (ch.2.1.3.), the 
horizontal dimension itself is not bereft of hierarchization, since every 
new term in a series manifests in a more deficient way the 
                                                          
307 El.Th.103,13.   
308 Another characteristic that must be traced back to Iamblichus. 
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characteristic of its predecessor.  Hence we should be speaking about 
transverse rather than horizontal strata.  Moreover, that was one of my 
main points when I was explaining the reasons why Proclus equates 
love (ἔρως) with friendship (φιλία).  I will not repeat this discussion 
here, but simply recall an example that shows the interchangeability of 
the two: “since the whole order of love proceeds from the intelligible 
(νοητοῦ) father (‘In all things,’ as the oracles say,309 the father ‘has sown 
the fire-laden bond of love,’ in order that the whole world may be held 
together by the indissoluble bonds of friendship, as Plato’s Timaeus 
says)”.310  In describing Love’s effects Proclus shifts from the word 
«ἔρως» in line 4 to «φιλία» in l.5.  Furthermore, we should expect that 
if there are many kinds of attractions and relationships in the present 
world, their cause in the intelligible realm must be much more unified.  
It is no surprise that Proclus wants to unify and identify friendship 
with eros in the intelligible.311 
The previous passage cited makes use of the characteristic of 
eros-friendship as “bond”, whether this is of the world or of entities at 
other levels, and connected to each other either vertically or 
transversely.  I have been talking about Eros’ providential bestowal of 
his characteristic upon lower beings, either in vertical ranks, or 
transverse strata originating from the participants of the former.  I 
                                                          
309 Cf. De Oraculis Chaldaicis,p.25 Kroll; cf. O’Neill,n.50 ad loc. 
310 On Alc.,26,2-5.  Cf. Tim.,32c1-4 and 43a2.  Another characteristic instance is 
ibid.,33,8-11. 
311 The ‘inspired humans’ of this world, like Socrates, preserve this unity. 
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proposed that in both cases, the erotic bestowal is the awakening of 
desire for and reversion towards the Beautiful in the lower entities that 
participate directly or indirectly in Eros.  It might be that these lower 
erotic entities cannot attain to the Beautiful, which is strictly the object 
of Eros’ desire, but each of them retains this upwards orientation.  
However, this image does not reveal very much about the way in 
which erotic entities are “bonds”.  One of the answers proposed was 
that each erotic entity imparts to a lower one the desire for erotic union 
with beauty; in its turn this process leads to the fulfillment of each 
desiring entity, with the subsequent result of a well-ordered and 
unified whole.  Still, if the desired union is with beauty, what does this 
tell us about the friendly union with each other?  Speaking of ‘bonds’, 
do we simply mean a mediating entity that implants desire (for union 
strictly with beauty), or that actually unites one another?  The first 
answer to this is that the erotic desire does indeed give an entity a 
strong attachment to its immediately higher (and beautiful) entities, 
either vertically or transversely.  The idea of an actual bond is thus 
preserved, because the continuum has no gaps.  A second answer that 
completes the first is the following: the desire for Beauty leads to 
attachment to the beautiful object that each entity is able to reach.312  
Analogously, each entity strives for the Good, but the good they end 
up with is their own good, i.e. their own self-fulfillment.  In any case, 
the erotic self-fulfillment which has been caused by an attraction to 
                                                          
312 Remember the Platonic qualification “as far as possible” (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν). 
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Beauty, has the by-product of strong unity between adjacent beautiful 
entities (“the indissoluble bonds of friendship”313).  Consequently, these 
entities are erotic and friendly bonds of each other, but indirectly, 
because the direct aim is the union with Beauty.  -Imagine a society 
which is well-ordered not because its citizens primarily respect their 
friends and enemies, but because everyone obeys the law, i.e. due to a 
common end.  It is the direct relation to the law that results in good, 
friendly and fine-tuned relations.314  In other words, erotic entities are 
actual bonds of friendship for one another, because they aspire for a 
common beloved object.315  
Let us ascend now to the friendly ontology of the «καθ’ ὕπαρξιν» 
level.  There is a remarkable passage where Proclus engages with the 
problem of the identity of the «φίλιος» god stated by Socrates in 
Alcibiades I,109d7.316  The consideration is owing to the Proclean answer 
to an anterior problem: “From what source then do these benefits 
accrue to souls, viz. friendship and unity (φιλία καὶ ἕνωσις)?”,317 
benefits exemplified in Socrates’ treatment of Alcibiades.  The response 
lies in Socrates’ call to “the god of friendship who is their common 
guardian to witness his words and purpose, considering, as a man of 
                                                          
313 On Alc.,26,4-5; cf. supra,n.310 (and n.37 in ch.2.1.2.). 
314 Like in Plato’s ideal Republic. 
315 The reason I put the clarification here is that the discussion of friendship as a bond 
between two entities reminded the tension of how to combine reversion with 
providence for the reversion of the others. 
316 Cf. on Alc.,231,14. 
317 Ibid.,233,2-3. 
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knowledge, that union (ἕνωσις) extends to all beings from god, and, as 
a lover (ἐρωτικὸς), from the god friendship (φίλιος).”318  In other 
words, Proclus here verifies my first point about the interchangeability 
and equivalence between eros and friendship.  Secondly, he reminds us 
of the erotic effects of the One (and the Henads), which I termed 
causally erotic, and to which I will return in the end of this section.  
Now, I want to turn to Proclus’ desire to be more specific about this 
god of friendship, i.e. the «καθ’ ὕπαρξιν» cause of friendship.  While 
according to my treatment so far we would not hesitate to call this god 
Eros, Proclus’ religious background confronts him with two 
candidates: not only a) the well-known tradition found e.g. in the 
Phaedrus which makes Eros the god of friendship, but also b) the 
tradition that speaks of Zeus as god of friendship.319  As we might 
expect Proclus unites the two accounts:  «κάλλιον δὲ συνάπτειν 
ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς λόγους· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Διΐ καὶ ὁ Ἔρως ἐστί.»320  Here I 
want to recall my first discussion of the generation of Eros qua 
intellective intellect from an intelligible intellect (νοητὸς νοῦς).  Proclus 
is actually repeating the same points put now in theological terms.  He 
even cites the same Orphic fragment: “‘Counsel is first begetter and 
much-delighting Love,’321 and Love both proceeds (πρόεισι) from Zeus 
                                                          
318 Ibid.,ll.4-7. 
319 See ibid.,7-14.  Segonds’ n.3,p.415 ad loc. indicates that this b-tradition is derived 
mainly from Platonic texts. 
320 On Alc.,233,14-15: “But it is better to combine both accounts, for love is contained 
within Zeus,…”. 
321 Cf. supra n.237 in ch.2.2.1. 
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and co-exists (συνυπέστη) with Zeus among the intelligibles (νοητοῖς); 
for in the world above is “all-seeing Zeus’ and ‘delicate Love,’ as 
Orpheus says.322  They are therefore related to, or rather united with, 
each other, and each of them is concerned with friendship (φίλιος).”323  
As with my earlier discussions, Zeus’ relation to Eros is understood in 
terms of «κατ’αἰτίαν» and «κατ’οὐσίαν» modes of being.324  Thus, this 
parallel passage, occasioned by a discussion of friendship, helps us 
confirm the intelligible location of Eros as put forward in the first 
section. 
But why stop at these two?  Aren’t there other candidates for the 
role of a divine Love?  Why for example not include Empedocles’ 
account?  In fact, Proclus, imitating the generosity of his providential 
gods, can satisfy the Presocratic desires of his readers too.  So, earlier in 
the Commentary he writes: “Again, true friendship is both of the gods 
themselves and of the classes superior to us and has also come down as 
far as souls that are good;… It is necessary to realize that although 
friendship is a thing to be revered and honoured, yet it requires a life 
                                                          
322 See Westerink’s apparatus ad loc. for references. 
323 On Alc.,233,16-234,2. 
324 I.e. Zeus is κατ’αἰτίαν Eros.  I do not have the space to get into details about the 
entity represented by Zeus in Proclus hierarchy.  See also the treatment by Kirk-
Raven-Schofield [1983],p.62 of a passage in Proclus, on Tim.,II.54,28-55,2 (Diehl), 
which reports the view of Φερεκύδης, and mentions Eros, Zeus, friendship and 
union, i.e. the principal notions of our passages.  Another god who would be worth 
examining in conjunction is Hermes, who was ψυχαγωγός, like eros, and like 
Socrates according to Aristophanes, Aves,1555.  For Hermetic references in on Alc. see 
195,4-196,18; 187,19-188,6 with O’Neill,n.359 ad loc.; 258,2 with n.475( p.338); 105,2 
and n.229.   
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that is divine (θεοπρεποῦς) and intelligent (νοερᾶς); since it [sc. φιλία] 
subsists primarily among the gods and intelligent (νοερᾷ) life and the 
intelligible (νοητῷ) god of Empedocles, whom he is accustomed to 
term a ‘sphere’.”325  This passage repeats the familiar elements and 
adds to the previous list of Zeus and Eros the Empedoclean candidate 
of the φίλιος god.  Exploiting the «κατ’ αἰτίαν and ὕπαρξιν» formulas 
we can also explain how φιλία is connected with νοερὰ life, while the 
god itself is also νοητός.  The former corresponds to Eros on the «καθ’ 
ὕπαρξιν» level, while the latter to Zeus’ «κατ’ αἰτίαν» one.  The 
constant reference to intelligible and intellective/intelligent layers of 
reality once again confirms our placing of Eros in the intelligible 
hierarchy, and verifies the ontological identification of Eros with 
Friendship. 
Having exhausted the «καθ’ ὕπαρξιν» level let us finish with the 
causal mode of erotic/friendly being.  At this point we should not be 
surprised if the One, qua causally erotic (super-)entity was found to be 
the ultimate cause of friendship as well.  Indeed, Proclus makes the 
connection explicit: “friendship is between good men of serious 
purpose, but among villains moral character is not in evidence; the 
reason is that both friendship and the good have come from the One, 
and from a single cause (ἀφ’ ἑνὸς326 ἥκει καὶ μιᾶς αἰτίας).  To each 
                                                          
325 On Alc.,113,13-15 and 17-21; cf. Empedocles, B29(Diels) with the references in 
Segonds,n.1,p.94 ad loc. 
326 Segonds ad loc. agrees in taking this as a reference to the One.  See also the more 
obvious case in on Alc.,38,6(ff.).  
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being the source of good is also the source of unity, and the source of 
unity is also the source of good.”327  I have dealt with the Aristotelian 
(and Pythagorean) flavour of the passage328 elsewhere.329  Now, I only 
want to note how the preceding discussion has helped us to avoid 
attributing any inconsistency to Proclus with respect to the cause of 
friendship (and eros).  The «κατ’ αἰτίαν» formula extends up to the 
First principle.  If Zeus-Sphere is the immediate «κατ’αἰτίαν» erotic-
friendly entity, prior to the existence of Eros, the ultimate cause of 
Eros/Friendship is the One, as we asserted previously.  As the ideal of 
‘unity-unification’ was connected with eros, so too it can relate to 
friendship.330  Consequently, the present passage confirms that even the 
One is causally erotic and «φίλιον». 
                                                          
327 Ibid.,109,6-8; see also ibid.,ll.3-5 and the corollary in ll.8-10 which concerns 
Alcibiades. 
328 Cf. also ibid.,221,16-222,2. 
329 See supra, n.79 in ch.2.1.3. 
330 Cf. also ibid.,274,21-24.  Plotinus,V.1.9,6 connects the One with Empedocles’ φιλία 
(to which he also refers in III.2.2.4 and IV.4.40,6; see also the analogical use for 
Intellect in VI.7.14,20). 
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CHAPTER 3 
PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND THE DIVINE NAMES 
 
As one of the first representatives of a major, albeit old, movement 
in Dionysian scholarship, Koch supported his view that pseudo-
Dionysius1 is more or less a plagiarizer of Proclus with a meticulous 
examination of parallel passages from the two authors.2  One of them 
concerns love.  Ιt is cited for the same reason by Dodds and was used 
in the introduction of my chapter on Proclus:3   
“So the Beautiful and the Good is desired and loved and 
beloved by everything; and because of it and for its sake the 
subordinate love the superior reversively, and the entities of 
the same rank [love] their peers in communion, and the 
superior [love] the inferior providentially, and each of these 
[love] themselves4 summarily5…”.6  
                                                          
1 Henceforth I will be using interchangeably the following names: pseudo-Dionysius, 
Dionysius, Areopagite.  For a new interesting hypothesis regarding Dionysius’ 
pseudonymity see Stang [2012], e.g. pp.2-6.  Let us bear in mind (or ear) that the name 
of Paul’s convert (cf. Acts 17:34), who became a saint, has sound similarities to the 
ancient Greek god of wine, Dionysus as well as Dion (Δίων), the Sicilian close friend 
of Plato, who, according to Nussbaum [2001],pp.228-230, lies beneath some names of 
the Phaedrus, a Platonic dialogue on love.  
2 A similar attitude is expressed in Koch’s contemporary, Stiglmayr [1895]. 
3 See n.1 in ch.2.  Since then, the similarity has been also observed among others by 
Nygren [1953],p.579,n.2. 
4 This last possibility, not frequently stated by Dionysius, should be interpreted along 
the lines of Gospel’s “love your neighbour as yourself” (cf. e.g. Mathew 19:19 and 
Mark 12:31 citing from Leviticus 19:18).  Vogel [1963],p.16 refers to possible Stoic and 
Pythagorean connotations. 
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In the following sections I will attempt to address all the issues 
raised in this passage, i.e. I will show in which way Dionysius’ system 
is erotic.  During this voyage into Dionysius’ ontology of Eros I will 
locate Love in the world-picture of Dionysius and also define its 
function, as I did in Proclus’ case.  Thus, I will have the opportunity to 
make ample comparisons with Proclus’ system but also with Plotinus.  
Finally, I will examine some consequences of ps.-Dionysius’ erotic 
approach within his Christian-non-Neoplatonic framework, offering 
some glimpses of Dionysius’ Eastern reception.  In my treatment I will 
be focusing on the Divine Names, because this work devotes a specific 
section7 to the revealed name of God as Eros.8 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 The not very usual Greek here is «συνεκτικῶς» and I follow the rendering of LSJ ad 
lem.(II), where they refer to the occurrence of the word in Proclus, on Alc.,52,7.  Vogel 
[1963],p.12 translates “self-preservingly”. 
6 «Πᾶσιν οὖν ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐφετὸν καὶ ἐραστὸν καὶ ἀγαπητόν, καὶ δι’ 
αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἥττω τῶν κρειττόνων ἐπιστρεπτικῶς ἐρῶσι καὶ 
κοινωνικῶς τὰ ὁμόστοιχα τῶν ὁμοταγῶν καὶ τὰ κρείττω τῶν ἡττόνων 
προνοητικῶς καὶ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστα συνεκτικῶς,…»: Pseudo-Dionysius, The 
Divine Names (henceforth: DN), §4.10, 155, 8-11 / 708A.  In my system of referencing I 
first write the number of chapter and sub-chapter I will be referring to.  Then, I give 
the page and line numbers of the Greek text in the standard edition of Suchla [1990].  
The number and letter after the slash denotes the pagination of Migne’s edition in the 
Patrologia Graeca (PG, vol.3 -reproducing B. Corderius’ text), because it is followed by 
the standard English translation I am using, i.e. that of Luibheid-Rorem [1987] (most 
of the times heavily modified though). 
7 DN, (last portions of) §4.10-§4.17 (i.e. before the long treatment of evil starts), 
155,8-162,5/708A-713D. 
8 Or «ἀγάπη» (agape/charity/love; cf. e.g. 1 John 4:8).  I will not be dealing with the 
terminological issue.  Dionysius regards the two names as interchangeable, although 
he prefers the name «ἔρως» (cf. Ignatius, Ep.4.7.2,4 Camelot, cited in 
DN,4.12,157,3/709B), which ‘accidentally’ was the central term in the ancient Greek-
pagan discussions on love.  See his justification in DN,4.11-12,156,1-158,12/708C-709C, 
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I will first give a synopsis of the main points of my following 
presentation of Dionysius.  There are four important stages in 
Dionysius’ treatment.  These are the harmonious effects of eros, the 
archetype of eros as descending power, eros as ecstasy and eros as a 
circular force.  Each step forms an explanation of the one before it, and 
offers a refinement of Dionysian theory.  As will be seen though, the 
central claim pertains to the third step.   
The unifying effects of eros should not be new to a reader of 
Neoplatonism.  We have seen that the mutual love and friendship of 
the entities in the cosmos make it a harmonious, beautiful and 
functional whole.  It is noteworthy that when Dionysius discusses these 
relationships he does not omit to mention the love between entities of 
the same rank, which is an additional possibility to the instances of 
downwards and upwards eros, familiar to us from Proclus.9  The 
reason for this loving synthesis must be traced back to (the) Go(o)d, the 
efficient as well as final cause of the universe, who imbues love to His 
creating overflow.  I will come back to these puzzling enunciations. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
especially his warning (ibid.,4.11,156,2-3/708C), which forms a self-conscious 
hermeneutical principle so that we understand Dionysius’ relations with various 
Christian and non-Christian traditions: “In my opinion, it would be unreasonable and 
silly to look at words rather than at the power of the meanings.”  I am afraid that the 
prejudices of Nygren [1953],pp.589-593, esp. n.1 in 589, do not let him appreciate 
neither the above enunciation, nor Dionysius’ overall treatment.  Cf. also Rist 
[1966],pp.236-237, 242, and Aertsen [2009],p.195.  For well-balanced reasons 
regarding the adoption of eros-terminology by the Fathers see Βουλγαράκης 
[1989],pp.8-10; cf. also ibid.,p.11.  Specifically for Dionysius see also Osborne 
[1994],pp.208-210. 
9 See also a fourth possibility, rarely found even in Dionysius, supra in n.4.  
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Hence we come to the second stage: due to this love that God 
exhibits for the cosmos He can be named ‘Eros’/‘Love’, or Lover.  In 
other words the archetype of Love, which is exemplified by God in His 
relation to what is external to Him, is descending Eros, i.e. what the 
Neoplatonists can also term as Providence.  But if so, then the distance 
from the deficiency-claim of the Symposium is stark.  Where is eros as a 
desire for something one lacks?  Does not the creation desire and love 
God?  If so, how does this take place? 
To these problems the third stage comes as an answer.  To be more 
precise, what God exemplifies is not only descending Eros, but actually 
ecstasy, i.e. going out of Himself to give something of Himself, or even 
Himself to the other(s), i.e. to the cosmos.  Ecstasy does not 
immediately imply desire (for something), which would lead us to 
examine the Symposium’s abovementioned claim.  It denotes the 
movement out of oneself, without specifying a particular reason for 
this movement.  If so, it does not matter anymore whether the recipient 
of love is an entity higher or lower than the lover, i.e. whether a lover is 
in lack with respect to his beloved or not.  Thus, God’s paradigm just 
calls for our ecstatic response to his erotic ecstasy towards us.  What I 
regard as the most crucial point of Dionysius’ treatment is that thus 
eros has no specific direction (upwards or downwards).  Hence, 
Dionysius can be more comprehensive when enumerating the various 
possibilities of eros I mentioned before, where he includes the strictly 
horizontal dimensions.   
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The fourth step in this ascent, the image of the circle, concludes 
Dionysius’ picture by confirming the discussion of ecstatic eros’ 
orientation, and this is why I suggested above that the third rather than 
the fourth state has prominence.  The circle implies that Eros is a 
unique force in the universe: it starts from God and comes back to God.  
In this image what goes downwards is simultaneously going upwards 
and vice versa.  The beautiful cosmos is the outcome of God’s ecstasy.  
The sustainment of this cosmos, though, requires the loving response 
of the universe to God; it is God Himself that enables this erotic 
dialogue.  Consequently, Dionysius speaks of Eros as a single force that 
unites the cosmos not only with respect to its parts, but also with 
regards to its Father.  Finally, we can ascertain that for the Areopagite 
being is intimately connected with love; to be and to exist is to love and 
be erotic, i.e. ecstatic in whatever direction (whether procession or 
reversion).   
The above brief exposition suffices to suggest that even if Eros is 
only a name among other divine names, Dionysius’ metaphysics is 
essentially erotic.  However, specific reasons for some of the previous 
claims must be traced in God’s status as Trinity.  What is more other of 
the above enunciations are verified with the Incarnation of Logos.  
Although neither of these issues is explicitly mentioned in Dionysius’ 
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section on Eros, in the following pages I will try to find their traces, 
assess their importance and explain his silence regarding them.10 
I will end this introductory section with a caveat.  Although the 
following discussion will be most of the time abstract, without specific 
references to everyday life, we should not think that Dionysius’ corpus 
is obsessed with bare metaphysics.  The unifying effects of Eros in our 
world should also have practical and political applications.11  Indeed, in 
one of the longest and in my opinion the most interesting and moving 
of Dionysian Epistles,12 the Areopagite makes ample references to 
everyday life and specific sociopolitical structures.  So, for instance, in 
                                                          
10 Regarding the philosophical relation between Proclus and Dionysius my discussion 
will show that although the latter is indebted to the former, Dionysius has enough 
subtle deviations from the Platonic Successor and Neoplatonism, so that we need not 
accuse him of plagiarism, as some scholars have done in the past.  (I have already 
referred to the examples of Koch [1900] and Stiglmayr [1895].)  Even when their 
language is very similar, (as is also shown in Saffrey [1982]), the underlying content 
of the two philosophers might be less akin.  Scholarship has drawn attention to this 
phenomenon recently and what follows helps to confirm this intepretive trend.  Most 
of the scholars referred to in my following notes of the chapter are more or less 
sympathetic to the view of Dionysius’ creative and critical reception of Proclus.  Cf. 
for instance the balanced approach of Louth [2008a],p.581 and see also Τερέζης 
[1986],pp.10 and 16-22, Vogel [1981],p.75, McGinn [1996],pp.(199-)200 (cf. also p.203) 
and Florovsky [1987],p.210; cf. also ibid.,pp.216-218 and 222.  Stang [2012],pp.27-39 
and 5 (with notes) gives a helpful literature review of modern scholarship (i.e. of the 
20th century, including some decades before and after it); see also ibid.,pp.143-144 for 
his (and Chr. Schäfer’s) position, which is similar to what Sorabji [1987],p.165 says 
about John Philoponus and Boethius of Rome.  On the other hand, Rist 
[1999],pp.(377-)378 and 387 notes Dionysius’ independence from both Neoplatonism 
and Christianity, due to the synthesis he offers. 
11 This is exactly what is successfully shown in Riggs [2009] with specific reference to 
the Ecclesiastical hierarchy.  Cf. also Rist [1999],p.386 and Esposito Buckley 
[1992],pp.60-61. 
12 See Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle,8:1,1-6,55 (Heil-Ritter)/1048A-1100D (PG). 
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the beginning13 we are reminded that love for God means love for our 
neighbours,14 even for our enemies,15 and in the end16 we see Christ 
being identified with those in need, whether sinners or not.17   
 
3.1. Divine Eros and its function 
The aim of this section is to show how Dionysius accommodates 
notions such as providential and reversive love in his system.  Our 
guide in this enquiry will be the stipulation of the actual location and 
function of eros in the different levels of the Dionysian reality.  The 
result will be that as with Proclus eros is to be found everywhere in 
Dionysius’ universe.  However, there are also subtle dissimilarities 
when contrasting Dionysius with Proclus and Plotinus, as we will see.   
 
                                                          
13 See ibid.,§1,19-20/1085B. 
14 Many Church Fathers, like John Chrysostom, make the most out of this radical idea 
to be found e.g. in 1 John 4:20-21 and Matthew 25:40 (in the Parable of the 
Judgement); cf. Mark 3:35 and Luke 6:27-35 (on love of enemies).  For the experience 
of the fact that ‘ἀγάπη Θεοῦ=ἀγάπη ἀδελφοῦ’ in contemporary saints, monks and 
spiritual fathers, see Παπαθανασίου [2011],n.33. 
15 See also Larchet [1996]. 
16 See Ep.8.6,49-52/1100C. 
17 Another early Father gives a beautiful image in order to explain how love of God 
entails closer bonds between people: if God is the center of the circle and we are in 
the other extreme of its radii, then coming close to the center we also come closer with 
those in the other radii.  Cf. Dorotheus of Gaza, Doctrinae diversae,VI.78,1-25 (Préville 
and Regnault); the excerpt is also included in the nice anthology of Ἀγγελόπουλος 
[2001],(pp.105 and 110). 
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3.1.1. God and Eros: causally or existentially? 
I begin with a bold Dionysian statement:  
“And we may be so bold as to claim also that the Cause of all 
things loves (ἐρᾷ) all things in the superabundance of his 
goodness, that because of this goodness he makes all things, 
brings all things to perfection, holds all things together, 
returns all things.  Divine Eros is the Good of the Good and 
for the sake of the Good.”18 
In the chapter on Proclus we ascertained that divine eros, the entity 
attached to Beauty, and the erotic rank in general had the same 
characteristics as those expressed in the above passage, such as the 
attribute of returning other things toward the divine.  So too with 
respect to Beauty itself, a specific group of Henads (the “conversive” 
causes) and the Good.  In my exposition I stressed that the plural 
existence of eros in different ontological levels is explained with the aid 
of prop.65 of the Elements of Theology.  The mode of ‘existential (καθ’ 
ὕπαρξιν) subsistence’ is preceded by the ‘causal’ (κατ’ αἰτίαν) mode.  
Eros is existentially erotic, whereas the principles above him are 
causally erotic.  However, not even in this manner does Proclus ever 
affirm that the Good itself actually loves what lies beneath it.  Hence, 
this is the first important differentiation between Proclus and ps.-
Dionysius.  For the latter the First Principle is a καθ’ ὕπαρξιν lover of 
                                                          
18 DN,4.10,155,14-20/708A-B.  The last sentence is taken from the translation of 
McGinn [1991],p.167, as indicated in Papanikolaou [2006],p.126 and n.13 in p.135.  In 
McGinn [1996],p.210 (and n.36) the last “and” is omitted following closely the Greek, 
which however has twice “and” in the beginning of the sentence that have been left 
untranslated. 
CHAPTER 3:  PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND THE DIVINE NAMES 
208 
the creation.  The distance from Plotinus is also clear enough, since, 
despite the existence of providence, as we saw, the Neoplatonic 
founder had used erotic language to describe at best the ‘relation’ of 
the One with its own self.   
For a more precise view of what it means for the First principle to 
love the creation the following passage is indicative:  
“What is signified [sc. by the divine name ‘Eros’] is a capacity 
to effect a unity, an alliance, and a particular commingling in 
the Beautiful and the Good.  It is a capacity which preexists 
through the Beautiful and the Good. It is dealt out from the 
Beautiful and the Good through the Beautiful and the Good.  
It binds the things of the same order in a mutually regarding 
union.  It moves the superior to provide for the subordinate, 
and it stirs the subordinate in a return toward the superior.”19 
The characteristics of implanting unity and harmony in the 
universe, as well as bringing each level of reality into communion are 
familiar to us from Proclus.  Nonetheless, although the Good and Eros 
                                                          
19 DN,4.12,158,13-18/709D.  Especially regarding the last three lines (:16-18) there are 
many other parallel passages in the DN itself: see 4.2,144,18-145,2/696A-B (although 
here the reference is particularly to the angels); 4.7,152,16-19/704B-(C); 4.10,155,8-
11/708A (cited in the opening of my chapter); 4.13,159,1-3/712A; 4.15,161,2-5/713B 
(supposedly from Hierotheus).  It should be noted that the first two references 
describe the effects of God as goodness (which we will see is identified with love; 
hence also n.160 in Luibheid-Rorem,p.83 with general parallel references in the 
Dionysian corpus about providence/procession and return/reversion.  Cf. also 
ibid.,p.79,n.149, Rorem [1993],pp.151 and 169, and see Schäfer [2006], comparing 
Dionysius and Proclus on the basis of the triad μονή-πρόοδος-ἐπιστροφή).  Finally, 
DN,7.3,198,16-20/872B and 12.4,226,1-5/972B are more loosely connected with our 
main passage in that they denote the unity of the cosmos due to God’s Wisdom and 
the first entities, i.e. first images of God, in the Dionysian hierarchies, respectively, 
but not in the aforementioned detailed manner. 
CHAPTER 3:  PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND THE DIVINE NAMES 
209 
shared similar features in Proclus, God’s effects in the world were not 
deemed as instances of love, but rather of goodness, i.e. providence.  
Finally, the reader can find another presentation of the loving effects of 
God-Eros in our world, but in a lengthier and more elaborate manner, 
in the not thoroughly explored chapters of the Divine Names where 
Dionysius examines God as “Peace” («Εἰρήνη»).20 
Now I want to draw our attention to a reasonable question.  An 
objector might justifiedly claim that Dionysius’ language is not 
consistent in all places.  There are passages where Dionysius seems to 
be advocating that eros subsists causally at the level of God, not 
existentially.  For example, few lines after the first passage cited 
Dionysius states that “[t]hat yearning (ἔρως) which creates all the 
goodness of the world preexisted (προϋπάρχων) superabundantly in 
the Good”.21  But the fact that Dionysius employs the «κατ’αἰτίαν» and 
                                                          
20 See ibid.,11.1-5:217,5-221,12/948D-953B.  Hence, “Peace”, and its subsequent 
«ἡσυχία» (“tranquility”; cf. ibid.,11.1,218,7/949A), appears as an alternative name for 
“Eros” (and ἀγάπη).  Another frequent term used in that section is «ὁμόνοια» 
(passim), while friendship («φιλία», unhelpfully rendered as “yoke” by Luibheid-
Rorem ad loc.) is used once (ibid.,11.2,219,17/952A, in a context similar to those of 
Proclus;  for «φιλία» see also infra, n.19 in ch.3.2.).  In other words, DN,§§11,1-5, 
which is very close to the final section of the book, forms an enlightening complement 
to the section on Eros in DN,§§4.10-17.  This is observed by Louth [1989],pp.95-96, 
too, who adds as another “twin” divine name that of “Power” (DN,§§8.1-6). 
21 DN,4.10,155,17-18/708B.  (NB the word «ἀγαθοεργός», since the contracted form 
«ἀγαθουργός», although absent from Plotinus, is used many times by Proclus for the 
Henads and the divine principles in general; e.g. in on Alc.,61,4 it characterizes Eros.)  
Cf. DN,4.12,158,13-15/709D («…προϋφεστώσης…»); ibid.,4.13,159,18-20/712B 
(«…προΐδρυται…»); ibid.,4.14,160,9-10/712C («…προοῦσαν…»). 
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the «καθ’ὕπαρξιν» formulas even together22 might make things worse, 
because it implies that he is confused as to their distinction.  
Nevertheless, this is an uncharitable reading.  In what follows I will 
show why and will suggest a more adequate approach.  
Reading his penultimate Epistle we can ascertain that Dionysius is 
very well aware of Elements’ prop.65.23  At one point he writes that the 
“image of fire takes on different meanings, depending on whether it 
refers to the God who transcends all conceptions, to the providential 
activities or reasons of God, or indeed to the angels themselves.  In one 
instance one thinks under the heading of ‘cause,’ (κατ’ αἰτίαν) in 
another under the heading of ‘subsistence,’ (καθ’ ὕπαρξιν) in a third 
instance under the heading of ‘participation,’ (κατὰ μέθεξιν)…”.24  Not 
only do we see here Dionysius’ knowledge of the Elements, but this 
passage is also helpful for understanding how he connects this 
threefold distinction with his own system, which is more frugal and 
synoptic than Proclus’, and even Plotinus’ one,25 consisting of two 
                                                          
22 Cf. also ibid.,5.4,183,5/817D:  «ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ εἶναι συνειληφὼς καὶ 
προειληφώς.»  In ibid.,7.2,196,18-20/896B Dionysius combines the two verbs into one: 
«[sc. the divine mind] ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατ’ αἰτίαν τὴν πάντων εἴδησιν καὶ 
γνῶσιν καὶ οὐσίαν προέχει καὶ προσυνείληφεν» (of itself and in itself it precontains 
and comprehends the awareness and understanding and being of everything in terms 
of their cause). 
23 This is also observed by Dodds [1963] in his note ad loc.,p.236. 
24 Ep.9.2,18-22/1108D. 
25 Whereas in Plotinus there are three divine principles in Dionysius there is only one 
(since the Three Hypostases are consubstantial).  NB that the notion of Dionysian 
hierarchy (a word coined by ps.-Dionysius) applies only to the created beings.  God is 
outside the hierarchy because the latter’s existence is owed to the varied relation that 
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‘elements’: God and the creation.  So, starting from bottom, the mode of 
being ‘by participation’ refers to the angels as first members of the 
created order.26  The other two modes apply to God, but not in the 
same respect.  The ‘causal’ mode refers to God in Himself, without 
external relations, since he transcends the reality of created things, 
while the ‘existential’ mode of being characterizes God’s providential 
activities that bring him in relation with the creation.27  As for erotic 
providential activities, we should understand them in light of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
each of its members has with God.  Cf. Perl [2013],pp.24-25 and 29, 32, and see the 
Dionysian definition in his Celestial Hierarchy (CH),3.1,17,3-5 (Heil-Ritter)/164D (PG) 
with the comments ad loc. by Louth [2010],pp.9-10.  See also his broader as well as 
convincing approach in Louth [1989],pp.105-110 and 132-134, with various Dionysian 
and bibliographical references in Luibheid-Rorem [1987],pp.197-198,n.11.  
26 I am explaining the passage cited above.  That the specific image of fire is used only 
for angels, not for say humans, does not exclude the possibility that the ‘participation’ 
mode applies to every other created order below the angels. 
27 By ‘providential activities’ («νοηταὶ πρόνοιαι ἢ λόγοι») we should not understand 
an intermediate level of Being between God and angels.  See Dionysius’ unusually 
fervent polemic contra polytheism (hence against pagan Neoplatonism, too) in 
DN,11.6,222,3-13/953C-D; cf. Σιάσος [1984],pp.123-124 and Louth [1989],pp.86-87.  Of 
course, whether this makes the Areopagite immediately a Palamite (i.e. follower of 
Saint Gregory Palamas) avant la lettre is another problem: when speaking of these 
providential activities do we mean ‘uncreated energies’ (with Palamas) or created 
ones (with Barlaam and Aquinas)?  On the other hand, this issue stirs the further 
question as to what the substantial difference between Proclus (cf. the Henads) and 
Palamas (cf. God’s uncreated energies) is.  (Cf. e.g. Hankey [2009],p.125.)  Perhaps 
both problems cannot be solved with the sole aid of philosophy…  For instance, 
regarding the first question, the motivator in Tollefsen [2012], e.g. p.2, is that Palamas 
is quite traditional in his hesychastic distinctions, whereas Meyendorff (e.g. in his 
introduction to Gendle [1983],p.21, but see also p.13) is critical of this view, 
advocating Palamas’ modified reception of the Areopagite.  See also Louth 
[2008b],p.585 (with the notes in p.598).  With regards to the second debate, despite its 
title and the enlightening treatment of the encounter between Christianity and 
Ancient Greek culture-philosophy in other Church Fathers, Μπέγζος [2000] does not 
deal with Dionysius at all. 
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passages cited before: they are the unifying and harmonious effects of 
God in the world, because they bring the cosmos into communion with 
God.  If so, the question now becomes: what does it mean for God to be 
eros in himself, or eros beyond any conception, or eros causally?  Eros 
is a relational term which denotes the relationship of God and the 
cosmos.  If we want to transcend any reference to the cosmic level, 
what would it mean to say that God is Eros in a causal manner?   
When treating Proclus on this issue it was the unifying effects of 
the One that led us to speak of it as causally erotic.  However, we saw 
that Dionysius is more radical in his demand, in that he does not 
consider external relations at the causal level.  Perhaps, then, Dionysius 
wants to guide us to something closer to the Plotinian One which, as 
we saw, is love of itself?  The answer is yes and no.  If we were dealing 
with other Church Fathers like the Cappadocian Gregory the 
Theologian28 and the Medieval Richard of St Victor,29 or with 
contemporary philosophers and theologians such as Χρῆστος 
                                                          
28 See e.g. Gregory Nazianzenus, «Λʹ. Ὕμνος πρὸς Θεόν», from Carmina Dogmatica, 
509,10-510,4(PG). 
29 In his De Trinitate,III, e.g.§§4,6,14 and 19.  Cf. Ware [2013],pp.26-33 (with notes), 
where he also mentions and criticizes Aquinas’ unjust Aristotelian criticism of Victor 
in this respect (ibid.,pp.33-36 with n.21).  Dionysius was one of the greatest 
authorities for Aquinas, who had written a commentary on the DN.  Aertsen 
[2009],pp.198ff. compares the two philosophers only in terms of the “Doppelgestalt” 
of love, as he calls it: while we have seen (supra in n.8) that for Dionysius eros and 
agape are interchangeable, due to the Latin tradition and translations, the relation of 
the two terms acquires a new character in Aquinas, who imports a four-fold 
distinction: amor-dilectio-amicitia-caritas (cf. also Aertsen,p.203).  McGinn 
[1996],pp.205ff. gives a broader comparison of Aquinas and Dionysius on love. 
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Γιανναρᾶς30 and Metropolitan Ιωάννης Ζηζιούλας,31 the key to our 
quibbles would undeniably be Trinitarian theology.  God is love of 
himself, but not by being simply alone or just simple, like the 
Neoplatonic One, but because he is the loving relation between three 
Hypostases/Persons32 which are consubstantial (i.e. share the same 
substance/nature).  The mystery of Christian Trinity reveals God not 
only as personal (as e.g. in Judaism and Islam), but also as inter-
personal.33  Without mentioning external relations with created beings, 
it is the internal relations of the three Divine Persons that show us why 
                                                          
30 The most notable work in this respect is Yannaras [2007].  However, the 
fundamentals of his approach are already present in Yannaras [2005].  In this book, 
under the influence of Vladimir Lossky (see e.g. Lossky [1976],esp. ch.2:pp.23-43), 
Yannaras proposes that Dionysius’ unknowability of God is the Eastern Orthodox 
alternative to the Western absence of God found in Heidegger and Nietzsche.  
Nihilism is avoided in Dionysius, because his God is Love, i.e. Trinity, and hence 
comes into loving contact with the creation, via his uncreated energies (where 
Yannaras employs Palamas’ understanding of Dionysius.  See esp. the final 
ch.:pp.99-110).  Regarding the (creative) ‘distortions’ of Lossky’s enterprise and its 
relation to the Western understandings of Dionysius as well as developments in 20th 
century’s Roman-catholic theology see Coakley [2013],esp. pp.127-136 and 140-141.  
For a brief presentation of most of Yannaras’ translated books in English (including 
the ones mentioned) see Louth [2009],esp. pp.332 and 335-338.  Finally, a (perhaps 
unnecessarily too) critical presentation of Lossky’s and Yannaras’ enterprise with 
respect to Dionysius is given in Gavrilyuk [2008],pp.712-716 and 720. 
31 See e.g. Zizioulas [1985].  For a brief introduction to the philosophical and 
personalist theologians just mentioned, i.e. Lossky, Yannaras and Zizioulas see 
Papanikolaou [2008]. 
32 Although the latter term is not used (in this technical sense) by Dionysius, as is duly 
acknowledged by Wear-Dillon [2007],p.44. 
33 For a succinct and lucid presentation of the Orthodox Christian understanding of 
the Trinity, with many scriptural, liturgical and patristic citations, see the 
corresponding chapter in Ware [1995],pp.27-42. 
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God is Love, dialogical and an eternal self-giving.34  Moreover, they 
explain why, because of this loving overabundance, God is then Love 
when seen from the point of view of his communion with the 
creation.35  In other words, God as Eros καθ’ὕπαρξιν is explained by 
the fact that God is Eros κατ’αἰτίαν, i.e. because he is a Trinity.  This 
Christian radical innovation against the ancient background36 is also 
                                                          
34 Hence, I resist here one of Augustine’s Neoplatonizing understandings of the 
Trinity, where the Holy Spirit, qua the relation of the Father with the Son, is their 
mutual Love.  See e.g. De Trinitate, VIII.X.14; cf. also Ware [2013],p.25,n.13 and Coffey 
[1990],pp.194-201, who makes connections with the issue of “Filioque” and criticizes 
Augustine (ibid.,p.201) for providing insufficient scriptural grounding.  For all its 
Western origin, one can trace this idea also in late Byzantium, presumably via the 
Greek translation of De Trinitate by Μάξιμος Πλανούδης (accomplished in ca.1280-
’81).  See e.g. Gregory Palamas, Capita physica, theologica, moralia et practica CL,§36,11-
15 and relevant bibliography with Sinkewicz’s orthodox Christian retort in 
Γιαγκάζογλου [1992],pp.21-22, n.19.  What is more, in a personal exchange I had with 
fr Andrew Louth (at Senate House on 12 June 2012) he suggested that Palamas wants 
rather to stress the presence of the Spirit in the Church, as the Love between God and 
the Church.  (See also Palamas, ibid.,36,28-31.) 
35 Even the creation itself is explained on the basis of God’s Love, (cf. DN,4.10,155,17-
20/708B and see Osborne [1994],pp.194-195 and Esposito Buckley [1992],p.55), whence 
the differentiation from the lack of envy in Plato’s Demiurge.  Compare also Wear-
Dillon [2007],pp.52, 54 and 70-71 and Rist [1966],p.240. 
36 Wear-Dillon [2007],p.34 argue convincingly that Dionysius picks up Porphyry’s 
‘heretical’ interpretation of the Parmenides, whereby both the first two Hypotheses are 
attributed to the One.  (Cf. ibid.,pp.33 and 47.)  In particular, the second Hypothesis 
allows for the connection of multiplicity with unity.  Despite Porphyry’s prominence, 
whose influence on Dionysius is detailed in ibid.,pp.45-48, they conclude that with 
regard to the Trinity “Dionysius reproduces the thought of the Cappadocian Fathers, 
as well as the Platonic concept of the unity of the intelligibles” (esp. Being-Life-
Intellect), a claim that is fleshed out in the main body of this illuminating chapter 
(pp.37-48).  A virtue of this reading is that it explains why the processions referred to 
infra in n.52 are used in contexts about both the Trinity (internal multiplicity) and the 
creation (external to the Godhead multiplicity), while it parallels my discussion of 
how the ‘causal’ and the ‘existential’ mode refer to God.  I am more resistant to 
accepting, though, that the Cappadocians, being influential to Dionysius, were 
eagerly copying Porphyry’s trinitarian understanding (see ibid.,pp.34 and 132). 
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revealed in the relational names that the Persons have, e.g. Father (of a 
Son)37 and Son (of a Father). 
Nonetheless, things unfortunately are not that clear in the case of 
the Areopagite.  To be sure, the Trinity is not absent from his writings,38 
but it does not play the central role that it plays in other Church Fathers 
and it is not, at least evidently, employed in his section on Eros.  What 
is more, to my knowledge, not a single time does Dionysius explicitly 
connect Trinity, i.e. the relations of the Persons, with Love.  Hence, 
father Florovsky notes that “Dionysius speaks briefly and fleetingly of 
the Trinitarian dogma”.39  However, we need to do justice to the 
Areopagite.  In the second chapter of the Divine Names he makes some 
distinctions concerning the a) “unified” and the b) “differentiated 
                                                          
37 Rather ironically, such an example about the relationality of Eros is already given in 
Socrates’ interchange with Agathon in the Symposium,199d1-8. 
38 See for example the opening prayer of The Mystical Theology (MT),141,2 
(Heil-Ritter)/997A (PG).  From DN see e.g. §1.4,112,7-113,12/589D-592B; §1.5,116,7-
10/593B; §2: passim; §11.5,221,8-10 (although in Migne’s edition: PG,953A-B there is 
no reference to the Spirit); §13.3,229,6-10/980D-981A.  Let me add that the language of 
‘consubstantiality’ («ὁμοούσιον») used before, employed by Fathers like Athanasius 
the Great and the Cappadocians and included in the Nicene Creed, is not used by 
Dionysius, and reasonably so, if he would like to pretend that he writes in the 
Apostolic times.  So, in DN,1.5,116,9/593B Dionysius indicates ‘consubstantiality’ with 
the adjectives «ὁμόθεος» (“possessing the same divinity”) and «ὁμοάγαθος» 
(“possessing the same goodness”) Trinity. On the other hand, this is not the case 
regarding the advanced Neoplatonic language he uses which is well ahead the 
Apostolic/middle-Platonic era.  Finally, Loudovikos [2002],p.11 notes that, in contrast 
to Maximus the Confessor, the notion of consubstantiality is absent from Dionysius’ 
ecclesiology, too. 
39 Florovsky [1987],p.220.  Cf. Florovsky [1933],p.109, cited (in English from Russian) 
by J. Pelikan in his introduction to Berthold [1985],p.7 (and n.27 in p.13).  Cf. also 
Pelikan’s introduction in Luibheid-Rorem [1987],p.19 (and n.38) and Armstrong 
[1982],p.221 (with the references though in n.19, p.292). 
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theologies” (words of God or divine names).  The names related to 
‘divine unity’ express the transcendence of God, i.e. attempt to describe 
him without relation to his creation (e.g. ‘Ineffable’), whereas ‘divine 
differentiation’ includes the names that have to do with God’s 
relationship with the cosmic order (e.g. Eros).  Each of these categories 
is divided into two sub-categories on the basis of the applicability to 
the persons of the Trinity.  That is: i) ‘unity’ in each of these categories 
means that the corresponding divine names refer to the entire Godhead 
(e.g. a: beyond Being; b: Light).  On the other hand, ii) ‘differentiation’ 
means that in each of the two categories there are also names that 
apply only to one or some of the Persons of the Trinity (a: Son; b: 
incarnated Logos).40  Moreover, in the end of this methodological 
chapter, Dionysius announces the scope of his present work (DN) 
which pertains to subcategory (b-ii), i.e. the unified names related to 
divine differentiation.41  In other words, Dionysius tells us that he is 
interested only in the names that reveal a particular relation between 
(the entire) God and the cosmos.  If we recall our previous discussion 
of Eros with respect to prop.65 of the Elements, this means that 
Dionysius is interested in the «καθ’ὕπαρξιν» mode of Eros’ existence, 
i.e. the one that exemplifies God’s relation with the cosmos, not the 
                                                          
40 For the sake of clarity I have inverted Dionysius’ order of exposition.  For (i) and (ii) 
see DN,2.3:125,13-126,2/640B-C.  Louth [1989],p.89 notes that this distinction is 
familiar from the Cappadocians.  For (a) and (b) and their interweaving with (i) and 
(ii) see ibid.,2.4-6:126,3-130,13/640D-644D.  See also a very helpful table with these 
distinctions in Σιάσος [1984],pp.115-116. 
41 See DN,2.11,137,8-13/652A. 
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‘causal’ mode.  Therefore, it is because Dionysius limits the scope of his 
treatment that there is no elaborate presentation of the Trinity, and 
hence, presumably, no connection of Trinity with love either.  It is true 
that in this way Dionysius’ enterprise becomes more easily accessible 
by a Jew or a Muslim, and perhaps more frustrating for a Christian.  
Nonetheless, we should definitely not complain for the absence of 
something that the author has warned us that he is not going to deal 
with. 
This might not be, however, the end of the story.  As an answer to 
Florovsky’s sort of complaint Σιάσος wants to remain fully faithful to 
the details of ps-Dionysius’ enunciations.42  In the same chapter (DN,2) 
the Areopagite writes that issues concerning the Trinity, as well as the 
Incarnation, (i.e. unified and differentiated names of unified theology: 
a-i and a-ii, plus differentiated names of differentiated theology: b-ii) 
have been dealt in another book, the Theological Representations.43  The 
problem is that the existence of this book is seriously disputed since no 
manuscript of it exists, nor do other ancient authors cite passages from 
it.44  Σιάσος is convinced of its existence because it makes perfect sense 
within the program that Dionysius has set out with the unified and 
                                                          
42 See Σιάσος [1984],p.117. 
43 Cf. DN,2.7,130,14-131,1/644D-645A. 
44 See also Rorem’s nn.3 and 10 on DN,§1 in Luibheid-Rorem [1987],pp.49 and 52. 
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differentiated theologies, as well as the structure of the Mystical 
Theology.45   
Whether we follow Σιάσος’ line, or we contend ourselves with 
thinking that the Areopagite urges us to do the work that he is not 
doing in his (extant) corpus, I would rather focus on Trinitarian clues 
which could be found in passages that do exist.  The last Dionysian 
sub-chapter on Eros in DN, before the Areopagite supposedly quotes 
three further subchapters on Love from his teacher Hierotheus, is a 
very vexed one.  It speaks of a sort of erotic universality to which I will 
return (in ch.3.1.2.).  What I want to do now is to highlight some 
phrases relevant for our purposes.  Dionysius writes that God “stirs 
and moves himself through himself”46 by “revealing himself via 
himself”47 and being “the good procession of [his own] transcendent 
unity”.48  As I said the context is unclear and one can wonder: is here 
Dionysius speaking about the Trinitarian God, where the Father begets 
the Son and proceeds the Spirit, thus revealing Deity as Trinity, or are 
we dealing with the providential activities of the Deity which result in 
the creation and sustainment of the cosmos?  Despite the interpretive 
difficulties, the context of the whole chapter on Eros, as well as hints 
                                                          
45 Cf. Σιάσος,pp.117-118.  On the brief recapitulation of Dionysius’ program in MT, 
but outside Σιάσος’ argument, see n.17 in Luibheid-Rorem,p.140. 
46 DN,4.14,160,4-5/712C: «…ἦ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἐστι προαγωγικὸς καὶ 
κινητικός.» 
47 Ibid.,160,8/712C: «…ὥσπερ ἔκφανσιν ὄντα ἑαυτοῦ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ». 
48 Ibid.,160,8-9/712C: «…τῆς ἐξῃρημένης ἑνώσεως ἀγαθὴν πρόοδον…».  There are 
many parallel phrases in this dense subchapter. 
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like the word “beings” («τοῖς οὖσι»)49 few lines after the above 
enunciations reassure us that Dionysius has in mind the relation of 
God and the cosmos.  Still, our dilemma was quite reasonable.  In fact, 
there are places where Dionysius is employing almost identical phrases 
that apply very clearly to the Trinity.  For instance, in the already 
mentioned methodological chapter 2 of DN, the Areopagite notes that 
with reference to the Trinity “divine differentiation applies to the 
goodlike processions of the divine unity, overflowing and multiplying 
[itself] due to goodness in a super-unified way”.50  Taking for granted 
that the author must have been aware of these verbal similarities, while 
he makes clear that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not creatures,51 I 
propose that in this way he might be giving more hints to the reader in 
order to connect the Trinity with Love.  If, that is, the term 
“procession” can be used both for the internal relations of the Trinity 
and the external relations of God,52 then we can constantly have in 
                                                          
49 Ibid.,160,10. 
50 Ibid.,2.5,128,15-17/641D-644A: «…θεία διάκρισίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀγαθοπρεπὴς πρόοδος 
τῆς ἑνώσεως τῆς θείας ὑπερηνωμένως ἑαυτὴν ἀγαθότητι πληθυούσης τε καὶ 
πολλαπλασιαζούσης,…». 
51 Dionysius e.g. speaks of “theogony” («θεογονίας»; cf. Hesiod’s work with this title) 
in ibid.,128,10/641D; see also the whole passage: ibid.,128,10-13 and cf. Wear-Dillon 
[2007],p.36.  Whether Dionysius is its most faithful exponent or not, the Christian 
dialectic of Uncreated (Ἄκτιστον: a word absent from the Corpus Areopagiticum) 
and created (κτιστόν: appearing through Dionysius’ quotations of Paul), 
characteristic of e.g. Athanasius the Great, seems to be absent from (pagan) 
Neoplatonism. 
52 «Πρόοδος» refers to the internal relations of the Trinity also in: 
ibid.,2.11,135,14/649B, while at the very same chapter the instances of 136,5/649B and 
137,9/652A refer clearly to God’s activities with respect to creation (although the noun 
«δημιουργία» is not used in DN).  To the latter camp belong also the «οὐσιοποιὸς 
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mind that Love might be underlying Dionysius’ statements about the 
Trinity in chapter 2, while the Trinity might be a helpful model in order 
to understand God’s external relations, too, in the chapter on Eros.53  
What is more, the insistence on this bond between Trinity and Love 
helps us solve another puzzle.  Whereas in passages we have seen 
Dionysius identifies God with Eros, in other ones he states that Eros is 
in God.54  Of course, he does not suggest that Eros is a sort of 
independent principle within Deity.  Our treatment so far can give a 
neat answer: the ‘in’ formula applies first and foremost to the internal 
relations of the Trinity, i.e. to the ‘causal’ mode,55 which explains why 
God can be said to be Eros both with respect to himself (cf. again 
causally) and with respect to the creation (cf. existentially).56   
Hence, so far I have shown that Trinity does play a role in 
Dionysius’ system, albeit perhaps not the central one, and that 
«κατ’αἰτίαν» eros can be taken as a hint to the Trinity.  Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
πρόοδος» of ibid.,5.1,180,12-13/816B and 5.9,188,18/825A and the πρόοδος (both in 
singular and in plural) of: 5.2,181,18/816D; 9.5,211,4 and 12/913A and B; 9.9,213,14 and 
17/916C.  See also Terezis [2012]. 
53 See also supra,n.21.   
54 Cf. DN,4.12,158,14/709D and: 4.10,155,17-18/708B; 4.13,159,19/712B and 
4.14,160,10/712C, where the ‘in’ formula is combined with the ‘causal’ one (cf. 
«προϋπάρχων», «προΐδρυται», «προοῦσαν»). 
55 Hence that Eros is in God does not mean that God simply has Eros, but He is Eros 
Himself. 
56 It will have become evident by now that Dionysius’ ‘causal’ mode of being and love 
is to be disconnected from God’s “causaliter” love as it features in Aquinas (cf. 
McGinn [1996],p.207,n.51), and which is the origin of love by participation, to be 
treated infra in ch.3.1.2. 
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we need to take also into account that the Areopagite, like all great 
Platonic philosophers (Plato, Plotinus, Proclus) does not rigidly stick to 
a technical vocabulary.  My above treatment has shown that Dionysius 
was aware of Proclus’ proposition 65, but still he adapted it to fit in his 
own Christian scheme.  Still, this is not the only adaptation of this 
proposition to be found in the Divine Names.  At one point within the 
long section on evil Dionysius notes that “[e]vil is not to be found in 
the angels either.  For if the goodlike angel brings tidings of the divine 
goodness,  he is by participation, i.e. in a secondary manner, that [sc. 
which he is announcing,  and which exists] causally, i.e. in a primary 
manner.”57  A strict Proclean would not endorse the loose Proclean 
language Dionysius is using here.  First of all, here we have a binary 
relation of a thing participating (cf. δευτέρως: angel) and another one 
which is participated (cf. πρώτως: God).  We should expect that the 
participation (cf. κατὰ μέθεξιν) is of an entity that exemplifies the 
characteristic which is participated.  But instead of calling this 
characteristic as existing «καθ’ὕπαρξιν», the Areopagite states that it is 
«κατ’αἰτίαν», i.e. at another stage further above.  This is not to suggest 
that in Proclus’ system an entity whose characteristic exists 
«καθ’ὕπαρξιν» does not participate in an entity having this 
characteristic ‘causally’.  However, participation strictly speaking is of 
an attribute which is exemplified by (i.e. exists καθ’ὕπαρξιν in) the 
                                                          
57 «Ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἐν ἀγγέλοις ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.  Εἰ γὰρ ἐξαγγέλλει τὴν ἀγαθότητα τὴν 
θείαν ὁ ἀγαθοειδὴς ἄγγελος ἐκεῖνο ὢν κατὰ μέθεξιν δευτέρως, ὅπερ κατ’ αἰτίαν 
τὸ ἀγγελλόμενον πρώτως,…»: DN,4.22,169,20-22/724B. 
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entity participated.  Again, a participated entity is a cause of the thing 
participating, but this is different from saying that a characteristic 
exists causally in an entity.  If the characteristic is not exemplified 
(καθ’ὕπαρξιν) in the participating entity, then its progenitor is not 
deemed as a proper cause of this very characteristic.58  Furthermore, if 
someone claimed that actually Dionysius is interested in the (indirect) 
relation between an entity existing «κατ’αἰτίαν» and another one 
existing «κατὰ μετοχήν», then the Dionysian language still falls short 
of the Proclean standards, because he should have said that the thing 
«κατὰ μετοχήν» exemplifies its characteristic in a “tertiary” manner 
(‘τρίτως’), following the trinitarian distinction of prop.65 of the 
Elements.   
What does all this show us?  First of all, it shows that Dionysius is 
not a dull and unimaginative follower of Proclus, uninterested in the 
latter’s meticulous classifications.  Rather, Dionysius is very flexible in 
using Proclean schemes and adapting them in his Christian context, 
according to the purposes of his particular treatments.  In our case, he 
reduces Proclus’ triadic distinction into a simpler binary one.59  Already 
in my previous treatment we saw that the ‘causal’ and the ‘existential’ 
                                                          
58 See the helpful table by Dodds [1963],p.232. 
59 The Christian tendency not only for triads but also for pairs and dual formulas is 
revealed in the case of the unmediated relation between God and the cosmos.  But 
this should not be so foreign for a Neoplatonist too: apart from the subscription to the 
ten Pythagorean pairs, all Neoplatonists, including Iamblichus and his incontinence 
regarding medium terms, contrasted the one with the many (see e.g. Proclus, 
El.Th.,prop.1 and the first Pythagorean pair). 
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mode applied to God (with respect to himself and to creation), whereas 
the ‘participatory’ one to creation (starting with the angels).  The same 
rationale applies to this current instance although the Areopagite omits 
to mention the verbal formula «καθ’ὕπαρξιν».  Still, we know from the 
above elaborations that God is not only causally Eros but also 
‘existentially’.  Dionysius implies that to be the first cause and to 
exemplify a characteristic are one and the same thing.60  Therefore, for 
him to be erotic is tantamount to being the cause of eros directly, i.e. 
being eros causally (apart from existentially).61   
An analogous pattern of thought is exhibited when Dionysius 
speaks of the names «κάλλος» (beauty) and «καλόν» (beautiful).62  He 
mentions that the first is used with regard to the cause of the beautiful 
(the participated63 entity), whereas the second with regard to beautiful 
participants.  Nonetheless, he does not refrain from calling God, who is 
identified with Beauty, as Beautiful, too, i.e. as exemplifying beauty, 
albeit in an unprecedented manner, hence Dionysius adds also the 
                                                          
60 Hence, we return to a Platonism that is characterized by ‘self-predication’.  Cf. also 
Osborne [1994],pp.192-193, although I disagree with some of the claims she makes on 
this occasion.  
61 This is brought out lucidly in the following phrase from DN,2.8,133,3-4/645D: “the 
caused things preexist more fully and more truly in the causes (περισσῶς καὶ 
οὐσιωδῶς προένεστι τὰ τῶν αἰτιατῶν τοῖς αἰτίοις)”.   
62 See ibid.,4.7,151,2-17/701C-704A. 
63 Cf. ibid.,4.7,151,3 and 5/701C.  Dionysius’ term for the Proclean participle 
«μετεχόμενον» is the noun «μετοχή». 
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usual prefix of “super-“: God is «ὑπέρκαλος».64  Hence, we can 
conclude that the conjunction of something exemplifying a 
characteristic and being the cause of it means that this characteristic is 
exemplified καθ’ὕπαρξιν, but in an ultra-cosmic manner,65 following 
God’s Trinitarian super-existence.66  Now, the reason that there is no 
‘super-eros’ formula67 might be that eros is not only a relational term,68 
but also a symmetrical one.  As we will shortly see, God’s love for 
cosmos implies the corresponding love of cosmos for God.  Thus, since 
we are speaking about one single phenomenon, it would be better to 
stay with the name “eros” without further designations.  However, the 
linguistic fact does not negate the thought that Eros is exemplified in 
God’s super-being (both with respect to Trinity and in relation to the 
                                                          
64 Cf. ibid.,151,11/701D, in the neutral form, where the adjective «πάγκαλον» is used, 
too.  Dionysius also employs the etymology we found in Proclus, on Alc.,328,12, (cf. 
supra, n.277 in ch.2.1.4.), and which is ultimately derived from the Cratylus,416b6-
d11, in DN,4.7,151,9-10/701C-D: «καὶ ὡς πάντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καλοῦν, ὅθεν καὶ 
κάλλος λέγεται». 
65 Cf. also ibid.,11.6:221,18-22/953C and 222,13-15/(953D-)956A. 
66 In ibid.,4.7,151,16 and 18/704A (for God –cf. ibid.,152,4- and creation respectively) 
another feminine noun is introduced: «καλλονή».  
67 As also with the name “Light” etc.  Of course, none of Dionysius’ ‘super’-formulas 
is idiomatic Greek, and to my knowledge there is no antecedent in Classical or 
Neoplatonic literature of the composite name ‘super-eros’.  For other exceptions see 
«ὑπερουράνιος» in Plato, Phaedrus,247c3; «ὑπεράγαθον» and «ὑπέρκαλος» in 
Plotinus, Enn.,VI.9.6,40 and I.8.2,8 respectively (cf. «ὑπέρκαλον» in V.8.8,21 and 
VI.7.33,20); «ὑπερκόσμιος» in Proclus’ Republic Commentary,vol.2:257,23 (one of many 
entries in TLG’s search).  See also Wear-Dillon [2007],p.11. 
68 See also the explanation with regards to God’s name «ὁ ὤν» (from Exodus,3:14, 
instead of «ὁ ὑπερών») in DN,5.5,184,2-7/820B. 
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creation).  In other words, in order to understand eros we need to 
search for God (and the other way round).   
So, so far I have shown that Dionysius’ is flexible in using Proclean 
notions in order to fit them in his more modest ontological scheme.  
Now, to go a step further, it is this simpler scheme that enables 
Dionysius to identify providence with love,69 something that forms 
another deviation from Proclus.  In Proclus we had underscored that 
with respect to descending eros, providential love was only a species of 
providence, determined by its recipients which were beautiful entities.  
Moreover we had asserted the correspondence of providence with 
goodness and of love with beauty, because Beauty stood lower to the 
Good, which was at the top of the metaphysical pyramid.  It is no 
wonder, then, that the frugal Christian metaphysics of One (i.e. 
consubstantial) God led Dionysius to call him Good and Beautiful 
(ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν).70  There does not exist anymore a hierarchy of 
                                                          
69 Compare the results of God’s providence and of His love in 
DN,4.7,152,12-153,1/704B-C, (esp.152,16-18 and 19-20) and ibid.,4.10,155,8-11/708A 
(partly cited in the chapter’s beginning) respectively. 
70 Cf. e.g. ibid.,4.7,152,6-9/704B, which provides a short explanation for Dionysius’ 
identification, and Vogel [1963],p.11 with nn.1-2..  The formula of «καλὸς καὶ 
ἀγαθός» (or in the inverse order) reappears quite frequently in this sub-chapter 
(§4.7), as well as §§4.10 and 12, and brings to our mind the ancient Greek «πολίτης» 
(citizen), whose Athenian ideal was to become «καλὸς κἀγαθός» (although 
Dionysius does not use the contraction-«κρᾶσις» of «καί» with «ἀγαθός»).  
Reasonable enough, since although both Aristotle and Dionysius would agree that 
man is “by nature a political animal” (cf. Aristotle, Politics,I.2,1253a2-3), for –I hope- 
Dionysius contra Aristotle (cf. ibid.,1253a27-29 and 3-4) God is not solitary (because 
He is Trinitarian)…  Finally, there might be also resonances with Plotinus, Enn.,I.6, 
where although the main thesis is, with Proclus, that the Good is higher than the 
Beautiful (e.g. §9,37-39) and is its source (§9,41-42), in the vacillating final words of 
CHAPTER 3:  PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND THE DIVINE NAMES 
226 
principles such as beauty and goodness, hence love ceases to have a 
more limited scope than providence.71  To love is to be providential and 
vice versa.   
Continuing on these lines of Dionysius’ divergences from Proclus, 
we may observe that although in the latter’s case Eros was an entity 
attached to and desiring Beauty, while Beauty was only causally erotic, 
Dionysius contracts not only the Good and the Beautiful but also Eros 
with them.  If strictly speaking Proclean Eros exemplified the 
ascending love and desire, while it had downwards love as a by-
product due to providence, now the unqualified archetype of Love is 
the descending one.  Trinitarian God exemplifies Eros for the creation, 
which is none other than descending Eros.  We can see how from 
Plotinus’ emphasis on Eros’ deficiency, Proclus’ bond with providential 
eros has enabled Dionysius to pick this notion up in order to express a 
perhaps similar, but in many respects distinctive Christian vision of 
reality.  It might be that in his ‘contractions’72 of various terms 
(goodness, beauty, eros) the Areopagite may be coming close to my 
interpretation of Plotinus, who wants us to contract Eros with the 
entity that bears it, i.e. Soul or Nous.  Nonetheless, in Dionysius the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the treatise (§9,39-40 and 42-43) he leaves open the possibility that the Good could be 
identified with the Beautiful.  See Καλλιγᾶς’ surprise ad loc. and his tentative 
explanation in Καλλιγᾶς [1998],pp.132-133. 
71 Drawing on the Proclean principle that the higher an entity the deeper its effects.  
See El.Th.,prop.57.  (Thus, in a discussion I had with Jan Opsomer he spoke of 
Proclus’ ‘onion’-image of reality.) 
72 See supra in ch.1.1.3. on the issue of erotic «συναίρεσις» in Plotinus, Enn.,III.5. 
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contraction does not take place in lower strata, but at the very top, the 
Go(o)d.  Moreover, because of the identification of providence with 
love the Areopagite does not stay at Plotinus’ Good which loves only 
itself, but he proceeds to ascribe to God an active love (not only 
providence) for what exists outside him.73 
There remains a last issue before going to examine eros in beings 
other than God.  For the Platonic background of Proclus it was obvious 
that Eros would be a mediator.  However, now with Dionysius we see 
that there is no mediation anymore.  Eros has been identified with the 
outer extreme which itself erotically provides for the cosmos.  Does 
Dionysius deviate also from this Platonic background?  The answer is 
no; Proclus and Dionysius are here close enough.  When elaborating on 
the location of Eros in Proclus’ system I emphasized that strictly 
speaking Eros is a bond, i.e. a mediator, in that it bestows the erotic 
desire on the rest of reality in order that it attain to the intelligible 
realm.  In this sense this is also what Dionysius’ erotic God does.  He 
himself is the very bond between Him and the cosmos.74   
                                                          
73 NB the Trinitarian grounding noted above and contrast also Proclus, on Alc.,53,2-3: 
«τὰ μὲν οὖν νοητὰ διὰ τὴν ἄφραστον ἕνωσιν οὐ δεῖται τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μεσότητος·» 
(“Now the intelligibles on account of their unutterable union have no need of the 
mediation of love”). 
74 One might propose that Christ is the proper mediator between humanity and God.  
But although He exemplifies the bond of humanity and divinity, representing Him as 
a mediating entity is not helpful.  Rather Christ encompasses everything.  More on 
Dionysius’ Christ infra in ch.3.2.  A more apt case is that of Παναγία (Holy Mary), 
the Mother of God, who according to the hymnography is a «μεσίτρια».  Dionysius 
without addressing this issue and without even mentioning her name seems to be 
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To recap, in this section I have shown the mode of existence of Eros 
at the level of God as well as the “synairesis” of the latter with the 
former, and I tried to explain how the causal mode of eros’ existence 
relates to the existential one.  To this end I referred to the Trinity, which 
forms a major differentiation between Christianity and Neoplatonism 
and I underlined various others divergences of Dionysius from Proclus 
and Plotinus, many of which relate to Dionysius’ simpler and more 
synoptic ontological scheme.  Now it is time to go downwards. 
 
3.1.2. After God: Eros by participation 
When trying to locate Eros in Proclus’ system I posed the question 
whether below proper divine Eros there are other erotic divine entities.  
Exploiting Proclus’ emanationist metaphysics we saw how this was the 
case using again the third-“participatory” mode of Elements, prop.65.  
In Dionysian reality, however, there is no vertical or horizontal 
polytheism, so there are obviously no divinities regarding their essence 
below God-Eros, although each being is go(o)d-like to the extent that it 
can participate in God.75   
Still, now we are facing another problem: according to Greek 
philosophers and Christians alike the cosmos desires and loves God.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
referring to her dormition in DN,3.2,141,6ff./681Cff.  Cf. also n.130 in Luibheid-
Rorem,p.70. 
75 For this common Neoplatonic principle see e.g. DN,2.6,129,14-15/644B. 
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But whether we express the cosmos’ dependence upon God as God’s 
bringing creation into being after His image,76 or as creation’s 
participation in God’s providential processions,77 we have just seen that 
the archetype and source of these participated properties is 
providential/downwards love.  How, then, to account for the existence 
of reversive love?  In other words if love at the level of God is 
disconnected from the ‘deficiency’ claim which the Symposium 
bequeathed to the Neoplatonists, how can we explain the very fact of 
reversive love?  There seem to be two options here: either we should 
distinguish between desire and love, admitting that created beings 
desire but do not love God, or we should introduce a new kind of love, 
the reversive/upwards one, which is disconnected from the 
providential one and characterizes created beings.  The first option is 
easily denied taking into account Dionysian passages we have already 
quoted, where it is plain that creation does love God.  My task now is 
to show why and how reversive love is not separated from 
providential love.   
                                                          
76 According to the famous enunciation of Genesis, 1:26-27, man was made after the 
“image and likeness” of God.  Dionysius in DN,9.6,211,19-20/913C applies this 
formula not only to mankind, but to everything that has demiurgically ‘proceeded’ 
from God.  So, for instance, the half of the formula, i.e. the image of God, is ascribed 
to angels in DN,4.22,169,22-170,1/724B.  (I cannot locate with certainty the other 
allusion to the abovementioned passage of Genesis indicated by the Index of 
Luibheid-Rorem [1987],p.294a to be CH,15.3,53/329C42, although language of 
similarity is present there.  Due to this language the context of the passage first 
referred to in this note clearly reminds the reader of the Platonic Parmenides’ first 
part.)   
77 On the complementarily of the two alternatives see DN,9.6,211,18-19/913C. 
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When speaking of divine love Dionysius adds another important 
section which starts as follows: “Divine eros78 is ecstatic, not allowing 
the lovers to belong to themselves but to the beloveds.  This is shown in 
the providence lavished by the superior on the subordinate.  It is 
shown in the regard for one another demonstrated by those of the same 
rank. And it is shown by the subordinates in their divine return toward 
what is higher.”79  Again we witness the unifying effects of Eros in the 
realm of being.  What is new here is that the reciprocal relations of the 
various entities are expressed in terms not only of love, but also of 
«ἔκστασις» (ecstasy).80  To love means to be ecstatic, i.e. to get outside 
one’s self in order to meet and unite with the other.  Most importantly, 
the direction of love, whether ascending or descending, does not 
matter anymore.  This is inferred by the fact that Dionysius is speaking 
                                                          
78 Luibheid-Rorem have “[t]his divine yearning”, in their usual habit of not rendering 
«ἔρως» as love or plainly ‘eros’ (cf. Luibheid-Rorem,p.80,n.150).  Although for this 
reason I prefer the rendering “[l]ove for God” found in Ware [1995],p.25, I believe 
that preserving the form of Dionysius’ cryptic enunciations (adjective and noun here: 
«θεῖος ἔρως», as Luibheid-Rorem do) is more efficient.  So, in this case does 
Dionysius mean God (the divine eros par excellence) or the cosmos? Both as we shall 
see, and as is indicated from the preceding and following passages, are at stake, but 
because the source is God I would like to emphasize this aspect.  (Hence “love of 
God” might have been better than “love for God”, where the genitive “of God” can be 
either objective or subjective).  See also Osborne [1994],pp.28ff., who discerns a third 
interpretive possibility, too. 
79 DN,4.13,158,19-160,3/712A.  Cf. also the parallel references given ad loc. in nn.156 
and 160 by Luibheid-Rorem,pp.82-83. 
80 On this important notion see the old study of Völker [1958], who despite the old 
trend emphasizes Dionysius’ antecedents in previous Patristic literature, e.g. Gregory 
of Nyssa.  Yannaras, presumably following Lossky [1974],p.120, connects the 
Dionysian ecstasy with Heidegger’s etymology of existence as “Ek-sistenz”.  (Cf. 
Yannaras [2005],pp.106-107, speaking in p.106 of the “ecstatic existence of God”; cf. 
also ibid.,p.131,n.16 and n.18, where the reference to Heidegger’s relevant work.) 
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about “divine eros”.  Owing to the context, even if he does not mean 
exclusively God, we have already seen that the paradigm of divine eros 
is the divinity itself.81  We casted this archetype as providential love 
before, but the harmony of the universe shows the reality of both 
ascending/reversive and descending/providential love.  Hence, 
«ἔκστασις»82 acquires the role of unifying these two concepts.  How 
does it do this? 
Dionysius goes on to substantiate his claim first by giving a salient 
example from the created realm (‘upwards ecstasy’).  This is Paul, who 
wrote that “it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me”.83  
                                                          
81 See/exploit also the use of «θεῖος ἔρως» in DN,4.10,155,16-17/708B. 
82 Dionysius’ treatment of ἔκστασις gives solid Patristic background to fr 
Loudovikos’ criticism of Yannaras and Zizioulas regarding the connection of nature 
with necessity.  It is a different thing to say that a nature or a being is ecstatic (as 
Dionysius does in our passage), and different to speak of a being’s “ecstasy from (or 
‘for’ its) nature” as these two important contemporary personalist thinkers seem to 
do.  See Loudovikos [2011],passim, e.g. p.686, who centers his discussion around 
Maximus the Confessor and shows the latter’s relevance to contemporary 
anthropological problems; for the ongoing debate see Loudovikos [2013].  Finally, as 
an example of Dionysius’ having no problem with (a being’s) nature see 
DN,4.26,173,14-15/728C.   
83 Galatians,2:20, cited in DN,4.13,159,5-6/712A: «”Ζῶ ἐγώ”, φησίν, “οὐκ ἔτι, ζῇ δὲ ἐν 
ἐμοὶ Χριστός”.»  See the whole passage ibid.,159,3-8/712A.  For a parallel instance of 
ecstasy, that of Hierotheus, see ibid.,3.2,141,11-12/681D, and for an admonition to do 
so via apophaticism see ibid.,7.1,194,12-15/865D-868/A.  Ibid.,7.4,199,13-16/872D-873A 
is an interesting passage in which the first instance of «ἐξεστηκώς» (perfect participle 
of «ἐξίσταμαι») has a negative sense, while the second instance in the next line has 
the positive meaning, as it happens with the words «μανία-μαινόμενος» in Proclus, 
on Alc. (see supra, n.186 in ch.2.1.5.), taking its lead from the famous classifications of 
the Phaedrus.  (Incidentally, «μαινόμενος» in the negative sense appears in the last 
line of the Dionysian passage referred to.)  Finally, while the ecstasy of MT,142,9-
11/997B-1000A and DN,13.3,230,1-3/981B has the positive sense, it is indirectly 
connected with God-directedness, and directly related to ecstasy from those that put 
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Then Dionysius comes to the Uncreated love (‘downwards ecstasy’), 
which “is also carried outside of himself in the providential care he has 
for everything.  He is, as it were, beguiled by goodness, by love, and by 
eros and is enticed away from his transcendent dwelling place and 
comes to abide within all things, and he does so by virtue of his 
supernatural and ecstatic capacity to remain, nevertheless, within 
himself”.84  In both cases there is an interchangeability between lover 
and beloved.  As soon as the loving “ecstasy” takes place the roles 
cannot be distinguished anymore.85  One of the originalities of 
Dionysius here is that, to my knowledge, nowhere does downwards 
ecstasy feature in Plotinus or even in Proclus.86  Hence, when 
connecting the archetype of ‘providential love’ with ecstasy, whereas 
the traditional Neoplatonic motive saw ecstasy as ascending,87 
Dionysius must not have been interested in the direction of love or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
obstacles to the being’s relationship and union with God.  In any case, Rist 
[1999],pp.385-386 argues against Rorem that this instance, too, should be connected 
with eros, despite the absence of the word in MT. 
84 DN,4.13,159,10-14/712A-B: «…δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἐρωτικῆς ἀγαθότητος ἔξω 
ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται ταῖς εἰς τὰ ὄντα πάντα προνοίαις καὶ οἷον ἀγαθότητι καὶ 
ἀγαπήσει καὶ ἔρωτι θέλγεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπὲρ πάντα καὶ πάντων ἐξῃρημένου 
πρὸς τὸ ἐν πᾶσι κατάγεται κατ’ ἐκστατικὴν ὑπερούσιον δύναμιν ἀνεκφοίτητον 
ἑαυτοῦ.» 
85 This is my qualification to the informative n.266 of Luibheid-Rorem,p.130. 
86 Cf. also Rist [1966],p.239-240, Louth [1989],p.95, Aertsen [2009],p.196 and Esposito 
Buckley [1992],pp.39 and 56.  As I indicated before (in ch.3.1.1.), the reason for this 
should be traced in the Trinity. 
87 See e.g. Plotinus, Enn.,VI.9.11,22-25, esp.l.23.  For this reason Aquinas seems to be 
missing the point once again, since he holds that ecstasy cannot be really ascribed to 
God except by metaphor; cf. McGinn [1996],pp.206 and 209. 
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ecstasy,88 but just in the love and union with another, whether inferior 
or superior in Neoplatonic/Dionysian terms.89  In other words, 
Dionysian providential love becomes the paradigm of ecstasy which 
does not have determinate (upwards or downwards) direction.  As 
soon as there is something other, love forces us to unite with it,90 hence 
the exhaustive possibilities that Dionysius gives above: 
providential/descending, reversive/ascending and love between 
entities of the same rank.91  It is in this sense that Heraclitus’ dictum 
acquires a new relevance with Dionysius: “The way up and the way 
down are one and the same”.92   
If someone pressed us to explain reversive love the ultimate 
answer would be that it is rooted in the beings’ natural response to the 
loving and ecstatic call that God has already proposed to them.93  In 
                                                          
88 This is not exactly what Wear-Dillon [2007] say in pp.122-123, but compare 
ibid.,pp.128-129.  It is strange that, given the aims of their book, in these contexts of 
loving ecstasy Wear-Dillon contrast Dionysius only to Plotinus without mentioning 
Proclus. 
89 Contrast Perl [2007],pp.45-46. 
90 This is consonant with what Osborne [1994], esp. pp.77-79 and 80 says about love 
being itself a motivation with reference to Gregory of Nyssa and Origen; cf. also 
ibid.,p.219. 
91 This is a possibility that we do not find formulated in Neoplatonic texts we have 
approached so far.  Rist [1966],p.241 connects it primarily with the love between the 
persons of the Trinity and derivatively with the love for one’s neighbours. 
92 Heraclitus, B60 DK: «ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή.» 
93 Cf. 1 John 4:19: «Ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν αὐτόν [i.e. God], ὅτι αὐτὸς πρῶτος ἠγάπησεν 
ἡμᾶς.»  In Photius, Fragmenta in epistulam ad Romanos (in catenis),493,34 (in Staab 
[1933]; cf. also Ζωγραφίδης [2009],p.19a) the formula has become: «ὅτι αὐτὸς ἡμῶν 
ἠράσθη πρῶτος.». Cf. an analogous scheme about knowledge in Paul’s Galatians 4:9.  
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other words, in a paradoxical way the archetype of reversive love is 
again the providential one.94  But we should not forget that it is this 
reversive love, i.e. participation in God95 as far as possible, that imbues 
an entity with divine love, with the subsequent harmonious result of 
the entity’s ecstatic love in every possible direction,96 both in the 
vertical axis, i.e. upwards (not only to God, but to the neighbouring 
entities, too) as well as downwards, and in a horizontal fashion.97   
Exactly due to this Heraclitean annihilation of the importance of 
direction, and to the gratification of a reader of Aristotle’s Physics,VIII, 
Dionysius will pass beyond the linear representation of downwards 
and upwards eros to speak of a cycle.  This move might not be 
surprising against the Neoplatonic background,98 but it is not explicitly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
For Maximus’ elaborations on the Dionysian theme of love as ecstasy see Loudovikos 
[2010],pp.172-177. 
94 Thus, it is in this not quite Neoplatonic sense that we should understand the 
Neoplatonic similarity-principle expressed in the following enunciation of 
DN,9.6,211,18-19/913C: «Καὶ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς θείας ὁμοιότητος δύναμις ἡ τὰ 
παραγόμενα πάντα πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον ἐπιστρέφουσα.» (“It is the power of the divine 
similarity which returns everything toward the cause.”) 
95 More accurately in God’s providential activities (which are uncreated according to 
Palamas). 
96 See also Ράμφος [1999],p.159, who stresses the freedom of man’s loving response to 
the divine call.  Cf. ibid.,pp.160 and 167.  (This erudite work belongs to Ράμφος’ 
previous, “Neo-orthodox” phase of his writing career.)  Cf. also Manos [1995],p.58. 
97 Cf. also Μάνος [2006],p.67. 
98 See e.g. Perl [2007],pp.35, 37-40; cf. also ibid.,pp.41, 47-48 and 112.  Especially with 
respect to Proclus see Vogel [1963],p.28 with n.1 and Gersh [1973],pp.124-125 and 127 
(responding in a slightly oversimplified manner to Nygren).  Cf. also Florovsky 
[1987],pp.214-215 (although he refers to other characteristics of the image of the circle, 
too). 
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stated with regard to love in Plotinus or Proclus either.  Dionysius 
makes this move in ch.4.14, which, as I have already noted (in ch.3.1.1.), 
is a quite dense and obscure chapter.  The specific problem it tries to 
address is why “theologians sometimes refer to God as Eros and Love99 
and sometimes as the object of love and the Beloved”.100  After my 
exposition the answer is easy: in so far as God is ecstatic, i.e. an efficient 
cause, He is called Love, whereas qua final cause,101 i.e. the ultimate 
aim of the creation’s ecstasy He is called the Beloved.  In order to see 
however how he introduces the idea of the cycle, I will turn to the 
much briefer ch.4.17, which is supposed to be the last quotation from 
Hierotheus:102 
“Come, let us gather all these [sc. instances of eros: on God’s 
and on cosmos’ behalf]103 once more together into a unity and 
let us say that there is a simple self-moving power directing 
all things to mingle as one,  that it starts out from the Good, 
reaches down to the lowliest of the beings, returns 
(ἀνακυκλοῦσα) then in due order through all the stages 
back to the Good, and thus turns (ἀνελιττομένη) from itself 
                                                          
99 As with my n.63 (in ch.3.1.1.) on Dionysius’ term «μετοχή» instead of 
«μετεχόμενον», so too here Dionysius avoids the active participle «ἐρῶν» and 
«ἀγαπῶν» for the respective nouns «ἔρως» and «ἀγάπη». 
100 DN,4.14,160,1-2/712C.  Remember and compare the Symposium’s Socrates who 
transformed his beloveds into his lovers. 
101 Cf. also Niarchos [1995],p.107. 
102 It is an irony that Dionysius’ work serves as the unfolding of Hierotheus’ 
condensed teaching.  Cf. DN,3.2,140,6-16, esp.ll.6-10. 
103 See ibid.,§§4:15 and 16. 
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and through itself and upon itself and towards itself in an 
everlasting circle.”104 
Dionysius here speaks of the existence of a single erotic force in 
universe that goes forth and comes back eternally.  It is true that there 
is a pantheistic, not to say Hegelian, flavour in the passage.105  Still, 
apart from the dangers lurking in anachronistic readings, there are 
Dionysian passages which extol the gap between the ineffable first 
cause and its effects106 and thus can acquit Dionysius from 
pantheism.107  Hence, if the passage is seen under the light of our 
present discussion, what the Areopagite wants to make clear is the 
universality of eros as a single force that moves the universe into 
communion with its originator and Father.  In this circular scheme108 as 
                                                          
104 DN,4.17,162,1-5/713D.  [‘Circle’ in the translation is derived from the context.] 
105 Still, modern jargon speaks of the distinct notion of “panentheism”, various sorts 
of which are detected in the Neoplatonic and the Christian structures of reality.  See 
Culp [2013] and the contributions in Clayton-Peacocke [2004], which include 
Orthodox Christian perspectives on the issue, too. 
106 See e.g. the discussion in DN,11.6, esp.223,4-14/956A-B. 
107 For further bibliography on the question see Rorem [1993],p.177,n.11.  Cf. also Perl 
[2007],p.33. 
108 Movement/motion should not be conceived rigidly and exclusively as locomotion, 
as with the Peripatetic tradition (cf. e.g. EE,II.6.5,1222b29).  Dionysius examines the 
kinds of motion that pertain to divine minds (i.e. angels) in DN,4.8,153,4-9/704D-
705A.  The threefold (dialectical) scheme here is circular motion, straight and finally 
spiral.  The three stages should be conceived as working not successively, but 
contemporaneously at different levels.  The case of soul is examined in the next 
chapter, ibid.,4.9,153,10-154,6/705A-B.  Here, whereas circular motion is the starting 
point, the two next stages are inverted: first comes spiral and in the end straight 
motion.  The consecutive ch.ibid.,4.10 speaks of God as the goal and enabler of all 
these motions, while He is “beyond every rest and motion” (ibid.,4,10,154,9-10/705C).  
Still, beside this Platonic or Aristotelian picture of the ineffable First Principle, God 
also comes into communion with creation, hence in ibid.,9.9,213,15-20/916C-D 
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soon as love is downwards, i.e. it is directed towards the creation (God 
as Lover/Love), it is already coming back to God and forms the loving 
response of the creation in the natural course of God’s loving 
providence (God as Beloved).109  The ideal of love as union (but not 
confusion) pushes Dionysius to go beyond the already mentioned 
identification of the «κατ’αἰτίαν» and «καθ’ὕπαρξιν» modes of 
existence, and to propose the ultimate kinship of the first two modes 
with the «κατά μετοχήν» one.  If this claim be put in the non-
pantheistic framework set out before, the result is that as with Proclus 
and Plotinus eros acquires an omnipresence in Dionysius’ system.  Yet, 
whereas in Proclus I was austere in the designations of causal, 
existential and participatory levels of love’s existence, now eros is 
always construed in the way Proclus describes as existential.  For 
example, we saw that Dionysius is ready to ascribe Eros to the First 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Dionysius returns to complete and specify the topic.  Now, circular motion is put at 
the end stage which is preceded by the straight and the spiral motion.  NB that the 
final and the starting point in a cycle are the same.  More specifically, straight motion 
refers to God’s generation of the cosmos, whereas spiral motion to the cosmos’ 
providential sustainment by God.  Finally, “the circular movement has to do with his 
sameness, to the grip he has on the middle range as well as on the outer edges of 
order, so that all things are one and all things that have gone forth from him may 
return to him once again.” (: Ibid.,9.9,213,18-20/916D.)  In other words, circular 
movement here refers to Eros, as treated in my main text.  (Wear-Dillon [2007],p.30 
examine the Neoplatonic antecedents of the above-mentioned types of motion.  See 
also ibid.,pp.55-56.) 
109 Hence, one can claim that although the cycle implies a unique force, the hierarchy 
is not affected; the earth for instance has a North and a South Pole.  However, this 
thought forgets the presence of Christ who is both God and man, while the North 
Pole will never meet the South… More on this infra (in ch.3.2.), but see also the 
compelling account of Louth [1989],p.108, without invoking, at least explicitly, Christ 
at this point. 
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principle, while Proclus avoided it.  What is more, in the end Dionysius 
went on almost to identify God’s eros for the creation with creation’s 
eros for God, i.e. the ‘existential’ and ‘participatory’ mode of eros, 
while in the Platonic Successor the participatory level falls short of the 
existential one. 
Before I end I need to add a last note as a counterpoint to the 
identification of beauty with goodness and of providence with 
(descending) love in the previous section.  Our examination so far 
shows that if we want to abstract creation’s ascending response to God 
from the universal erotic scheme, desire and (reversive) love are 
identified.  In Proclus we had seen that eros is related to beauty, 
whereas desire is attached to the Good.  It is very reasonable that since 
in Dionysius Good and Beauty are the same, then desire and 
(reversive) love are identified because they have the same intentional 
object.110  Moreover, we have seen that although descending and 
ascending the name Eros/Love was unique.  Dionysius’ extraordinary 
image of eros as a unique circular force gives the non-Neoplatonic 
possibility to identify providence with desire, or at least see both of 
them as aspects of exactly the same movement: Eros. 
To conclude, let me give a brief overview of what we achieved in 
this section.  My main focus was the «κατὰ μετοχήν»/’participatory’ 
mode of love’s existence.  I began addressing the problem of how to 
                                                          
110 Cf. e.g. DN,4.10,155,8/708A: «Πᾶσιν οὖν ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐφετὸν καὶ 
ἐραστὸν καὶ ἀγαπητόν,…». 
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account for creation’s reversive love given the divine paradigm of 
providential love.  The solution involved referring to the notion of 
«ἔκστασις», main characteristic of which is a lack of interest as to 
whether the direction is upwards or downwards.  If for Neoplatonism 
there is a strong connection between being, love and ecstasy, especially 
for Dionysius to be is to love, i.e. being ecstatic in whatever direction.  
Consequently, although at the ‘causal’ and ‘existential’ level divine 
love acts as providential, at the level of participation eros expresses 
itself both as providential and reversive because both of these are 
possible instances of έκστασις within the hierarchy of beings.  The lack 
of dissection or dichotomy with respect to Eros’ function led us to the 
idea of a single circular erotic force in the universe expressed in ch.4.14 
and synoptically put in ch.4.17, which forms a testimony to the 
unifying effects of love that can bridge the gap between the 
transcendent God and its progeny.  A final result of this treatment is 
that eros acquires an omnipresence in Dionysius’ universe.  Although 
we had met this idea in other Neoplatonists too, in Dionysius it 
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3.2. The Christianization of Eros? 
In my treatment of ecstasy I left out that Dionysius concludes that 
section by calling God «ζηλωτής» (zealous),111 i.e. a manic lover, of His 
beloved cosmos.  We have seen that this manic love is expressed within 
the unending erotic dialogue of this pair of lovers.  But what is its 
ultimate expression?  The short answer is Christ’s incarnation: the 
Uncreated God not only created the cosmos, but finally assumed in 
Himself the created nature of His beloved.  Thus, in this last section I 
will examine some consequences of Dionysius’ teaching on love, and 
especially how the person of Christ relates to Dionysius’ erotic 
theory.112  In this context I will also attempt a comparison with Proclus’ 
counterpoint to Christ, the Platonic Socrates.  Again we will see that 
despite the similarities there are cardinal differences, particularly with 
regards to the meaning of “undefiled providence”. 
The status of Dionysian Christology is much as with his Trinitarian 
theology: it exists, but it is not developed.113  Moreover, explicit 
                                                          
111 Not envious («φθονερός») of course.  See ibid.,4.13,159,14-18/712B.  For the 
scriptural basis see e.g. Exodus,20:5 and 30:14 with further references in the upper 
apparatus of Suchla [1990],ad loc.  
112 Hence my disagreement with Perl’s [2007] methodology enunciated in p.2. 
113 The most extensive and enlightening Dionysian reference to Christ in DN forms 
another supposed quotation from Dionysius’ «καθηγεμών», Hierotheus’ Θεολογικαὶ 
Στοιχειώσεις (a title suspiciously similar with Proclus’ Elements), and figures as 
ch.§2.10.  In its first part Hierotheus/Dionysius exclaim Christ’s divinity 
(DN,134,7-135,1/648C-648D), while incarnation and the paradoxical conjunction of 
full divinity and full humanity are extolled in the second part (ibid.,135,2-
9/648D-649A).  See also Hainthaler [1997] and cf. Louth [2008a],p.582,n.7, p.580, 
Armstrong [1982],n.20 in p.292 (with some reservations in p.221) and Esposito 
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reference to Christ is absent from Dionysius’ section on Eros.  Fr 
Meyendorff writes that “[u]ndoubtedly, Dionysius… mentions the 
name of Jesus Christ and professes his belief in the incarnation, but the 
structure of his system is perfectly independent of his profession of 
faith.”114  While I believe that here Meyendorff is right and we had 
better look at other Fathers, like Maximus the Confessor,115 if we 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Buckley [1992],pp.58-59.  Hence, I agree with Riggs [2009],p.76 (see also ibid.,pp.77 
and 96) and Stang [2012],p.14 (with n.7) in not assuming that Dionysius was a 
monophysite, as Wear-Dillon [2007],pp.4-6, 49-50, 131 and 133, do.  (Cf. also Pelikan’s 
thesis in the introduction to Luibheid-Rorem [1987],pp.13-17).  Regarding the 
«θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια» of Ep.,4.(1),19/1072C, which has been taken to suggest 
“monenergism” (cf. e.g. Pelikan in op.cit.,pp.19-21 and Wear-Dillon, pp.5-6 and 133), 
although Maximus the Confessor, the champion of Christ’s double activity and will, 
did not do so, (cf. the commentators’ perplexity noted by Rorem [1993],pp.9-11),  
Louth [1989],p.14 speaks of Dionysius’ “Cyrilline way of speaking of the 
incarnation”.   
114 Meyendorff [1969],p.81; cf. citation by Pelikan in the introduction to Berthold 
[1985],p.7 (and n.28 in p.13).  Cf. also Florovsky [1987],p.225, (but contrast ibid.,p.226).  
So, for instance, when in the penultimate chapter (IV) of the MT Dionysius stresses 
that the ineffable God transcends every perceptual category, we might wonder why 
he does not allude to Christ.  Apart from the specific aims of the treatise, a response 
might be that he is thinking in terms of Christ’s resurrected («καινόν») body, and this 
might underlie Maximus’ thought infra, in n.137.  On the other hand, Dionysius’ 
scholiast (see next n.115) does not allude to Christ either (in 197C, PG, vol.4, 
commenting on DN,1.4,114,6), although Christ is in the context few lines below 
(ibid.,114,7-11, esp. l.8)!   
115 See e.g. Pelikan in Berthold [1985],p.7: “…Maximus explained the language of 
Dionysius in such a manner that he achieved the Trinitarian and Christocentric 
reorientation of the Dionysian system and thus rehabilitated it.”  Some lines below 
Pelikan speaks of Maximus’ “Trinitarian Christocentrism”.  See also ibid.,p.6.  Despite 
the long tradition reflected in Migne’s PG, and followed even today in some modern 
editions/translations, like Γουνελᾶς [2002], e.g. p.63 and note in p.41, most of the 
Commentary on Dionysius’ works attributed to Maximus the Confessor was in fact 
written by John of Scythopolis.  Cf. e.g. Louth [1993],pp.166-167 with references (in 
nn.1 and 2) to the groundwork of H.U. von Balthasar [1940] as well as the more recent 
study of B.R. Suchla [1980].  For a short intellectual portrait of John of Scythopolis see 
Louth [2008a],pp.575-578. 
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wanted a full-fledged and well-worked out Christology,116 I am more 
optimistic than the Palamite scholar, and hold that Christ’s traces in 
Dionysius’ corpus can help us complete the Dionysian picture of love.   
The particular reason why Christology is relevant for my purposes 
is that in contrast to the discussion of Trinity in Dionysius, which 
although pivotal is not explicitly connected with eros, almost every 
time that the Areopagite refers to Christ, he connects Him with our 
topic by extolling His «φιλανθρωπία»117 (“love for mankind”).118  
Admittedly, love here is denoted by «φιλία» rather than ἔρως (or 
                                                          
116 Λουδοβίκος [2003], esp. the first essay (pp.15-42) as well as passim in the 
“Concluding Summary” (in English,pp.103-114), forms an example of how such a 
Christology can be of an aid to the psychoanalyst. 
117 On the precedents of this word in Plato and Proclus’ Comm. on Alc. see supra, n.83 
in 2.1.3.  For a succinct archaeology of the word in Stoicism, Middle Platonism, 
Clement of Alexandria and Origen see Osborne [1994],pp.171-176, with relevant 
bibliography in n.24 (pp.171-172); see also nn.45 and 48 in pp.177 and 178 
respectively.  For the use in Gregory of Nyssa see Rist [1966],pp.237-238. 
118 See already the first appearance of Christ in DN, where the «φιλάνθρωπον» is 
ascribed to the Trinity “because in one of its persons it accepted a true share 
(ἐκοινώνησεν) of what it is we are, and thereby issued a call to man’s lowly state to 
rise up to it [sc. the Divine Trinity]” (cf. DN,1.4,113,6-9/592A), although some lines 
below, ibid.,1.4,114,3/592B φιλανθρωπία is related primarily to the Scripture (i.e. the 
word of God).  Again, in 2.6,130,9-10/644C Dionysius speaks of the «φιλάνθρωπος 
ὁμοβουλία» (“the identity of will that loves mankind”) of the Trinity in the context of 
making clear that despite this, only the second Person, who has the entirety of 
Godhead though, was incarnated (see ibid.,130,8-9).  See also 
ibid.:2.3,125,21-126,2/640C (implicit about the incarnation) and 2.10,135,2-3/648D 
(explicitly connected with the incarnation and supposedly quoted by Hierotheus), 
with further references in n.56 (on CH,4.4,22,23-25/181B) by Luibheid-Rorem,p.158.  
Finally, as was indicated above there are also instances where φιλανθρωπία is not 
directly related with Christ or the incarnation; see ibid.,6.2,191,16/856D, where 
«ὑπέρβλυσις φιλανθρωπίας» (“overflowing of love for mankind”) is ascribed to the 
Godhead as (the giver of) Life (and perhaps Ep.8.4,15/1093D and 21-22/1096A, too).  
See also Rist [1966],p.238,n.11. 
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ἀγάπη).119  Still, Dionysius is here referring to God’s manic love for 
mankind, which leads to His self-emptiness («κένωσις»)120 and results 
in the incarnation.  If we ask why the incarnation, the paradigm 
instantiation of theophany, should take place, the most succinct 
Patristic answer has been given by Athanasius the Great: ”He became 
man so that we be made God”.121  The Trinitarian God’s providential, 
descending and ecstatic eros leads not only to the unification of the 
cosmos in itself, but implants an indissoluble bond between God and 
creation.  The erotic effects of this unification are so strong that the 
“zealous” God becomes a God-Man.  Hence, it is only with Christ in 
mind (and heart) that one can understand Dionysius’ erotic image of 
the circle.  When the erotic force that has proceeded from God returns 
                                                          
119 Apart from the philosophical preexistence of the word «φιλανθρωπία» noted 
above (n.117), and the rareness of Greek compounds with the word ἀγάπη or ἔρως 
(«παιδεραστία» being an exception), the issue is like with «φιλοσοφία» (used by 
Dionysius e.g. in DN,3.3,142,11/684B): although we do not do this in the case of the 
noun, we describe philosophers as lovers (ἐρασταί) of e.g. truth.  (See the formula 
«ἀληθείας…ἐρασταί» in ibid.,1.5,117,8/593C.)  In general, there are few usages of the 
word «φιλία» in the Divine Names (while it does not appear in the other Areopagitic 
writings; see e.g. DN,4.21,169,7-11/724A, ibid.,4.19,164,13-14/717A, and in conjunction 
with harmony ibid.,4.7,152,20), as also in Plotinus (see some instances supra, in n.316 
of ch.2.2.5.).  Consequently, I do not refer further to it, as I did in Proclus’ case.  
Finally, in the end of DN Dionysius asks Timothy’s benevolence, because the former 
is «φίλος ἀνήρ» of the latter (cf. DN,13.4,230,22/984A) and hopes that his work is «τῷ 
θεῷ φίλον» (“dear to God”; cf. ibid.,13.4,231,6/984A.  It is also in the end of the 
Phaedrus,279c6-7 that a Pythagorean maxim about friends is mentioned). 
120 There is a sole reference to “self-emptiness” («κενώσεως»: DN,2.10,135,6/649A; cf. 
Paul, Phil.2:7,) in the whole Dionysian corpus.  For the importance of kenosis in 
orthodox Christian theology, spiritual life and asceticism see Sakharov 
[2002],pp.93-116. 
121 Cf. Athanasius of Alexandria, De incarnatione verbi, 54.3.1-2(Kannengiesser): 
«Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν·».  Cf. a close Dionysian 
remark in the initial chapters of DN:1.4,113,6-9. 
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from the level of creation, it bears the seal of both the divine and the 
created.  Thus, the best exemplification of this return is Christ, who is 
literally both divine and a created human being.  This completes 
Dionysius’ picture of the erotic cycle and ultimately acquits him from 
any pantheistic accusations.  Moreover, it explains and anticipates 
Maximus’ view that the end of God’s overflowing creation is the 
person of Jesus.122  Finally, Christ’s manic φιλανθρωπία should not be 
conceived as an exclusive love for man as opposed to the cosmos, but 
as the consummation of God’s love for His total creation, because the 
microcosm of human being encompasses in itself both the spiritual (e.g. 
angelic) and the material (e.g. soulless) creation.123   
And now I come to the obvious question: if Christ is so important 
in completing and verifying the Dionysian erotic doctrine, why does 
Dionysius avoid mentioning Him in the section on Eros?  He seems to 
be absent both from the passage of ecstatic “jealousy” (in DN,§4.13), as 
well as from the picture of the circle (§§4:14 and 17), despite the fact 
that in the latter case I was able to discover indirect references to the 
                                                          
122 See Maximus the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, 60, esp. ll.33-40 and 51-55 
(Laga and Steel-vol.2; see English translation in Blowers-Wilken [2003],pp.123-129, 
esp. pp.124 and 125).  See also Βλέτσης [1994],pp.237-249, esp. pp.243-245.  This is an 
optimistic view quite different from the one presupposed and envisaged by Osborne 
[1994],pp.196-199, although elsewhere (ibid.,pp.25-26) she seems to be coming close to 
Maximian eschatological perspectives. 
123 This is again the line of thought taken by Maximus the Confessor (contra Osborne 
[1994],p.197); cf. Louth [2004],p.192, who gives a helpful diagram.  Hence, because 
man is the coronation of demiurgy, the possibility of “transfiguration” is granted to 
the entire cosmos. 
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Trinity.  The short answer is that both Trinity124 and Christ’s 
«εἰρηνόχυτος φιλανθρωπία»125 are present in the climax of the 
chapters on God as “Peace”,126 which I have characterized as an 
enlightening and necessary complement to the section on Eros.  Of 
course, there too we do not find an elaboration on the significance of 
Christ, but only a brief mention.   
There are two ways to answer this problem.  On the one hand, if 
we follow the line of Σιάσος mentioned with reference to Trinitarian 
theology, then we would expect that these associations were 
mentioned in another a perhaps lost or fictitious Dionysian work, the 
Theological Representations.127  On the other hand, we can work again on 
the basis of implicit hints in Dionysius’ extant work and employ what I 
will call ‘erotic hermeneutics’.  It might not be an accident that the two 
sole instances of Dionysius’ quoting his teacher Hierotheus in the DN 
are on love and Christ.128  In the case of love, Hierotheus’ chapters form 
                                                          
124 If we accept Suchla’s, not Migne/Corderius’ text ad loc. 
125 “Loving-kindness of Christ, bathed as it is in peace”. 
126 See DN,11.5,221,8-10 and 5 respectively.  This is consistent with Rist [1966],p.243, 
although he proposes that in the section of Eros in DN Dionysius is interested in 
“cosmic theology” (ibid.,p.237, said for the corpus in general), and hence in “cosmic 
Eros” (ibid.,p.236).  I am not sure what the distinction he implies is.  Armstrong 
[1982],p.221 writes with regard to Dionysius that the theophany of creation out of 
love as well as the (redemptive) return “are cosmic and universal, not strictly tied to a 
particular human person or historic event”.  That is, he proposes that creation could 
be conceived as “cosmic incarnation” (ibid.,p.222), and in this respect he must be 
deviating from Rist’s understanding. 
127 Incarnation falls under the differentiated names of differentiated theology (b-ii); 
see supra in ch.3.1.1. 
128 See §4.15-17 and §2.10 respectively. 
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a synopsis of Dionysius’ teaching, whose explicit target is to explicate 
and develop the succinct statements of his teacher’s theology,129 while, 
as I have noted, Christology is only touched in passing.  Still, apart 
from the Areopagite’s relation to his teacher’s writings, in the very end 
of Divine Names130 Dionysius himself notes the human restrictions and 
difficulties of his enterprise, and invites the recipient of the work, i.e. 
Timothy or us, to take a critical stance,131 and by loving God and trying 
to imitate His philanthropy132 he urges us to attempt to correct or 
develop his theology, as he did with the teaching of his own divine 
teacher.  If so, then the two key themes of love and Christ, must be first 
in the list of subjects calling for further exploration.  Since, while brief, 
they already form the supposed Dionysian interpretation of 
Hierotheus, the reader ought to understand that these are two key 
themes in need of further analysis and interconnection by us, even if 
love figures as just one name among others.  To this end we might also 
note that the last of Dionysius’ Epistles,133 as if the last words of his 
                                                          
129 See ibid.,§3.2, esp.140,6-10/681B. 
130 See the methodological chapter ibid.,13.4, esp.230,11-22/981C-981D. 
131 In this respect Dionysius might come close to Plato’s attitude toward his readers.  
As for ‘cryptic enunciations’ in need of further clarification, these are in abundance in 
both writers.  Let us not forget that if ps-Dionysius is hidden, philosophically and 
literarily speaking Plato is also absent from his dialogues… 
132 A quite independent instance is ibid.,13.4,230,18/981D, where «φιλανθρωπία» is 
attributed to Timothy (‘the one who honours God’), to whom the Divine Names is 
addressed to (see e.g. the title of the work, ibid.,107,1/985A with the caveat indicated 
by n.2 in Luibheid-Rorem,p.49), with view to Timothy’s reception of Dionysius’ 
treatise. 
133 See Ep.10,1117Aff. 
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corpus, is addressed to John, who was the best friend and a disciple of 
Jesus Christ,134 and/because he is deemed the Evangelist of Love.135 
These features hint at the centrality of Christ in Dionysius’ erotic 
universe, and invite us to connect ecstasy with Christ’s kenosis-
incarnation, seeing the latter as species and perfection of the former,136 
even if Dionysius does not explicitly do so.  This is precisely what we 
find in interpretations of the text by later Fathers.  Authors like 
Maximus and Palamas137 do not impose a “Christological corrective” 
on Dionysius, but rather develop insights implicitly present in his 
writing.138  To sum up, whether we read Dionysius via the later 
tradition or we take Σιάσος’ way, Dionysius’ extant exclamation(s) of 
                                                          
134 Cf. ibid.,§1.2-3/1117A. See also ibid.,l.23. 
135 Hence, I give another perspective to the one noted by Rorem (in Luibheid-
Rorem,n.152,p.288) or Wear-Dillon [2007],p.10.  What is more, the theme of Love that 
John’s presence brings, along with the affirmed belief in God which supports 
Dionysius’ hope that John will be released and return from his exile (see Ep.10,25-
28/1120A), bring to mind the cardinal stages (or the Pauline triad: faith, hope, love) of 
the “Hymn of Love” (see 1 Corinthians 13: esp.13), written by another beloved 
theologian of Dionysius, Paul (see e.g. DN,3.2,140,3-4/681B.  Paul is central to Stang’s 
understanding of Dionysius; see Stang [2012],e.g. p.3).  
136 Due to her contemporary theological agenda, which is selective in that she 
challenges Process Theology and J. Moltmann, my suggestion is denied by Osborne 
[1994],pp.198 and 195; cf. also pp.186-189.  In the (Einsteinian) jargon of Rist 
[1999],p.378 erotic ecstasy manifested in the creation corresponds to the “General 
Theory of Divinity”, whereas incarnation belongs to the “Special Theory of Divinity”.  
Cf. also ibid.,p.380 (and pp.383-384). 
137 See also Louth [2008b],pp.590-593 and 595-598 respectively.  For instance, Louth 
emphasizes Maximus’ usage of Dionysian apophatic and kataphatic theology with 
specific regard to Christ (ibid.,pp.590-591), and mentions Palamas’ concern with the 
issue of angelic mediation, since after the Incarnation man does not necessarily need 
intermediaries in his communion with God (see ibid.,p.597). 
138 With Louth in ibid.,p.591 pace Meyendorff (cf. also ibid.,p.590 and n.14 in p.598). 
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Christ’s ‘self-emptying’ φιλανθρωπία provide, for the systematic 
reasons I explained before, the ultimate proof of and the most adequate 
explanation for understanding why Dionysius concludes his treatment 
of erotic ‘ecstasy’ by calling God «ζηλωτής», i.e. a manic lover of His 
«καλὴ λίαν»139 creation.140   
I come now to a final comparison between Dionysius and Proclus.  
The topic in question is the juxtaposition between undefiled 
providence and incarnation.  One of my central points of reference 
while treating Proclus’ erotic doctrines was Socrates, whose presence is 
frequent in Proclus (although not in Plotinus).  I stated that Socrates’ 
loving relations helped us to grasp the intelligible divine relations, and 
that ultimately Socrates was an expression, albeit an attenuated one, of 
the divine in our world.  Dionysius’ Christian counterpoint to Socrates 
is Christ.  As we just saw, Christ not only helps us to understand what 
divine eros is, but is its best exemplification.  Hence, the cardinal 
difference between the two figures is that Christ is not just a micro-
expression of the divine in our world, but actually God Himself.141   
                                                          
139 Cf. Gen.1:31, which is used in CH,2.3,13,23/141C. 
140 So, if as I said the creation is explained on the grounds of God as Trinity, then also 
kenosis and incarnation should be explained on this basis.  It cannot be an accident 
that in the strictly monotheistic religion of Islam God is not and cannot be incarnate, 
(Christ is just a prophet before Mohamed), hence the absence of divine 
representations in religious painting, too.  The root of iconoclasm in Byzantium 
should be traced back to this non-Christian Eastern attitude.   
141 Christ is perfect God and perfect Man.  This is extolled by Dionysius, supposedly 
quoting Hierotheus, in e.g. DN,2.10,135,2-9/648D-649A.   
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Thus, on a first reading Dionysius differs completely from Proclus 
in this respect.  The incarnate Christ is a clear anomaly not only for the 
Neoplatonic system of Proclus, but for the whole of ancient Greek 
philosophy.142  Furthermore, even if Socrates was said to provide for 
other souls, as well as for his own body, the Neoplatonic ideal was that 
of “undefiled providence”, where the divine principle exercises 
providence without any intermingling with or embodiment in the 
recipient of providence.143  Socrates formed a marginal case, where in 
order to exercise providence he had to descend to the earthly realm,144 
while the ‘undefiled’ part of his care meant e.g. abstinence from sexual 
relations.  By contrast, the quintessence of Christ’s philanthropy, i.e. the 
loving providence of the Uncreated First Principle, is that He 
descended to created mankind, “so that we may be made God”, in the 
abovementioned famous words of Athanasius.145  Christian God’s 
loving ecstasy or kenosis means ‘intermingling’ with the beloved.146   
Yet Dionysius’ language is very close to Proclus’.  First of all, 
without reference to Incarnation Dionysius uses the Proclean 
vocabulary of divine transcendence and undefiled providence.  I 
                                                          
142 Especially when the death on the cross has been characterized as «Ἰουδαίοις μὲν 
σκάνδαλον, Ἕλλησι δὲ μωρία» (1 Corinthians 1:23). 
143 Cf. El.Th.,122,2-3 and 13-16 and see supra, ch.2.1.5. 
144 In a work in progress I connect Socrates’ care with the philosopher-king’s 
providential descent to the Republic’s cave and I explain their relative inferiority to the 
providence exercised by higher Neoplatonic deities. 
145 Since Adam failed to become Christ (i.e. χριστός: nominated, dubbed) by grace, 
the New Adam became man by nature.   
146 Hence there is no ‘disinterested affection’ anymore (in the sense I gave in ch.2.1.5.). 
CHAPTER 3:  PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND THE DIVINE NAMES 
250 
choose the following example taken from outside the section on love, 
because it connects the two themes: “The divinity is described as 
omnipotent because he has power over all, and is in control147 of the 
world in an unmixed way («ἀμιγῶς»); because he is the goal of all 
yearning and because he lays a happy yoke on all who wish it, the 
sweet toil of that holy, omnipotent, and indestructible yearning for his 
goodness.”148  This may seem unremarkable; when trying to capture the 
nature of the First Principle both Neoplatonism and Christianity are 
bound to assert Deity’s super-transcendence.  But even in the case of 
the incarnate First Principle, i.e. Christ, who has taken human flesh, 
Dionysius’ language is similar: “[(The divinity of) Jesus] is the Being 
                                                          
147 I agree with Χατζημιχαήλ [2008],p.539, n.456 in retaining Migne’s text 
(«ἐπάρχουσα») instead of Suchla’s («ἐπαρκοῦσα»). 
148 DN,10.1,215,3-7/937A.  See also the word «ἀνεκφοίτητος» (‘not proceeding from 
[sc. oneself]’: either in adjectival or adverbial form) used about the Deity, while 
accompanying and contrasted with Its πρόνοια, in ibid.,4.13,159,12-14/712B (esp. 
l.14); 2.11,135,16-136,1/649B and 137,5-7/652A; 9.5,210,7-11/912D (l.9) and 13.2,227,6-
7/977C; Ep.9.3,9-25/1109B-D, esp. l.11.  In DN,4.8,153,7-8/(704D)-705A there is specific 
reference to the divine minds, i.e. angels.  Cf. also ibid.,4.4,147,4-8/697C (comparing 
Deity with the Sun).  In ibid.,9.4,209,13/912B God is called «ἀμιγές» (‘unmixed’ or 
“unalloyed” with Luibheid-Rorem ad loc.) Being.  This is used not only with regard 
to God’s relation to the creation (see DN,2.5,129,9-11/644B; cf. ibid.,2.11,136,15-
17/649C), but also when illustrating the unconfused unity of the Persons of the Trinity 
(see ibid.,2.4,127,12/641B; cf. ibid.,127,15-128,1/641C; 2.5,128,9-10/641D).  Further, 
God’s loving effects make also the various elements of the creation be unmixed with 
each other; see e.g. ibid.,11.2,218,18-21/949C, where only the term «ἀσύγχυτος» is 
used to describe the «ἕνωσις» effected by «αὐτοειρήνη», and cf. ibid.,8.7,204,8-
10/896A and 2.4,128,5-6/641C.  Finally, in ibid.,11.2,219,3-5/949C, peace is said to effect 
both the ‘unmixed’ union of the created beings with one another and with the Deity.  
For Proclus’ use of the word see supra in ch.2.1.5. 
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pervading all beings and remains unaffected thereby.149  It is the supra-
being beyond every being…  In all this he remains what he is –
supernatural, transcendent- and he has come to join us in what we are 
without himself undergoing change or confusion”.150  A reader who has 
read Proclus and is unfamiliar with the significance that Church 
Fathers ascribe to Christ could think that Christ performs undefiled 
providence just as Proclean Socrates does.  If so, these passages would 
mean that for Dionysius incarnation is a secondary issue, because what 
primarily counts is God’s divine transcendence above His creation.  On 
this reading, God would not intermingle with the objects of its 
providence.  However, due to the Dionysian resources regarding Christ 
mentioned above, we should not be left thinking that Dionysius 
reproduces Proclus’ ideal of “undefiled providence” adding to this 
mixture Christ.151   
Here we may take note of an ancient comment (presumably by 
John of Scythopolis) on another paradoxical Dionysian enunciation, 
                                                          
149 This is quoted (or rather paraphrased in Greek) by Dodds [1963],p.265 on the 
occasion of prop.122, (although the parallel is not very successful as I intend to show). 
150 DN,2.10,134,12-14/648C and 135,4-5/648D (again from the supposed quotation 
from Hierotheus): «…οὐσία ταῖς ὅλαις οὐσίαις ἀχράντως ἐπιβατεύουσα καὶ 
ὑπερουσίως ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἐξῃρημένη,… κἀν τούτοις ἔχει τὸ ὑπερφυὲς καὶ 
ὑπερούσιον, οὐ μόνον ᾗ ἀναλλοιώτως ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσυγχύτως κεκοινώνηκε».  Cf. also 
Dionysius’ Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (EH),3.III.13,14-20, esp.ll.16-17 (Heil-Ritter)/444C 
(PG). 
151 Rather in a non-polemical way Dionysius reproduces the Proclean language by 
radically resignifying it, (although his suggestion, following Clement of Alexandria, 
might be that the Greeks just distorted the language and/or content of theology).  On 
this attitude see his explicit remarks in Epistle,7, esp.§1,1-3/1077Β and 1,13-2,5/1080A-
Β.  Cf. also his Ep.6.7-8/1077A-B and Louth [1989],p.14. 
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reminiscent of undefiled providence.  In one of the succinct chapters on 
Eros, supposedly by Hierotheus, the author speaks of God as the 
«ἄσχετος αἰτία παντὸς ἔρωτος».152  The paradox, as with Proclus’ 
undefiled providence, is that if eros is a relational term, how can its 
bearer be «ἄσχετος», i.e. non-related with its object of love?  The 
scholiast answers:  «Ἄσχετόν φησι τὸ ἀπόλυτον, οὗ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν 
οὐδεμία σχέσις, ἤτοι οἰκειότης φυσική».153  The absence of 
intermingling between lover and beloved means that the two are 
fundamentally different; not soul and body as in the case of Socrates, 
but Uncreated and Created.154  Hence, Dionysius could retain this 
formula when referring even to Christ, because although he is one 
Hypostasis which is constituted from two natures,155 there is no 
                                                          
152 DN,4.16,161,15/713C: “the unrelated cause of all yearning”.  
153 269B-C (PG, vol.4): “By ἄσχετον he means the absolute, of which [sc. absolute] 
there is no relation with the all, i.e. [there is no] natural affinity [of the absolute with 
the all]”.  (My translation and my additions in brackets); see also the paraphrase of 
Παχυμέρης ad loc., 780Β (PG, vol.3) and cf. Χατζημιχαήλ [2008],p.518,n.240 ad loc.  
On the occasion of God’s «ἄσχετοι μεταδόσεις» in DN,2.5,129,1/644A (cf. also His 
«ἀσχετος περιοχή» in ibid.,9.9,213,13/916C) Χατζημιχαήλ, p.505,n.134 draws again 
attention to John’s (even if he says Maximus’) scholion ad loc. (221A). 
154 In DN,6.2,192,1-5/856D Dionysius states one of his great differences from ancient 
Greek philosophy, i.e. that the promise for immortality refers not only to man’s soul, 
but also to his/her body.   
155 This is the “hypostatic union” enunciated in the Fourth Ecumenical Council 
(Chalcedon, 451AD).  See also from the hymnology of the Church the «Δοξαστικόν» 
(mode plagal of the fourth): «Εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός, διπλοῦς τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν 
ὑπόστασιν».  Whereas communion with body in Neoplatonism implies a degraded 
soul, in Christianity there is no natural alteration of the Uncreated nature of God 
when embracing the Created nature of man’s unity of soul and body. 
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confusion between them.156  Christ’s incarnation is not the same as 
Socrates’ embodiment.  The fact that Christ has received the total 
humanity157 shows why God is a manic lover, while Socrates’ undefiled 
providence denotes his failure when compared with higher demons or 
divinities; were he a higher soul he would not need to be incarnate or 
educate Alcibiades.  The result is that whereas Socrates can elevate his 
body or Alcibiades only up to the divine point he has reached, Christ 
takes the whole man, and hence the whole creation, up to the highest 
level, i.e. in Himself.158 
To recap, in this last section I examined an important consequence 
of Dionysius’ erotic doctrines.  Dionysius’ innovations as well as the 
deepening of the erotic doctrine are particularly evident when 
examining the case of Christ’s manic philanthropy in contrast with the 
                                                          
156 See another hymnographical example from the Γ’ στᾶσις of the «Ἀκάθιστος 
Ὕμνος»: «Ὅλως ἦν ἐν τοῖς κάτω, καὶ τῶν ἄνω οὐδόλως ἀπῆν, ὁ ἀπερίγραπτος 
Λόγος». 
157 From a Stoic or Neoplatonic point of view Christ is not a sage.  Why to mourn for a 
person we love (see Christ’s crying for the dead Lazarus in John 11:35-36) or why to 
feel fear in front of our sacrifice (see Christ’s passionate prayer in Gethsemane apud 
e.g. Mark 14:33-35 and esp. Luke 22:40-44)?  On this issue see the well-balanced 
position of Gavrilyuk [2004], esp. ch.2:pp.47-63, who focuses on early Church Fathers 
such as Cyril of Alexandria.  I am in complete agreement with his verdict (ibid.,p.15) 
that “[i]mpassibility was not baptized without conversion”.  (Hence the way to 
understand also DN,4.21,169,5-6/721D properly, and respond to the concerns of 
Osborne [1994],pp.195 and 197). 
158 A reason for this is that Dionysius’ system is not characterized by the Neoplatonic 
mediations of Proclus’ and even Plotinus’ one.  Still, if per impossibile there were 
such mediations Christ would still come to the lower strata of the cosmos and be 
incarnate.  Besides the Gospel assures that if we want to be among the firsts we 
should go with the last ones.  See e.g. Matthew 20:16 and 26-27; cf. idem 19:30 and 
Perl [2013],p.31.  
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undefiled providence of Proclus’ Socrates.  As I tried to show, although 
the language is similar the very fact that Christ is a full God in contrast 
to Socrates changes radically the Proclean scene.  Furthermore, in my 
general treatment in this section I was forced to employ 
interconnections not observable in the Dionysian surface, especially 
when interconnecting Trinity and Christ’s philanthropy with Eros.  The 
reader might have realized that there are indeed many ways to 
interpret Dionysius, as with Plato.  As the Areopagite himself 
‘develops’ the teachings of his teacher(s), let this be a hint for us, his 
readers to imitate him, and finally let our guide be love…   
255 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis we have passed through stations in the journey of 
eros’ transformations or ‘metamorphoses’ (to recall Apuleius’ novel 
that contains the central myth of Eros and Psyche).  From the Platonic 
theme of deficiency in the Symposium, of which Plotinus makes so 
much, we have arrived at the idea of eros as sacrifice, exactly because 
Dionysius’ God has no need whatsoever. As mediator in this transition 
stands Proclus, the Platonic Successor and Dionysian predecessor.   
Save for Plotinus’ nuanced interpretations and systematic 
exploitations of Platonic themes, as well as Dionysius’ representation of 
the Church Fathers, I regard the chapter I devoted to Proclean eros as 
particularly important, because Proclus has become a bond between 
two traditions.  For this reason, as well as because it explores 
previously untouched material, it was the longest chapter.  Further, I 
dealt with the misguided and rather anachronistic debate regarding 
egoism versus altruism in ancient Greek philosophy, concluding that 
Neoplatonism is indeed other-regarding.  There remains, however, a 
problem concerning the quality of the relation a Neoplatonist may 
develop with the other.   
Trying to pin down what a single name, i.e. love (in its various 
Greek formulations as ἔρως, φιλία or ἀγάπη) means, reflects another 
important dimension of this thesis: the relation between philosophical 
language and content.  Whereas Plotinus obviously uses the mythical 
vocabulary of Plato, the chapter on Proclus has been a good exercise 
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into unearthing philosophical kinship where vocabulary might suggest 
otherwise.  It might not be that Proclus understood better or developed 
Plotinus’ Neoplatonism, but that Proclus helps us understand Plotinus 
(and Plato) better.  On the other hand, the chapter on Dionysius 
considers the dilemma of whether Neoplatonic philosophical language 
is assimilated to Christian belief or vice versa, and opts for the former. 
Still, this thesis was not only concerned with the dialogue between 
Christianity and pagan Hellenism, but also the dialogue that needs to 
be strengthened between West and East.  Dionysius has been a 
cornerstone for both European traditions, both for Aquinas and for 
Palamas, hence in my treatment I have been aided by both Eastern and 
Western interpreters.  If love as well as Dionysius are central to 
Christianity, then love in Dionysius can form a platform for a loving 
dialogue between the traditions of Western Europe and Byzantium. 
Hence the relevance of my discussion to the preoccupations of 
some contemporary thinkers.  For instance, regardless of what people 
think Platonic love is, one might say that the shift from love as 
neediness to sacrificial love is owed to Romanticism (via its conscious 
or unconscious borrowing from Christianity).  Yannaras would deny 
this.  As I indicated in notes (30 and 80) to ch.3, Yannaras (e.g. [2005] 
and [2007]) believes that the absence of God, i.e. nihilism, that 
characterizes modern Western societies and was observed by Nietzsche 
and subsequently by Heidegger, but also Sartre, is in opposition to the 
unknowability of God that we find in Dionysius (and which is rooted 
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in Socratic ignorance we may add).  From the time that Scholastic 
Mediaeval philosophers transformed God into an abstract notion, 
approachable, although in the end ungraspable, through reason, God 
stopped playing any active and erotic role in the life of the society.  On 
the other hand, for Yannaras, who is a student of Lossky, the Eastern 
interpretation of Dionysian apophaticism (starting with Maximus the 
Confessor and extending to Gregory Palamas through John of 
Damascus and Symeon the New Theologian) denies that we can fit 
God into logical and linguistic discourse, although it affirms the 
possibility of having direct experience of God’s presence via the 
participation in His erotic energies.  Thus, Yannaras’ conclusion is that 
by neglecting Palamas’ distinction of uncreated energies and essence the 
West (including modern Greece and Slavonic countries) lost the game, 
and we should rather go back to the Eastern Fathers to resurrect God 
and our society (κοινωνία-sobornost) from the tomb that Nietzsche 
discovered and Dostoyevsky illumined.   
Whatever the diagnosis though may be, as an antidote to this fallen 
state we can turn to what unites all these traditions depicted in the 
present thesis, i.e. that philosophy is a way of life: apart from Plato or 
Socrates, also Plotinus, Proclus and whoever the pseudo-Dionysius is, 
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